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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis examines the nature of political interactions in the context of two critical 
policy issues within Turkish domestic politics: the 2004 negotiations over the Annan Plan in 
Cyprus and process of the 2007 presidential election and analyzes the impact of international 
environment on this process. This thesis predicts that the presence or absence of international 
attention impacted the nature of the domestic political interactions. The existence of 
international actors in the above cases made domestic conflictual political relations more 
moderate and cooperative. The absence of such audience led to more aggressive maneuvers 
and sharper polarizations. It was also found that the level of cooperation and competition of 
the domestic actors changed according to their level of involvement with the international 
community. 
 
The study is based on a comparative-case study implemented by process tracing 
methodology. The main objective of this research thus is to analyze the process of the policy 
and decision making of two politically sensitive cases through coding the domestic actors’ 
political interaction. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
Bu tez siyasi etkileşimlerin doğasını Türkiye iç politikasındaki iki kritik politik konu 
çerçevesinde incelemektedir: 2004 yılında gerçekleşen Kıbrıs Annan Planı müzakereleri ve 
2007 yılındaki cumhurbaşkanlığı süreci, ve uluslararası çevrenin bu süreçlere etkisini analiz 
etmektedir. Bu tez uluslararası ilginin varlığı veya yokluğunun iç politika etkileşimlerin 
doğasını önemli derecede etkilediğini öngörmektedir. Yukarıda sözü edilen çatışmalı iç 
politika olaylarında uluslararası aktörlerin varlığı ilişkileri daha dengeli ve işbirlikçi 
yapmıştır. Ancak, böyle bir varlığın olmaması daha agresif manevralara ve daha keskin 
kutuplaşmalara neden olmuştur. Ayrıca, iç politika aktörlerinin çatışmacı veya işbirlikçi olma 
seviyelerinin, yine bu aktörüleri uluslararası aktörler ile olan ilişkilerinin düzeyine göre 
değiştiği sonucuna varılmıştır. 
 
Bu çalışma karşılaştırmalı vaka analizine dayalıdır ve süreç analizi metodolojisi ile 
yapılmıştır. Bu anlamda, bu araştırmanın ana hedefi iç politikadaki aktörlerin politik 
etkileşimlerini kodlayarak politik anlamda hassas iki olayın politika yapma ve karar alma 
süreçlerini analiz etmektir.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis focuses on the nature of political interactions within Turkish domestic 
politics in relation to two critical policy issues: the 2004 negotiations over the Annan 
Plan in Cyprus and the political interaction in the 2007 presidential election process. I 
will also analyze the impact of international actors on these processes. Both cases 
have been controversially intense topics in recent Turkish domestic politics. Although 
the domestic actors involved in these two cases are almost the same in terms of their 
political positioning and identity, there is a major difference in terms of their political 
patterns. These different patterns were the result of the fact that the conflicts over 
presidential election were more or less an isolated domestic issue without any obvious 
stakes for international actors, whereas in the Cyprus issue the interests and concerns 
of international actors had a significant impact on the interactions between main 
domestic actors. In this sense, the comparison of these cases gives us a good 
opportunity to assess the impact of the involvement of international actors in domestic 
political interactions.  Through these comparative assessments and analyses, I will 
argue that the more international actors can impact on domestic political interactions, 
the more those domestic political interactions tend to be moderate, cooperative, and 
constructive; while in the absence of such international impacts domestic political 
actors tend to be less restrained in pursuing their own interests, decreasing the 
possibility of a sustainable reconciliation. Thus, isolated domestic conflicts tend to be 
more sharply polarized in comparison to those conflicts negotiated in the context of a 
larger international interests and concerns. This analysis is beneficial as it provides 
insights into the interaction between domestic actors and into the nature of the Turkish 
domestic policy-making processes. Let me briefly describe the cases analyzed in this 
study in focus of the study. 
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1.1 Focus of the Study 
 
This part provides an introductory description of the cases: the negotiations over 
the Annan Plan in 2004 and the political interaction in the Presidential Election in 
2007. 
 
 
1.1.1 The Annan Plan Case 
 
Initially the focus will be on the Annan Plan with a historical overview of the 
issue. Although the Cyprus issue has been part of the Turkish political scene for over 
50 years, the space it occupies on the domestic political agenda and the political 
interests it has been associated with have never been fixed and hence the issue is 
subject to constant changes in the larger political context. For example it was used as 
an excuse to expel the non-Muslim minority elements through 50’s and 60’s by the 
state authorities1 and the military establishment, but the same issue was also utilized 
by Bülent Ecevit, a social democratic figure in Turkish politics, to gain support for his 
third-world ‘leftist’ political programme in the 70’s. 2 Therefore it is outside the scope 
of this study to give a fully fledged account of the historical background of the issue.3 
                                                
1 Ayhan Aktar, Valık Vergisi ve “Türkleştirme” Politikaları [Property Tax and 
“Turkification” Policies], (Đstanbul: Đletişim Yayınları, 2004); Dilek Güven, 
Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında 6-7 Eylül 
Olayları[6-7 September Incidents in line with Minority Policies and Strategies of 
Republican Period] (Đstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2005). 
2 Gökçen Kesgin, “Bülent Ecevit” in Ali Faik Demir (ed) Türk Dış Politikasında 
Liderler [Leaders in Turkish Foreign Policy](Ankara: Bağlam Yayınları, 2007) pp.241-
342 
3 For detailed resources, see: Baskın Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği /Resmi Đdeoloji Dışı 
Bir Đnceleme[Ataturk Nationalism, An Evoluation out of Legal Ideology] (Ankara: Bilgi 
Yayınevi, 1997); Celement H. Dodd (ed.), Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives, 
(Hemingfors Grey: Eothen Press, 1999), pp. 128-147; Celement H. Dodd, “Turkey and 
the Cyprus Question,” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds), Turkey’s New World: 
Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, 2000); Dr. Đrfan KALAYCI, Kıbrıs ve Geleceği: Ekonomik-Politik 
Bir Tartışma [Cyprus and its Future: An Economic-Political Discussion](Ankara: 
Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2004); William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1974-2000, 
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Instead I will briefly describe what the Cyprus issue means for the major political 
actors in 2004 and explain the positions of the actors towards on the Annan Plan. 
There are two camps in this conflict and the meaning of the Cyprus problem differs 
greatly for each of them. On the one hand, there is the civilian government of the 
ruling the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), 
claiming to have accepted the basic values of modern liberal political system4; on the 
other hand, in opposition, there is the secular establishment, the Republican People’s 
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), and the military of the republic convinced that 
the government’s Islamic identity and agenda are still intact and its new liberal face is 
just a screen for their hidden Islamic agenda.5 In this context, AKP is attempting to 
gain legitimacy by solving the Cyprus problem which is the visible barrier between 
Turkey and the full membership to the European Union.6 However, the secular 
establishment, which has used unresolved conflicts and crises as political taboos in 
their ongoing political struggle to fortify their allegedly unquestionable political 
power and status, considers the possibility of a final solution to Cyprus problem as a 
challenge to the very existence of their privileged positions in Turkish domestic 
politics. Both camps are aware of the fact that a final solution to the Cyprus problem 
will eventually lift an important barrier in Turkey’s accession to EU. For the 
government, it is vital to maintain relations with the EU for these negotiations seem to 
be a critical democratic force and hence a source of legitimization for AKP.7 For the 
                                                                                                                                          
(Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000); Vemund Aarbakke...[et all.], Reciprocity: Greek and 
Turkish minorities law, religion and politics edited by Samim Akgönül (Đstanbul: 
Đstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2008). Çarkoğlu, Ali and Rubin, Barry (eds), Greek Turkish 
Relations in the Era of Détente, (London: Routledge, 2005). 
4 You can read main policies and principles of AKP via following web page: 
http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/akparty_MainPolicies.html 
5 For a detailed analysis of the AKP’s Cyprus Policy in 2003 and 2004, see: Müge 
Kınacıoğlu and Emel Oktay, “The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus Policy: 
Implications for Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 7 
No.2, (June, 2006), pp. 261-273. See also: Philip Robins, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 
2002: “Between a “post-Islamist” government and a Kemalist state”, International 
Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1,  (2007) pp. 289-304. Hakan Yavuz, The emergence of a new 
Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, (Salt Lake City: Universityof Utah Press, 2006). 
6 Dodd (ed.), Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives, pp. 128-147. 
7 Emin Fuat Keyman,. “Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and 
Domestic Transformations”/ E. Fuat Keyman, Ziya Öniş, edited by Can Cemgil, Evren 
Tok. (Đstanbul: Đstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007). 
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same reasons, the traditional Turkish elite understand possible Turkish membership of 
the EU would lead to a serious deterioration in their political establishment and power. 
Therefore, it is obvious why the Cyprus problem along with Annan plan negotiations 
has become such a nodal point in Turkey. Let me give some details of this conflict 
defining the actors’ positions. . 
 
In 2002, AKP which has been defined as a party of conservative democrats8, 
came to power winning a large number of the seats in parliament.9. One of the first 
actions of the newly formed government was to develop and implement new policies 
on the protracted conflict over Cyprus. Until then, policies on Cyprus had been shaped 
towards preserving the status-quo the strategic interests of Turkey and Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti, KKTC). The 
bureaucratic and the military elites of Turkey and their voice in politics, CHP, were 
already disturbed by AKP’s recent political victory. They were wary of the new 
government’s intentions to change the traditional Cyprus policy, which was 
fundamentally based on maintaining the status-quo, and to negotiate a final solution 
once and for all the Cyprus problem. When the new government decided to follow a 
proactive, pragmatic policy enabling long term resolutions to deeply seated conflicts, 
the forces of the status-quo mentioned above started a frontal attack on the 
                                                
8 Tayyip Erdoğan, “Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom” in The 
Emergence of a new Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti” edited by M. Hakan Yavuz, 
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006). See also a definition made by Tayyip 
Erdoğan: “AK Parti, Yeni Muhafazakar Demokrat çizgiyi muhafazakarlığın genlerine 
ve tarihi kodlarına uygun şekilde, ama siyaset yaptığı coğrafyanın toplumsal ve kültürel 
geleneklerine yaslanarak ortaya koymaktadır. AK Parti kendi düşünce geleneğinden 
hareketle, yerli ve köklü değerler sistemimizi evrensel standarttaki muhafazakar siyaset 
çizgisiyle yeniden üretmek amacındadır”. See whole document on: 
www.akparti.org.tr/siyasivehukuk/.../KonusmaBasbakan%20UMDS.doc. Another 
explanation: Metin Heper argues that the AKP defines itself as such. Metin Heper, 
“Conservative-Democratic Government by Pious People: The Justice and Development 
Party in Turkey”, in Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi (ed.), Blackwell Companion to 
Contemporary IslamicThought (New York: Blackwell, 2006),  pp. 345-361. 
9 In the general election, AKP had 34.34 %; CHP had 19.41 % of the votes. In the 
parliament, AKP had 365 seats and CHP had 177 seats over 550. Although AKP had the 
simple majority of the seats, it was not enough to make constitutional amendments. 
Therefore AKP did not hold the absolute majority power in the national parliament to 
elect the president on its own. Please see following link for further information: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/specials/1419_turk_elections/page2.shtml  
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government’s new Cyprus policy. These forces are defined as the defenders of the 
status-quo, while the AKP government is the challenger10  
 
The discussions which continued would lead to the negotiations of the Annan 
Plan proposed by Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, and the 
subsequent 24th April 2004 referenda which were held in both parts of Cyprus. The 
Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan in the referendum,11 and after that the Cyprus 
issue seemed to come to another gridlock. The leaders of Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
are still holding negotiations in Cyprus. 
 
The analysis of this conflictual interaction is one of the subjects of this thesis. In 
this interaction process, we see the political actors interacting fiercely on the domestic 
front and the limits of the Turkish domestic paradigm are tested. In other words, since 
the Cyprus issue is not an ordinary foreign policy issue but a constitutive element of 
the political status-quo defenders which have been represented chiefly by the CHP 
and the military, the analysis of conflicts around the Cyprus issue is also the analysis 
of the major political powers (the defenders and the challengers of the status-quo) in 
Turkish domestic politics and the historical transformation Turkey has been going 
through for more than a decade.. As a second case I will analyze the presidential 
election process in 2007 as explained in next section. 
 
 
1.1.2 Presidential Election Case 
 
In this section I will briefly introduce the presidential election process in 2007. In 
this process, the crisis was the very existence of Turkish Republic. The political 
                                                
10 Regarding the AKP’s approach towards the secular or Kemalist elite, Çoşar and 
Özman states that “Insel also notes that owing both to the distance between this new 
middle class and statist elites and to the AKP’s announced commitment to pluralist 
democracy and consensual politics, the party has the potential to provide democratic 
extensions that can thwart the hard-line Kemalist encroachment on Turkish politics.” 
Simten Çoşar and Aylin Özman “Centre-right Politics in Turkey after the November 
2002 General Election: Neo-Liberalism with a Muslim face”, Contemporary Politics, 
1469-3631, Volume 10, Issue 1, (2004), pp 57-74. 
11 75 % of Greek Cypriots voted “NO” and 65 % of Turkish Cypriots “YES” to the 
Annan Plan referendum. Detailed results are given in Chapter 4. 
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authority and power of the president12 in the Turkish political system has been 
                                                
12 The political position of the President is defined as following in the Turkish Republic 
Constitution article 104 which was made in 1982: 
ARTICLE 104. The President of the Republic is the Head of the state. In this 
capacity he or she shall represent the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the Turkish 
Nation; he or she shall ensure the implementation of the Constitution, and the regular 
and harmonious functioning of the organs of state. 
To this end, the duties he or she shall perform, and the powers he or she shall 
exercise, in accordance with the conditions stipulated in the relevant articles of the 
Constitution are as follows: 
a) Those relating to legislation: 
to deliver, if he or she deems it necessary, the opening address of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly on the first day of the legislative year, 
 to summon the Turkish Grand National Assembly to meet, when necessary, 
to promulgate laws, 
to return laws to the Turkish Grand National Assembly to be reconsidered, 
to submit to referendum, if he or she deems it necessary, legislation regarding 
amendment of the Constitution. 
to appeal to the Constitutional Court for the annulment in part or entirety of certain 
provisions of laws, decrees having the force of law, and the Rules of Procedure of the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly on the grounds that they are unconstitutional in form 
or in content, 
to call new elections for the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 
b) Those relating to executive functions:  
to appoint the Prime Minister and to accept his or her resignation, 
to appoint and dismiss Ministers on the proposal of the Prime Minister, 
to preside over the Council of Ministers or to call the Council of Ministers to meet 
under his or her chairmanship whenever he or she deems it necessary, 
to accredit representatives of the Turkish state to foreign states and to receive the 
representatives of foreign states appointed to the Republic of Turkey, 
to ratify and promulgate international treaties, 
 to represent the Supreme Military Command of the Turkish Armed Forces on 
behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 
to decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces, 
to appoint the Chief of the General Staff, 
to call the National Security Council to meet, 
to preside over the National Security Council, 
to proclaim martial law or state of emergency, and to issue decrees having the force 
of law, in accordance with the decisions of the Council of Ministers under his or her 
chairmanship, 
to sign decrees, 
to remit, on grounds of chronic illness, disability, or old age, all or part of the 
sentences imposed on certain individuals, 
to appoint the members and the chairman of the state Supervisory Council, 
to instruct the State Supervisory Council to carry out inquiries, investigations and 
inspections, 
to appoint the members of the Higher Education Council, 
to appoint rectors of universities. 
 11 
expanded considerably in the Constitution of 1982. Özbudun claims that “the 1982 
Constitution–again reflecting the values and interests of state elites- was even less 
trustful than its predecessor of the “national will,” elected assemblies, political parties, 
politicians, and all other civil society institutions such as trade unions, professional 
organizations, and voluntary associations”.13 He also affirms that the real intent was 
“to create a strong presidency, which the makers of the 1982 constitution (almost all 
of whom were military officers and civilian bureaucrats) assumed would long be 
controlled by the military”.14 On the other hand, the status of presidential 
accountability and non-accountability should also be taken into account while 
discussing the power of the president. Under article 105, it was stated that “no appeal 
shall be made to any legal authority, including the Constitutional Court, against the 
decisions and orders signed by the President of the Republic on his or her own 
initiative”.15 Özbudun argues that this statement aims “to keep him [the president] 
politically irresponsible”.16 As a result of these regulations, the office of the 
presidency has become tutelary body acting over the parliament. Thus the presidency 
has been regarded by the secular establishment as the guardian of the republic and 
their privileged status.17  
 
                                                                                                                                          
c) Those relating to the judiciary: 
 to appoint the members of the Constitutional Court, one- fourth of the members of 
the Council of State, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public 
Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals, the members of the Military High Court of 
Appeals, the members of the Supreme Military Administrative Court and the members 
of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors. 
The President of the Republic shall also exercise powers of election and 
appointment, and perform the other duties conferred on him or her by the Constitution 
and laws. This text is available on the website of Turkish Grand National Assembly:  
This info is obtained from following webpage: 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm  
13 Ergun Özbudun, “The Politics of Constitution Making” in Contemporary Turkish 
Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2000), p. 56. 
14 Ibid., p.56 
15 http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm  
16 Özbudun, “The Politics of Constitution Making” in Contemporary Turkish Politics: 
Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, p.37. 
17 Taraf, “Sivil Anaysa Formu -4-” (25 May 2009) avaliable on 
http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/34372.htm  
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In this context, as was expected, when the AKP decided to nominate a 
candidate,18, the bureaucratic and military elite perceived this action as an attempt to 
take over the secular Turkish state by the Islamist government.19 Consequently, in the 
process of presidential elections in 2007, the depth of the political fault line between 
the “Islamist” and the “secularist” political actors revealed itself with such clarity that 
the public was split into irreconcilable camps, leaving no room for nuanced political 
positions. Toprak and Çarkoğlu argue in their survey, “Religion, Society and Politics 
in Changing Turkey”, that “despite these positive changes, at the time we conducted 
this study in May 2006, there were already signs of an increasing polarization between 
one might call the “secularist” vs the “Islamists””20, politicians from the opposition 
parties, many rectors and scholars from universities participated in the protest 
demonstrations21 and published a declaration22 about the presidential elections 
claiming that what was at stake in the presidential elections was nothing other than the 
future of the political regime in Turkey, whether Turkey would stay as a secular 
republic or become a theocratic state regime. During this process, the parliament was 
the scene of highly vehement debates, mutual accusation, and rude speeches between 
                                                
18 Abdullah Gül was nominated as the presidential candidate by AKP on 25th April 
2007. 
19 It should be also pointed out that all presidents had been elected among military 
generals for 19 years. After the constitution of 1982, Kenan Evren, who was the chief 
commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, elected as the president again from the 
military officials. Only after him, Turgut Özal as the first civilian president was elected. 
For a detailed discussion, see http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/34372.htm  
20 Binnaz Toprak and Ali Çarkoğlu, Değişen Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset 
[Religion, Society and Politics in Changing Turkey], (Đstanbul: Tesev Publication, 
December 2006), p.11. 
21 Protest meetings were organized in many cities (Istanbul, Ankara, Đzmir, and so on) 
of Turkey in order to protest the AKP government and its presidential candidate and 
they were called as republican demonstrations by public and media. For a detailed 
media coverage, see: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/30/world/europe/30turkey.html?scp=13&sq=turkey&
st=nyt 
For a detailed information about the background of the protest demonstrations, also see: 
M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, “Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of Political 
Languages”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 14, No: 3, (Fall 2007). 
22 Erdoğan Teziç, the chairman of the Higher Education Board (YÖK), on behalf of the 
board members spoke out that, “There is no doubt that executing this kind of work 
requires impartiality. An impartial president is the assurance of our political regime.” 
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-603196 
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the two political parties: AKP and CHP. In addition to the parliamentary discussions, 
NGOs and the public in general participated in the process through demonstrations, 
press meetings, and declarations. It was also reported as “the crisis came to a head last 
week after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Islamic-oriented party 
nominated Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül to be Turkey’s next president”23 in foreign 
media coverage. The escalation of the crisis reached a stalemate when the military 
published on its web page a declaration emphasizing its opposition to the AKP’s 
candidate, Abdullah Gül. This was considered by many scholars, journalists, public 
authorities and the public as an “e-memorandum”24, a kind of military intervention, 
where the military “openly displays its position and attitudes when it becomes 
necessary” concerning the issue of secularism, into the civil political domain to stop 
the existing ruling power. The government responded to the military’s intervention in 
an unprecedented way which clearly reminded all that the military is responsible to 
the prime minister and any declaration against this institution or any such attempts are 
unimaginable.25 Nevertheless, the election process was blocked when the Turkish 
Constitutional Court reinterpreted the constitution, with its decision annulling the first 
round of the presidential election and requiring all of 367 deputies to be present in the 
parliament in the election.26 This amendment of the Constitutional Court made it 
                                                
23 “Secularism and Democracy in Turkey”    
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/01/opinion/01tue2.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=turkey&st
=nyt 
24 The Rector of Middle East Technical Univesity, Prof. Dr. Ural Akbulut first called 
the statement of the military as e-memorandum. Additionally, it was covered on media 
as such calling: “the statement -- widely termed a military memorandum due to its 
extraordinarily harsh tone -- was issued only minutes before midnight on Friday. The 
statement was dubbed an “e-memorandum,” or even an “e-ultimatum,” by some and 
threatened action if the government did not do more to preserve the republic’s secular 
tradition” on  http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=110566 , 
25 The government spokesperson, Cemil Çiçek, made a speech after government 
meeting on 28 April 2007. For the details of this speech, see: 
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=109749  
26Discussions about the quorum to hold the first round of the presidential election in the 
parliament had started February 2007. For a detailed report, see: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/02/world/europe/02turkey.html?scp=17&sq=turkey&
st=nyt 
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=110073  
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impossible for the current formation of the parliament to elect the president.27 Thus, 
the government decided to hold an early general election in July 2007. 
 
Similar to the first case, the political interaction and the process were also 
saturated with political conflict between almost identical main actors are almost 
identical. Additionally, the dynamics of the interaction are also very similar to the 
Cyprus case involving the CHP and the military (the bureaucratic and military elite) 
and the AKP (the elected government). Not surprisingly then these two processes have 
many similarities. What unanticipated in these two processes was the different 
patterns of interactions that took place even though almost the same actors involved 
and thus the two processes evolved differently. The main distinction between the two 
cases is the interest of the international actors and their impacts on the processes. 
Their existence of those is found to be one of the main determinants regarding the 
nature of the domestic political interactions. Therefore, the main discussions in this 
analysis are the nature of the political interaction of Turkish domestic politics in 
certain cases, the interaction of the actors, and the influence of the international actors 
--whether the international actors are involved or not—on both cases. 
                                                
27 According to the Constitution, of 1982, article 153 states that  the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court are final. For a detailed information, see: 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm  
8. Decisions of the Constitutional Court 
ARTICLE 153. The decisions of the Constitutional Court are final. Decisions of 
annulment cannot be made public without a written statement of reasons. 
In the course of annulling the whole, or a provision, of laws or decrees having the 
force of law, the Constitutional Court shall not act as a law-maker and pass judgment 
leading to new implementation. 
Laws, decrees having the force of law, or the Rules of Procedure of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly or provisions thereof, shall cease to have effect from the date 
of publication in the Official Gazette of the annulment decision. Where necessary, the 
Constitutional Court may also decide on the date on which the annulment decision shall 
come into effect. That date shall not be more than one year from the date of publication 
of the decision in the Official Gazette. 
In the event of the postponement of the date on which an annulment decision is to 
come into effect, the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall debate and decide with 
priority on the draft bill or law proposal, designed to fill the legal void arising from the 
annulment decision. 
Annulment decisions cannot be applied retroactively. 
Decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be published immediately in the Official 
Gazette, and shall be binding on the legislative, executive, and judicial organs, on the 
administrative authorities, and on persons and corporate bodies. 
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In both cases, these politically influential players are the policy-makers and main 
decision units in Turkish domestic politics. Both issues are perceived as crucial 
indicators of the struggle between the defenders and the challengers of the status-
quo.28 Regarding this power struggle, Đnsel argues that: 
 
“The instinctive reactions and fears of the laicist elite in the face of the AKP and 
the political stance it represents have their source mainly in the anxiety of losing 
a hegemonic position; they reflect a certain kind of class position. The clash 
between the radical laicist and islamists is not only a clash between 
modernizationists and traditionalists, but also a clash between the high (havas) 
and the low (avam) dating from the final period of the Ottoman Empire”.29  
 
Although tense interaction and political bargaining are considered natural 
elements of political life in the discourse of political science30, this issue could be 
studied more deeply based on process tracing analysis, utilizing the tools both of 
political science and of conflict resolution disciplines. This thesis aims to provide a 
dynamic analysis of political interactions in the context of Turkish domestic politics. 
Additionally, this research also introduces a different perspective in analyzing the 
process of issues and nature of the interaction within the Turkish political context 
compared to outcome-oriented evaluations or a casual-relational analysis or a power 
band approach. In this regard, this research is a process-based analysis.  
 
 
1.2 Methodology 
                                                
28 Ali Bulaç in his interview with Muhsin Öztürk stated that the secular establishment 
does’t want the system to be normalized, to transfer the executive power to public, to 
have fair and equal distribution of income, to spread of fundamental rights and 
freedoms to whole society, to be integrated Turkey to its regional developments and 
processe since all of these developments threaten their privilieged and granted position 
in the execution. Muhsin Öztürk, 27 Nisan Öncesi ve Sonrası Siyasi Röportajlar 
[Political Interviews before and after 27th of April], (Đstanbul, Zaman Kitap, 2008)  
29 Ahmet Insel, “The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey”, The South Atlantic 
Quarterly Vo: 102, No:2/3, (Spring/Summer 2003), p.299. 
30 For instance, Lewis Coser (1956) emphasizes that the existence of political conflicts 
can be useful both for coalition building and for keeping the balance of power. Coser, L 
(1956) The Functions of the Social Conflict. Glencoe, I11: Free Press. To give another 
For example, Pirages (1976), similar to Coser’s claim, states that conflict is important 
both within political organizations and in establishing coalitions in a political system. 
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The analysis of the policy-making processes of the two cases is examined 
through   process tracing with likert scale coding. The declarations, official 
statements, and public speeches of the actors which are collected via newspaper 
(Radikal)31 web pages and official web sites of the actors are the data. After encoding 
this data, the comparison of two conflictual issues is developed. The data are collected 
between these periods: for the process of presidential election in 2007, the period 
starts with 1 January, 2007 and ends with the election of Abdullah Gül as the president 
on 28 August 2007; for the process of the Annan Plan in Cyprus in 2004, the period 
starts with 1 January, 2004 and ends with the referenda held in Cyprus on 24 April 
2004. 
 
 
1.3 Aim of the Study 
 
Through this analysis, my aim is to present a dynamic analysis of the nature of 
the political interaction as well as actor’s interactions in Turkish domestic politics 
based on two conflictual cases. While volumes have been written about political 
conflicts in Turkey, there is little research on the subject of political interactions that 
engages the conceptual tools and frameworks of both political science discipline and 
the field of conflict resolution. Turkey has been experiencing domestic political 
debates and very tense and escalating processes since the beginning of the 2000s. 
Through this analysis, another aim is to present a detailed picture of the tense political 
interactions and important insights in Turkish domestic politics. Consequently, the 
final aim is to contribute to existing literature on the relations of domestic and 
international politics. 
 
The organization consists of six chapters. Chapter one presents the aim and 
importance of the study. 
 
                                                
31 Radikal  is a national wide daily newspaper published in Turkey in Turkish. Due to its 
easy access to online and broad archive, it is chosen to collect data for the case analysis. 
There is not any sort of ideological preferences in chosing it.  
 17 
Chapter two is the literature review section and consists of two main sections: 
political science and conflict resolution literature. 
 
Chapter three presents the method of the research and explains how process 
tracing methodology is used in analysis of the two cases. 
 
Chapter four interprets the cases through focusing on the positions and 
perceptions of the actors and their critical concerns related to the cases. 
 
Chapter five displays the comparative analysis of the political interaction and 
thus findings, which have been determined through data codification, are presented in 
the figures as well as in comments. The importance of Chapter Five lies in what the 
analysis shows based on actors-based and case-based illustration as well as a general 
comparison to see the nature of interaction and the dynamic of policy-making process.  
 
Finally, the last chapter presents theoretical and policy implications of the 
analysis. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
I will first present a review of the relevant literature chiefly on policy and 
decision making from the fields of political science and mainly on political 
negotiation and conflict from the fields of conflict resolution. In this section I will first 
provide a review of the political science literature on i) policy and decision making 
models ii) veto player theory iii) basic definitions of coalition building and interaction. 
Secondly, I will present the conflict resolution literature on i) negotiation and types of 
negotiation ii) political crises iii) political interaction iv) political conflict and studies 
on political conflicts. 
 
Firstly, the political science literature presented in this thesis analyzes the 
political interactions within policy and decision making models Moreover, the 
theories of these models explain the policy and decision making stages and their 
characteristics. Secondly, conflict resolution literature on political interaction focuses 
on negotiation processes and tries to define the nature of the political interaction. 
Below, I would like to introduce first the political science literature on policy and 
decision making and then conflict resolution literature. 
 
 
2.1 Political Science Literature 
 
Political science literature on policy and decision making presents six different 
clusters of approaches on policy making. Firstly, the features affecting the policy 
making process are presented. Secondly, policy making models and mechanisms are 
introduced. In the third section, decision making models and mechanisms are given. 
These three sections provide the theoretical framework of policy and decision making. 
The fourth section explains the veto player theory of George Tsebelis. Fifthly, the 
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coalition building approaches are presented. Lastly, the concept of interaction is 
briefly introduced. 
 
 
2.1.1 Features Affecting Policy Making Process 
 
A very initial definition of policy making is identified as “policy making is a 
process which is particularly complex, analytical and political”.32 This complex, 
analytical and political process includes three main features: political entities, a 
political environment, and political bargaining. These features have been considered 
as influential elements in the process. 
 
The first aspect which is presented in the literature is the political entities which 
are defined as “prime ministers, presidents, party secretaries, standing committees, 
military juntas, cabinets, bureaucracies, interagency groups, legislatures, and loosely 
structured revolutionary coalitions”.33 Specifically, political parties are viewed as very 
important elements in the policy making process. Regarding this, McCally argues that 
“the organization of the party, then, is of vital importance in the policy-making 
process. A study of the individuals and groups making up the political party is thus a 
starting point in any explanation of the party's contribution to policy making”.34 In 
addition, according to Thomas, political parties have a critical role in the political 
process35 and Yishai defines that role as partisan.36 
 
                                                
32 Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1968), p. 4 
33 Margaret G. Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical 
Framework”, International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, (Summer, 2001), p. 47 
34 Sarah McCally, “The State Political Party and the Policy-Making Process”, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 67, No. 1 (March, 1973), p. 57  
35 Clive S. Thomas, Political parties and interest groups : shaping democratic 
governance, (Boulder : L. Rienner Publishers, 2001) , p. 16 
36 Yael Yishai, “Interest Groups and Political Parties: The Odd Couple”, Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 
August-September (1995) 
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The second aspect is the political environment. Birkland argues that “the policy 
environment contains the features of the structural, social, political and economic 
system in which public policy making takes place”.37 These four systems are 
explained in Birkland’s work in detail. The structural environment is defined 
according to the structure of politics and the government such as whether the country 
is rules by two-party system or parliamentarism.38 The social environment is 
composed of “the nature and composition of the population and its social structure”. 39 
The composition of the population includes “the distribution of age, gender, and other 
attributes of the population”. The economic environment has many variables such as 
“the distribution of wealth in a society, the nature and the distribution of capital, the 
size and composition of industry sectors, the rate of growth of the economy, inflation, 
and the cost of labor and raw materials”.40 
 
The political environment is separately presented since it includes two 
components which are indicated as a “national mood”41 and political culture.  The 
national mood is considered to have an effect on policy making since it is argued that 
“that national mood changes from one time to another in discernible common lines, 
that these changes in mood or climate have important impacts on policy agendas and 
policy outcomes”.42 Birkland also explained the national mood concept as “how we 
feel about government, public problems, and the effectiveness of government and 
other institutions in successfully addressing these problems”.43 It is also underlined 
that the national mood and trust is important in government for public policy in the 
sense that “the legitimacy of democratic political systems depends in large part on the 
extent to which the electorate trusts the government to do what is right at least most of 
                                                
37 Thomas A,.Birkland, An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and 
models of public policy making, (Armonk, N.Y. M.E. Sharpe, c2001) p.194. 
38 Birkland, An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of 
public policy making. p.195 
39Ibid., p.197. 
40 Ibid, p. 198. 
41John W Kingdon, Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, (New York : Harper 
Collins, 1995)  
42 Ibid,p.146 
43 Birkland, An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of 
public policy making, p.200 
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the time”.44 The second component of the political environment is political culture 
described as “the long-standing ways that people think about politics and how they 
behave in politics”.45 Other than that, the definition of political culture is also 
introduced as “a shared set of knowledge, attitudes and symbols that help to define the 
procedures and goals of politics”.46 Thomas’s definition differs from Anderson’s in 
the sense that the former focused on how political culture works; however, the latter 
explains what constitutes political culture. Birkland also compared these two 
components saying that “political culture is much more consistent than national mood 
and has a substantial influence over the types of issues that are most likely to succeed 
as policy initiatives”.47 
 
The third aspect is political bargaining which shapes the political process. 
Initially, in the general sense, McCarty defines the term of political bargaining as “two 
actors negotiate to change an exogenously given status quo policy”.48 In this 
bargaining, McCarty identifies the actors as one who makes the proposal and the other 
as the one who vetoes it. Therefore, it can be argued that political bargaining includes 
two components: making a proposal and vetoing it. Bargaining is also presented as a 
process of government formation, which consists of various political actors and 
political negotiations as well, in the context of parliamentary democracies.49 Young 
defines the bargaining process in general as a process which “involves two or more 
parties who can make and accept offers, who can compromise with each other, and 
                                                
44 Ralph Erber and Richard R. Lau, “Political cynicism Revisited: An Information-
Process Reconciliation of Policy-Based and Incumbency-Based Interpretations of 
Changes in Trust in Government”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34,No: 1 
(February, 1990), p. 236 
45 James Anderson, Public Policy Making, 4th ed. (Boston: Hougton Mifflin, 2000), 205 
– 210 cited in Birkland, An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and 
models of public policy making, p.201 
46 Clive S. Thomas, Political parties and interest groups : shaping democratic 
governance, (Boulder : L. Rienner Publishers, 2001) , p. 16 
47 Birkland, An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of 
public policy making, p.201 
48 Nolan McCarty, “Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining”, American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 3 (July., 2000),  p. 506 
49 John D. Huber and Nolan McCarty, “Cabinet Decision Rules and Political 
Uncertainty in Parliamentary Bargaining” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
95, No. 2 (June., 2001), pp. 345-360 
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who can achieve mutual gains”.50 Young’s definition is based on a win-win solution 
which has been not necessarily the aim of the political parties involved in the process 
of policy making in the cases in this thesis. 
 
In the literature, political bargaining has been attributed to a process, and so 
models have also been developed accordingly. The model of political bargaining was 
first developed by Romer and Rosenthal.51 Regarding the first models, McCarty, 
argues that “formal models of political bargaining generally emphasize the importance 
of the allocation of prerogatives such as proposal and veto rights among the 
bargainers”52 and bargaining is also driven by an exogenous status quo. Based on 
these criticisms, McCarty develops the sequential-choice model which s/he defines as 
a “generalization of a model developed by Baron and Ferejohn”53 and in this model 
“bargaining is driven by endogenous expectations about the future”.54 
 
 
2.1.2 Policy Making Models and Mechanisms 
 
Various models have been generated and developed to present the system of 
policy making in a more comprehensive and systematic way. These main models of 
policy making are presented in this section. Although distinctive methodologies are 
applied through these models, the basic commonality is that all models have logical 
systematic stages and the policy-makers follow these stages without missing any of 
them. To begin Richardson’s “Four-Stage Model” presents four-stages of the policy-
making process. The first stage is named the agenda setting where various interest 
groups endorse diverse ideas and resolutions in response to problems or interests. The 
second stage is where ideas are formulated into policies with an aim to resolve the 
                                                
50 H. Peyton Young, Negotiation Analysis, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
c1991), p. 89. 
51 Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal, “Political Resources Allocation, Controlled 
Agenda, and the Status Quo”, Public Choice No:33 (1978), pp. 27-44 
52 Nolan McCarty, “Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining”, p. 506 
53 David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn. 1989a. “Bargaining in Legislatures”, American 
Political Science Review Vol: 89 No: 4. pp: 1181-1206 
54 Nolan McCarty, “Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining”, p. 508 
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problem or issue. The third stage is the development and consideration of alternatives 
where finally a policy is made. The last stage is the implementation of this policy. 
Richardson (1996) defines each process as complex in itself and argues that the 
relation between these can bring up more complexity. Consequently, he sums up by 
saying that “these processes are dynamic, fluid, and loosely joined”. 
 
The next model belongs to Kingdon which is known as “Stream Metaphor”55 
model. Basically, his model includes three streams to set the agenda in which each has 
different groups, agencies, institutions, and individuals. The first stream is “the 
politics stream”56 which “encompasses the state of politics and the public opinion”57. 
The second one is “the policy stream” that “contains the potential solutions to a 
problem”. Finally, the third one is “the problem stream” that “encompasses the 
attributes of a problem and whether it is getting better or worse…”.58 
 
 
 
Problem Stream    
 
Policy stream   
 
Politics Stream 
Time 
 
Figure 1: Kingdon’s Streams Metaphor 
                                                
55 John W Kingdon, Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, 1995. Birkland states 
that “this book has become very influential in policy studies and is used to explain 
policy making in many different fields” Birkland, An introduction to the policy process: 
theories, concepts, and models of public policy making, p.278. 
56 Birkland, An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of 
public policy making, p.223 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid.,p.224. 
Window of 
Opportunity 
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The third model is presented by Sabatier as “The Advocacy Coalition 
Framework”59 in this model the basic idea is that “interest groups are organized in 
policy communities within a policy domain”60. Two or four groups in advocacy 
coalitions are introduced and these groups participate in “policy debate, competing 
and compromising on solutions based on their core values and beliefs”61. There are 
also “policy brokers”62 which are defined as mediators for the competition within a 
coalition.  
 
The last model is called the “Punctuated Equilibrium”63 which is used to explain 
the process by which policy is made in the United States. According to Birkland, they 
argue that:  
 
“The balance of political power between groups of interests remains relatively 
stable over long periods of time, punctuated by relatively sudden shifts in public 
understanding of problems and in the balance of power between these groups 
seeking to fight entrenched interests”.64 
 
The main theory of this model is political monopoly which “corresponds with the 
idea of policy subsystems”.65 In this monopoly, dominance is held over policy making 
by a group and policy-making is controlled by that group. Nevertheless, there are 
certain situations: when media attention is greater, meaning that an “increased 
attention to a problem usually means greater negative attention to it” and when 
“groups can seek access to the courts or other units of government to gain access to 
policy debate”66, and this monopoly can be broken.  
                                                
59 Paul A. Sabatier, Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy 
Coalition Approach, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993) 
60 Birkland, An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of 
public policy making, p.224 
61 Ibid., p.225 
62 Ibid., 
63 Frank Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American 
Politics. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
64 Birkland, An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of 
public policy making, p.227. 
65 Ibid., p.227. 
66 Ibid., p.228 
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2.1.3 Decision-Making models and Mechanisms 
 
The main identification of a decision is presented by Brikland and Hermann. 
Brikland defines a decision as a “key to the common definition of ‘public policy’ and 
as ‘what government chooses to do or not to do’ is the idea of a decision”.67 Hermann 
also argues that “decisions are sought to deal with problems”68 and generated by 
policymakers. 
 
The decision making process has also been shaped through various mechanisms 
and mainly those are presented in this section. According to Brikland, “the decision 
making process begins after an issue or  a problem is placed on the agenda and it 
makes its way through the legislative process until it comes close to the decision 
agenda”.69 “Garbage Can” and “Models II and Model III” are presented as two main 
models for the decision making processes in Birkland’s work. The first one is the 
“garbage can”70 model developed by Cohen, March and Olsen which contains three 
streams: participants, problems and solutions and “in each of these streams; various 
elements of decision making float about”.71 In order to explain the model the authors 
use universities which are also called “organized anarchies”.72 Richardson also 
mentions this model in his book “Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies”, where 
he more explicitly states that “organized anarchies have three general properties: 
problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation”.73 
 
                                                
67 Ibid., p.228 
68 Margaret G. Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical 
Framework”, p. 53 
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Secondly, Models II and Models III were developed by Allison.  His book 
“Essence of Decision”74 is considered one of the outstanding studies in terms of the 
“development of three models of decision making and their application to the missile 
crisis case”.75 According to Allison’s modeling, decision making has two ways: 
Organizational Process (Models II), which is also called as “the bureaucratic politics 
model” and Governmental Politics (Models III) which is defined as “the model of 
political conflict”.76 Birkland states that “decisions in this model are the product of 
competition and negotiation among the president, top government executives, 
bureaucrats, legislators, and other interested parties”.77 Allison also defines this 
process in a more comprehensive explanation:  
 
“The governmental politics model see no unitary actor but rather many actors as 
players: players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse 
international problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of 
strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, 
organizational, and personal goals; players who make government decisions not 
by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics”.78  
 
This model demonstrates how the decision-making process, whether at the 
national or international level, is complex and requires multi-level analysis and 
analysis of interaction between different actors in the government as defined as 
players. 
 
The third decision making model by Putnam is “the Logic of Two-Level 
Games”79, which mainly analyzes the decision making process within the foreign 
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75 Birkland, An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and models of 
public policy making, p.273. 
76 Ibid., p.215. 
77 Ibid., p.216. 
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policy context at an international relations level.80 Putnam., in his well-known article 
“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games” presents this 
model in detail and basically argues that domestic politics affect the foreign policy 
making as well as the fact that domestic politics and international relations indeed 
interact yet many theories have  focused little on that interaction. Unlike the realist 
paradigm, he basically involves domestic factors that are considered influential in 
foreign policy making. As domestic determinants for foreign policy relations, he lists 
as follows: “parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and noneconomic), 
legislators, and even public opinion and elections”.81 His theory proposes two-level of 
analysis of which the first is at the international level (Level I) and the second is at the 
national level (Level II). The argument, which is that the relationship between these 
two levels is dynamic, is very clearly stated by Putnam. Additionally, Putnam also 
discusses ‘the state’ concept which is based on as central decision-makers and he 
rejects the “state-centric” understanding which “represents a unitary actor-model”. He 
argues that “on nearly all important issues ‘central decision makers’ disagree about 
what national interest and the international context demand”.82  
 
The fourth model is Hermann’s “Decision-Unit Framework”83 which is one of 
the prominent frameworks used in the literature to explain elements and core aspects 
in the decision-making process. Hermann’s work has been built upon studies of 
various researchers84 who develop models on foreign policy decision making. As a 
general explanation, these studies which aim to generate decision-making models 
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focus on “bureaucratic politics, group dynamics, presidential advisory systems, 
governmental politics, leadership, coalition politics, and the strategies for dealing with 
domestic opposition”.85 Based on this literature, Hermann in his research, aims to 
develop an integrated framework with these existing studies. There are three decision 
units which are “found in the various political entities”86 in Hermann’s study. These 
units are “the powerful leader, the single group and the coalition of autonomous 
actors”.87 Three basic aims are introduced in this decision-unit framework: i) to 
develop a general framework that researchers can use to study decision-making, ii) to 
show using several of methods how policy-making can serve to predict future 
explanations, iii) to understand foreign policy making in different political settings in 
other countries. 
 
Hermann proposes that “when problems are recognized, decision units are 
generally convened to deal with them”.88 Figure 2 for example shows decision units 
framework: 
Figure 2: Decision-Unit Framework 
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Decisions are made by policymakers and political analysts.89 Hermann explains 
these policymakers have certain aims and purposes which are significant to them as 
well as which they work to achieve them under their administration. He argues that 
“…as they begin to take action on such goals and objectives, they encounter problems 
in their domestic and international environments that challenge what they want to 
do”.90 In the framework, Hermann first put the term “inputs” and explains it as “the 
inputs to the framework represent the stimuli from the international and domestic 
environments to which the authoritative decision unit is responding”.91 A problem is 
defined as something that “is recognized when policymakers state that something is 
wrong, needs attention or presents an opportunity for gain if action is taken”.92 
Therefore, problems are considered as “the trigger” or “reason” to engage this 
framework. The part “occasions for decision” is explained as “representing the 
instances in coping with a problem when the policymakers are faced with making a 
choice”.93  
 
Decision Units:  
The authoritative decision unit composed of three types as explained following:  
Predominant Leader: When only one character has the power to decide on 
foreign policy if it is necessary and to influence all counter-parties. 
Single Group: When a group of people who are also the members of the one 
group have the power to make decisions. 
Coalition of Autonomous Actors: When separate individuals, representative of 
various groups come together and make decisions for the government all together; 
none of these separate groups or individuals has power to decide on anything alone.94 
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Based on Hermann’s analysis, there appeared six different possible outcomes in a 
decision-making process: i) one party’s position prevails; ii) concurrence; iii) mutual 
consensus and compromise; iv) lopsided compromise; v) deadlock; vi) fragmented 
symbolic action. Hermann explains that “in each case the outcome of the process 
indicates the endpoint of the decision in terms of the preferences of those involved”95 
Table 1 (Hermann, 2001, p. 72) is shown below:  
 
Table 1: Characteristic and Implications of Process Outcomes 
 
The seventh model Conn’s Model of Political Decision Making, (Figure 3) 
illustrates the “conflict resolution and the political process”.96 
 
 
 
                                                
95 Ibid., p.64 
96 Paul H. Conn, Conflict & Decision Making: an Introduction to Political Science ( 
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Figure 3: Conflict Resolution and Political Process 
 
In the beginning of this process in the illustration, Conn starts with a conflict 
which is between institutions and organizations or institutions and structures; then he 
continues with the “generation of demands” where “that the participants strive for 
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activation or politicization of their conflict”.97 This act, activation or politicization, 
leads to parties forming coalitions in order to strengthen their positions in the conflict. 
Conn defines the next step as a second phase of the process when policy decision-
making happens. The last step, as the illustration shows is the step of “execution and 
integration”.98 The political decision making process occurs “when the demands have 
been articulated, the strategies drawn up, the coalitions formed, and all the necessary 
resources mustered, a conflict is at last ready for the political battlefield”.99 At this 
stage, parties have four options: avoidance, tabling, acceptance and rejection that 
parties in the decision-making processes.100 In short, these responses are explained by 
Conn in the following ways: the first one avoidance, is a response that “political 
authorities can ignore a conflict”.101 Parties may hold a position to avoid a conflict due 
to the fact that they may see the issue as unimportant and therefore not want to waste 
energy and time with that seemingly unimportant issue.102 The second one is tabling 
which is explained as a very similar response to avoidance; however, the reason for 
tabling is very different to the reason for avoidance. In tabling, the comparison of 
issues or conflicts is the case, stated by Conn as “a particular conflict is seen as a 
lower-parity issue compared with existing conflicts”.103 The second reason for tabling 
is related to the resources which could be used to resolve the conflict. This situation is 
explained by Conn as tabling occurs “when the conflict is of such magnitude that 
decision makers either do not have enough information to deal with it affectively or 
feel that they cannot commit the resources necessary to solve the problem”.104 As the 
third response, decision-makers carry out acceptance which Conn relates these 
positions with “resolutions, legislations, programs, bureaucratic decisions”.105 In 
addition, Conn also divides acceptance into two types: temporary acceptance 
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“marginal action” and permanent acceptance “ideological acceptance”.106 The last 
response of decision-makers is rejection which could be “on ideological grounds, or 
be pragmatic or be comprehensive or incremental”.107  
 
The theory of “checks and balances” which was first defined in the constitutional 
papers in 18th century as well as in the American Constitution underlies the concept of 
the veto player.108 The decision-making process is also held by groups in governments 
“legislative committees, cabinets, military juntas, politburos of ruling parties, and 
executive councils”.109 These groups are defined as “at the core of the bureaucratic 
process”.110 In the government, decisions are taken by the members of the political 
parties. These members can vote for or against which is known as veto power.   
 
 
2.1.4 Veto Player Theory 
 
Veto player theory is another stream of study in explaining policy making and 
policy makers. 
 
George Tsebelis defines and then elaborates on this theory of veto player in the 
field of comparative politics and policymaking.111 The veto player theory is described 
                                                
106 Ibid., pp.78-79. 
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as “veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule 
for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo”.112 The function of the 
veto player is also described as one “who can block the adoption of a policy”.113 
According to Tsebelis, in the logic of policy-making process, a certain number of veto 
players should agree on a policy change in order to carry out a change of the status 
quo.114 He lists three characteristics which he argues matter: 
 
“The policy stability of a political system depends on three characteristics of its 
veto player: their number, their congruence (the difference in their political 
positions) and their cohesion (the similarity of policy positions of the constituent 
units of each veto player)”.115 
 
In Tsebelis’s article two types of veto players are defined: institutional and 
partisan veto players. Institutional veto players are found in the presidential system as 
the president and chambers; while partisan veto players are known as political parties 
in parliamentary systems.116 Tsebelis points out the difference between institutional 
and partisan veto players: “according to the constitution, the agreement of institutional 
veto players is a necessary and sufficient condition for policy change, while the 
agreement of partisan veto players is, strictly speaking, neither necessary nor 
sufficient”.117 It is also argued that in Westminster systems118 “dominant party 
systems and single-party minority governments have only one veto player, while 
                                                                                                                                          
No. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp. 591-608. George Tsebelis, “Veto Players and Institutional 
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coalitions in parliamentary systems, presidential or federal systems have multiple veto 
players”.119 
 
In terms of distance between veto players which Tsebelis identifies as 
congruence, he claims that each partisan player is different and is counted as separate 
veto player since each of them may have distinctive positions regarding various 
policies.  Regarding institutional veto players, Tsebelis focuses on two institutions: 
chambers and presidents. He argues that “two institutional veto players with different 
political compositions should be counted as two distinct players”.120 Besides this, he 
also emphasizes that if an institutional veto power is not a formal power, it would not 
be considered as a veto player.121 Tsebelis also argues that there can be additional 
powers that intend to act as a veto player such as interest groups in some political 
systems; the army is also considered as a veto player in particular issues and courts 
are also given as an example of veto players.122 
 
Lastly, Tsebelis describes the third characteristic of veto player which he depicts 
in the unusual metaphor of an egg yolk is the size of the yolk of each veto player123. 
This variable which proposes that “policy stability decreases when the size of yolk of 
each veto player increases”124 depends on “how cohesive a party is: cohesive parties 
have smaller yolks”.125 The definition of cohesion is also stated as “difference of 
positions within a party before a discussion and a vote take place inside the party”.126 
Nevertheless, he also states that “a party with big ideological differences among its 
members is not necessarily non-cohesive”.127 
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Tsebelis also emphasizes that the veto player theory does not depend on the 
political structure: presidentalism or parliamentarism; bicameralism or unicameralism; 
two-party or multi-party systems. 
 
It is also claimed as “the best known line of work in modern political science 
relating the rules of inclusion and exclusion of political actors to the relative difficulty 
of policy change is the veto players’ theory of George Tsebelis and others”.128 
Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi have studied the literature and found that the veto 
player theory has been applied to the field of many studies and majors ranging from 
fiscal adjustment129, to international trade arrangements130; from inequality131, to the 
European Union decision-making processes. According to Ganghoff, veto theory 
“systematically relates a veto player to the potential for policy change in a political 
system”.132  
 
 
2.1.5 Coalition building 
 
Research on coalition building mostly focuses on parliamentary systems rather 
than coalition building at the international level. According to Pfetsch, coalition 
building is very significant in decision-making processes in the sense that any 
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minority group may increase its power through coalition building in the international 
environment.133 
 
Coalition formation is also explained by Conn in an illustration of the political 
process of conflict resolution.134 Coalition formation is the first step in this process 
and defined as forming alliances with like-minded allies to gain support for the 
accomplishment of those own demands and this situations is considered to “allow 
participants to multiply their resources and thereby to compete for rewards in an arena 
where their single cries might have gone unheard”.135 He also points out the costs of 
and the strategies of coalition formation in his book.  
 
 
2.1.6 Interaction 
 
According to Conn, interaction is one to the conditions for a conflict to appear. 
Conn includes references to March and Simon saying that “the parties to conflict will 
engage in conflict only if there is a necessity for them to interact with each other or if 
both the contestants are subject to the same common authority”.136 The emphasis on 
authority can be considered to be one of the characteristic reasons why actors are in 
conflict in both cases in this study.  
 
Patchen also lists many variables of the probable determinants of interaction 
which have been researched. As variables he states “the objective situation: relative 
power, conflict of interest, communication channel”; “characteristic of the parties: 
ideology, motives, group decision-making processes”; “subjective orientations of the 
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parties: perception of the other’s intention”; and “the strategies of interaction: 
behaving noncooperatively and then switching to cooperation”.137 
 
To conclude, this section consists of the presentation of the policy and decision 
making models, and veto player theory as well as the definitions of coalition building 
and interaction from the political science literature. Firstly, to start with, models 
mentioned above: i) Richarson’s ‘Four-stage model’, ii) Kingdon’s ‘Stream 
Metaphor’, iii) Sabater’s The Advocacy Coalition Framework’, iv) ‘Punctuated 
Equilibrium’ as policy making models, v) Alison’s Model II and Model II, vi) 
Putnam’s model, vii) Hermann’s ‘Decision-Unit Framework and viii) Conn’s Model 
on Political Decision Making, have  not been applied to analysis in this thesis. The 
reason for this lies in the fact that these models have mostly been applied to either 
policy making process in parliament or foreign decision making process; however, the 
policy making processes analyzed in this thesis are realized between both elected 
political parties (CHP and AKP) and the military. Additionally, because these models 
lack a way to assess the impact of the international actor on the domestic policy 
making process, it could be argued that the models and mechanisms presented above 
cannot be comprehensively and truly applicable to the analysis which is undertaken in 
this thesis. Only Putnam points out that international and domestic politics have an 
influence on each other’s sphere. However, there is no other study that focuses on this 
relationship. As a result of these, I develop a new approach which takes into account 
more dynamic aspects of the issue at stake rather than providing descriptive model for 
relatively static issues. Nevertheless, these models are significant in order to present 
how the political science field analyzes and explore political interaction in policy and 
decision making.   
 
Secondly, veto player theory is valuable in the sense of presenting the positions 
taken by the actors. Therefore, although the analysis is not purely conducted based on 
this theory, it is still important and relevant to this research regarding the introduction 
of characteristics and positions of the policy and decision maker who shaped the 
political interaction.  
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Thirdly as a general observation, most articles and studies138 which have been 
published in political science literature include researches using quantitative methods 
or statistical analysis as well as having specific case analysis rather than exploring of 
the nature of the interaction. In this regard, these studies are not directly relevant to 
this thesis.  
 
In summary, none of these theories, models and explanations presented are 
directly relevant to what this research focuses on and this lack initiated the need to 
develop a new model for the analytical/methodological purposes of this study.  
 
 
2.2 Conflict Resolution Literature 
 
This section presents relevant explanations regarding the interaction analysis. 
The main reason for visiting the conflict resolution literature on interaction analysis is 
to present how interaction, especially political interaction, is studied and perceived in 
research. In this section, mostly definitions and understandings of certain concepts and 
approaches are introduced rather than theoretical models and frameworks. This 
section starts with negotiation and its definition. Secondly, political negotiation which 
has been mostly studied through development of a model is presented. Thirdly, 
integrative and distributive negotiation styles are defined. Fourthly, the research and 
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studies on crisis management, crisis negotiations and political crisis are visited. As a 
fifth part, the various definitions and interpretations of political conflict are presented. 
The sixth and seventh sections indicate models and projects which have been 
developed about the subject of political conflict. Lastly, the definition of cooperation 
is given.  
 
 
2.2.1 Negotiation 
 
In a very broad and general definition, “negotiation is a form of conflict 
behavior, which occurs when two or more parties try to resolve a divergence of 
interest by means of conversation”.139 Negotiation is also described as a complex 
human activity.140 This complex human activity can be between individuals, groups, 
organization, political units141 as well as within them.  
 
Negotiation is presented as a joint decision-making process.142 Zartman defines 
this process as one “in which both parties are necessary to the decision, or, otherwise 
stated, in which each party has veto power”.143 Pruitt and Carnevale affirm that 
negotiation is one of the procedures which occurs in joint decision making. Young 
also defines negotiation as a central activity in many subjects such as “diplomacy, 
politics, religion, the law, and the family”.144 Zartman additionally concludes that the 
decision-making processes should consider negotiation in satisfying both parties 
which are to decide on the decision and the process should be dealt with the actual 
decision-making is done through negotiation. Zartman lists three main modes of social 
decision-making: coalition, judication and negotiation which he clarifies these models 
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in decision-making process as “negotiation is one of a limited number of decision-
making modes”.145 According to Zartman, negotiation basically means “a process of 
two (or more) parties combining their conflicting points of view into a single 
decision”.146 Thompson also defines negotiation as a decision-making process not at 
the political level but at the interpersonal one and he underlines that people experience 
negotiation in their everyday lives.147 
 
In the negotiation literature, it is argued that the analysis of the negotiation 
process could contribute to predicting the outcome of the negotiation as well as 
understanding the forerunner conditions and effecting variables in negotiation.148  The 
fact that there are certain influential factors, learning of some important information 
regarding the adversary parties position or events or decisions as called “turning 
points” may turn the process into escalatory or de-escalatory situations are also 
presented.149 
 
 
2.2.2 Political Negotiations 
 
Ikle and Leites have researched the existing models of political negotiations and 
consider the models, such as “price theory” and “games of strategy”, helpful to 
understanding the real situations; however they argue that “these theoretical tools 
seem to be of but limited use for the complex reality”150 needed to study political 
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negotiations. They aim to develop a theory of negotiations through the formalization 
of the process of negotiation rather than give a definite description of political 
negotiations. 
 
In the general sense, the main element of the negotiation process is defined as 
‘opposing interests’.151 Pfetsch also explains the negotiation process of political 
science within the international context and gives examples from international 
negotiations. 
 
Zechmeister and Druckman argue that “political negotiators differ in how 
responsible they must be to the groups that they represent. Their “office-holding may 
depend on the extent to which they satisfy their constituents, both in terms of 
achieving favorable outcomes, and in terms of loyalty to the group’s initial 
position”.152  
 
 
2.2.3 Integrative-Distributive Negotiation  
 
In literature, negotiation has two basic types which are distributive and 
integrative negotiation, which have been defined, described, as well as analyzed by 
various scholars.153 Raffia argues that “two-party bargaining can be divided into two 
types: distributive and integrative”154 and he explains distributive negotiation as “one 
single issue is, such as money, under contention and the parties have almost strictly 
opposing interests on that issue”.155 The situation is shaped on the logic of when one 
gets more, the other gets less. Distributive negotiation refers to slicing the pie and to 
negotiating with existing resources. Therefore the satisfaction of both sides is hardly 
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to be achieved. On the other hand, integrative negotiation is known as a ‘win-win 
solution’ based on expanding the pie and so expanding the resources which facilitate 
reaching an outcome which satisfy both sides’ interests. Integrative negotiation is 
described as possibly occurring in a situation “in which two-parties and several issues 
to be negotiated”.156 In this case, negotiators are defined not as strict competitors and 
both parties can get more because “they can cooperate in order to enlarge the pie that 
they eventually will have to divide”.157 Interactive negotiation is also defined in 
various concepts as the “problem-solving workshop”,158 and “third-party 
consultation”159 . Integrative negotiation is defined as ‘soft’ negotiation160 by Pfetsch. 
He states that in ‘soft’ negotiation, the aim is to satisfy both sides’ all concerns 
through having mutual agreement. 
 
Distributive and integrative is also referred to cooperative and competitive 
negotiation.161 Competitive negotiation processes, similar to distributive negotiation, 
happen when “the goals of one party are usually in fundamental and direct conflict 
with the goal of other party” and the resources are again limited and fixed. Similarly,, 
cooperative negotiation processes resemble integrative negotiation and the adversary 
parties hold “positive moments to increase the potential gains relative to no 
agreement”.162 However, there is a third type of bargaining style which is called 
mixed-motive163  that includes both cooperation and competition.164  
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2.2.4 Crisis Management/ Crisis Negotiations/ Political Crisis  
 
The definition of the term “crisis” in political science literature varies based on 
the type of crisis which is argued by scholars. The crisis can be related to the societal 
reaction which is defined by James and Hristoulas who argue that “crisis activity may 
be a function of a change in the behavior of the domestic polity” and who list the five 
activities which make crisis activity more likely as follows: “assassinations, riots, 
political strikes, armed attacks and protest demonstrations”.165 
 
Gilbert and Lauren, in their paper “Crisis Management”, define crisis within the 
international context to argue that “they [crises] occur suddenly, demand quick 
decisions by leaders under intense pressure, threaten vital interests, and raise 
enormous uncertainties about war and peace”.166 The authors claim that the subject of 
crisis management has only been recently studied within international relations 
disciplines and they propose that policy makers and scholars in this field believe that 
this initiative would help states to develop better policies regarding their future. The 
authors also provide a critique of the literature on crisis management and thus argue 
that the nature of crisis or crisis management itself has not been analyzed in an 
analytical way but more in descriptive way. They also focus on crisis and crisis 
management at the international level.  
 
Gilbert and Lauren also discuss a different view of crisis and crisis management 
study and question whether a policy maker should focus on maximizing gains or 
avoiding war or both while s/he is dealing with crisis. The first group167 is perceived 
as defining the situation of crisis and crisis management with zero-sum situation 
according to Gilbert and Lauren. Basically, the crisis is seen as “a contest with an 
opportunity to increase benefits and further one’s ambitions by successfully managing 
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an adversary and manipulating his behavior by threats”.168 However, the conflict in 
the second group is seen as “no opportunity at all but rather as a source of potential 
disaster which, if not managed, will result in war”.169 Scholars170 underline the 
importance of shared risk, mutual desire to avoid escalation, and a common interest to 
escape disaster. As pointed out by Gilbert and Lauren, other theorists try to combine 
these two approaches with an aim “to reconcile both the conflicting issues and the 
common interests of a crisis”.171 Although the authors mostly analyze the international 
crisis in their article, they emphasize that crisis management theory should also take 
into consideration foreign as well as domestic elements in the decision-making 
process and argue that “bargaining occurs not only between states, but also within 
states or groups of states”.172  
 
Besides this, in order to predict the likelihood of crisis, it is claimed that “conflict 
carrying capacity” of political systems is also very crucial.173  
 
 
2.2.5 Political Conflict 
 
In the literature, there is not a common definition of political conflict. Three main 
definitions exist to delineate political conflict according to various studies. In this 
section, these studies and definitions are presented. 
 
First, political conflict is seen as a hostile situation “in which two political 
groups, antagonistic to each other, are engaged to open confrontation”.174 The two 
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parties engaged in the hostilities are referred to as ‘the hostile group’ (the challengers) 
and ‘the ruling group’ (regime). Due to the fact that the challengers find their interest 
at variance with the interest of regime, political conflicts emerge between these 
groups.175 In this definition, civil strife, collective violence and revolution are 
presented as the areas of study of political conflict.  
 
Second, similar to the first definition, political conflict is indicated in the form of 
protest and rebellion;176 protests, riots, strikes and political demonstration,.177 
interactions which are hostile and compelling between citizens and states in the form 
of again rebellion and protest.178 A similar definition of confrontation includes such 
actions as political demonstrations, riots, clashes, general strikes, coups d’états, 
clandestine armed attacks, guerilla and civil warfare,179 between collective actors 
over political issues is also presented by Gurr and Lichbach. The same type of 
incidents (assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla wars, major government crises, 
purges, riots, revolutions, and antigovernment demonstrations) is also defined as 
factors of domestic conflict by Rummel, in his quantitative analysis, “Applied Factor 
Analysis”.180  
 
Third, political conflict is “an actual or perceived incompatibility of interest, 
opinions or values between two or more political entities”.181This general definition 
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refers to a conflict between following the political entities “prime ministers, 
presidents, party secretaries, standing committees, military juntas, cabinets, 
bureaucracies, interagency groups, legislatures, and loosely structured revolutionary 
coalitions”182 rather than between political entities and any other group. 
 
In the literature, the underlying reasons and concerns of political conflict are also 
presented. Pirages argues that the function of political process is to control conflicts 
which are inherited in organized societies and states political conflict occurs due to the 
scarcity of position or resources.183 Pfetsch, basically argues that political conflict as a 
value-based conflict can be related to national identity or territorial issues, and he 
claims the concerns of political conflicts are public goods which are either “national 
interests or values, such as national territory and its border (national independence), 
constitutional rights (self-determination), as well as the monopoly over decision-
making”.184 Conn also differentiates conflicts as political and nonpolitical according 
to the style of the resolution.185 In his classification, for instance, conflicts between 
people do not require political means in the resolution phase; however, if political 
institutions such as “courts and legislatures” are chosen to resolve the disputes or 
disagreements, then conflicts can be considered political. In fact, he basically argues 
that “the character of political institutions is such that as long as they are effective, 
they are the ultimate or authoritative agents for the resolution of conflict”.186 Jeckins 
and Schock propose that the theories of ‘political process and global structures’ should 
be integrated to ‘power struggle approaches’ which claim that conflict is inherent and 
the main determinants of domestic conflicts are considered as power structures. They 
also affirm that those who “are the most deprived or frustrated either in absolute terms 
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or relative to their expectations, are the most likely to participate in political 
conflicts”.187  
 
 
2.2.6 Models of Political Conflicts  
 
There are two models188 which have been developed to analyze conflict 
processes and the unit of analysis is protest or rebellion rather than the political 
conflict between political entities. In their study, Karmeshu, Jain and Mahajan (1990) 
attempt to develop a model to understand the interactive process that regimes and 
challengers experience during the political conflict process.189 The authors also 
underline that these interactive processes have been ignored in the model developed 
by Lichbach and Gurr. The authors argue that “[in the model] they have highlighted 
the underlying control parameters of political conflict which at a critical value (point) 
could lead to discontinuous jumps in the level of hostility”.190 Through the analysis, 
they suggest that “if a regime chooses a policy of total confrontation and refuses to 
accommodate its challengers in any manner by alleviating their grievances, then it 
would ensure that the conflict would escalate indefinitely…”.191  
 
 
2.2.7 Projects on Political Conflicts 
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There also two important data collection papers on political conflict: the 
KOSIMO Project developed by the Department of Political Science at the University 
of Heidelberg192 and a workshop paper193 by Jackman and Boyd. 
 
 
2.2.7.1 KOSIMO Project 
 
In the Kosimo project which is presented in an article entitled “Databank on 
political conflict” the authors state that “an integrated and dynamic databank contains 
nonviolent and violent as well as domestic and international political conflicts on a 
global scale between 1945 and 1998”.194. They argue that this integrated databank will 
pilot the more concrete suggestions about political conflicts both for past and future 
explanations. Regarding the project, it is important to point out that violent conflicts in 
Rwanda, Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia have been coded as a violent form of 
political conflict. However, there is not a clear definition of   political conflict. This 
study of the Kosimo project brings out two main critiques: the first one is that the 
conflict data base is all about violent conflicts such as wars; the second one is that not 
only are the cases violent but conflict literature also captures only the violent stages of 
the conflict.  
 
The study also shows that frequency of domestic conflicts has increased during 
the period between 1945 and 1998. As a reason, Pfetcsh and Rohloff argue that  
 
“The issues involved in political conflict and the contextual setting have changed 
considerably over the past 50 years. Ideology, decolonization, geo strategic 
power conflicts, and hegemonic wars have by and large disappeared. Instead, the 
international agenda is dominated by local and regional power conflicts as well 
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as politicized minority conflicts in fragmented societies in Africa, the Middle 
East and Central Asia”.195 
 
 
2.2.7.2 The Workshop Paper 
 
The Workshop Paper is presented by Jackman and Boyd and examines “the costs 
and benefits of multiple source coverage in the context of measuring political conflict 
since 1960 “within 30 black African countries”.196 The data for this research is 
collected from “a wider study of political change in Third World countries”.197 The 
data are composed of six variables defined as six components of political violence: 
riots, anti-government demonstrations, political strikes, armed attack events, 
assassinations, and deaths from group violence.198 In conclusion, the researchers state 
that “it is easy to exaggerate the benefits that accrue from collecting comparative data 
on political conflict from a variety of sources”.199 
 
Although the KOSIMO project has different foci than does this thesis, it is still 
important to present the interpretation and perception of the concept of political 
conflict in academic studies. It can is clearly seen that the classification of political 
conflict is divided into two groups: violent and nonviolent. However, clear 
identification cannot be reached. This project is significant because it introduces an 
example regarding the political conflict. While this example may not be a very good 
one, it shows that there is not a proper and completely appropriate work related to 
political conflict and crisis analyzed in this thesis. On the other hand, in the workshop 
paper, it can also be seen that the description of the political conflict is similar to the 
second definition which has been explained above. In any case, both of these studies 
are related to political conflicts even though their understanding differs.  
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2.2.8 Cooperation 
 
According to Axelrod (1984), cooperation or an emergence of cooperation is 
very much related to the way people think and act in their social, political, and 
economical relations.200 Axelrod states, in his later book “The Complexity of 
Cooperation”, that “cooperation occurs when people organize themselves into groups 
to compete with each other” and adds that “it takes place in many forms, including 
alliances among nations, strategic partnerships among businesses, and coalitions 
among political parties in parliamentary democracies”.201 
 
To conclude, this part presents various definitions and models from the Conflict 
Resolution literature which focuses on interaction analysis. Firstly, the argument of 
negotiation as a decision-making process and the distinction between negotiation 
styles are relevant to this thesis since the interaction is presented as policy and a 
decision making process. Secondly, the definition of negotiation as a competitive or 
cooperative process is also helpful to define political interactions in this thesis. Both 
of these relevant remarks are helpful to define the nature of the interactions in this 
study. Thirdly, the definition of political conflict by Golec opens a space to study the 
conflict between political entities, mainly political parties and actors in this thesis. 
Therefore, the meaning of the political conflict in this thesis is in line with Golec’s 
definition rather than the general perception of the political conflict which is between 
the masses and the elite group. Therefore, in this thesis, this definition is taken into 
consideration in explaining and analyzing the political interaction. These are the main 
concerns that are relevant to this study. 
 
On the other hand, the following observations are also seen in the conflict 
resolution literature. To begin with ‘political negotiation’, it is not studied through 
research; rather some analyses have been developed about this concept. The aim of 
introducing this study is to give a general framework for the basic terms. Secondly, as 
a general perception, political conflict is defined as a conflict between the public 
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(masses) and the elite group (ruling group) in the form of protest, rebellion, and 
demonstration. This analysis is not built up on this understanding; however, it is 
valuable to present these as well. Additionally, the Kosimo Project also shows that 
political conflict might be violent or nonviolent; the project thus is a good example to 
indicate that the CR literature has also captured violent conflicts as political conflict.  
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3 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The third chapter explains the methodology undertaken in this thesis. Besides 
this, the research question is also presented in the following section. Mainly, this 
chapter consists of three sub-sections: i) research methodology and research question, 
ii) the methodology as process tracing, iii) data collection: unit of analysis and likert 
scale model, iv) procedures.  
 
 
3.1 Research Question and Research Methodology 
 
In this thesis, the following research question is addressed: What is the nature of 
political interaction in Turkey? In what ways do the actors interact with each other in 
sensitive domestic political discussions? Do the structure of political environment and 
the existence of an international audience affect the actors’ interaction and the nature 
of the interaction? 
 
Before going into the sub-sections, in order to give an introductory picture of the 
methodology, it is important to understand what kind of research this thesis has 
undertaken. According to Neuman exploratory research findings answer the“What” 
question and do not often come up with concrete answers.202 The exploratory research 
is defined as such if the issue is new and has not studied before; thus, rather than 
developing concrete answers, the researcher can generate different questions which 
may lead to further research.203 As a research technique, Neuman states the qualitative 
techniques are mostly used in exploratory rather than quantitative researches. Based 
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on above mentioned explanations, this research is exploratory comparative case study 
research which is implemented using process tracing methodology. In addition, the 
unit of comparison is the interaction process. A last point is that although this research 
is based on data coding analysis, it is not undertaken with a quantitative technique. 
Therefore, the main objective of this research is to analyze the process of the 
interaction of two extremely critical cases through coding the actors’ interaction: 
moves and actions.  
 
 
3.2 Process-Tracing Method 
 
As a method, process tracing is very useful and applicable technique  in 
analyzing cases through focusing on the interaction process and its dynamics. 
According to Druckman (2004), process tracing is a qualitative method for analysis in 
time-series and is a method to research an historical process to determine a 
hypothesized process was realized or not.204 Druckman’s definition of process tracing 
analysis is mostly relevant to negotiation or mediation processes. However, he points 
out that “the availability of detailed information about the process enables a researcher 
to code the events or moves made by the actors”205 which the research in this thesis is 
precisely based on that is, the codification of the moves (explanations, declarations 
and statements) made by the actors during the processes of the cases.  
 
Nevertheless, the actual understanding of the process tracing methodology, 
which is used in this thesis, is based on the work of George and Bennett.206 As a 
methodology, process tracing is defined as a research method which analyzes the data 
on the causal processes and intervening variables. It can also be applied both to micro 
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and macro level analysis rather than the individual level.207 The main characteristics 
of this methodology can be stated as testing a theory and theory development through 
identifying the causal process. It is also argued that it develops many clarifications 
within a case. Another valuable beneficiary aspect to my research is that “process 
tracing can assess to what extent and how possible outcomes of a case were restricted 
by the choices made at decision-points along the way”.208 Therefore, process tracing is 
commonly used in decision-making process analysis because by tracing the decision-
making process, certain predictions can be developed.  
 
The first reason for using this methodology in this research lies in the following 
explanation: “process-tracing is particularly useful for obtaining an explanation for 
deviant cases, those that have outcomes not predicted or explained adequately by 
existing theories”.209 In this regard, the authors propose the use of this method as it 
provides an analysis of “deviant cases”, the understanding of which can enhance the 
general theory.210 
 
This thesis aims to contribute and generate new dynamic implications for the 
existing theories. Thus, the use of this methodology is very applicable in analyzing the 
cases of this thesis. The second motivation in applying this methodology in the 
analysis of the data is because “process-tracing provides a common middle ground for 
political scientists and other scientists who are sensitive to the complexities of 
historical events but are more interested in theorizing about categories of cases as well 
as explaining individual cases”.211 This argument explains the categorization of the 
data of this research, yet not the exposition of the cases.  
 
In summary, this methodology can be used in four different analyses: i) testing a 
theory and theory development, ii) making predictions iii) causal analysis and iv) 
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explanation of individual cases and outcomes. In this thesis, process tracing 
methodology is used to provide a method for the fourth one: to explain the cases and 
outcomes of the analysis.  
 
 
3.3 Data Collection and Data Codification 
 
The main source of this research is the data collected between these periods: for 
the process of the Annan Plan in Cyprus in 2004, the period starts with 1 January, 
2004 and ends with the referenda held in Cyprus on 24 April 2004; for the process of 
presidential election in 2007, the period starts with 1 January, 2007 and ends with the 
election of Abdullah Gül as the president on 28 August 2007.  
 
Data collection is based on internet research conducted on two main kinds of 
resources. The first one is the online archive of the newspaper Radikal,212 and the 
second one is the official web pages213 of the actors defined in the thesis. The data are 
composed of the official speeches, declarations, papers announced publicly, published 
or released by the actors. In addition, the official web page of the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey (TBMM)214 is a secondary source which was sometimes checked 
along with the online newsletters in English: Turkish Daily News and Today’s Zaman.  
 
Data are coded according to the scales explained in the section below. 
Codification has been attained as following. Firstly the data are coded by myself and 
then in order to calculate inter-coder reliability it is coded by an independent coder 
who has been taught in a training process about definitions of the scales, coding, and 
presentation of coding. A pilot codification has been conducted in order to solve 
misconceives and misunderstandings about the coding. The independent coder 
conducted coding on the randomly selected data from both cases and each actor. The 
results for the inter-coder reliability are presented as follows: Percentage agreement 
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between the main coder (myself) and the independent coder is 0.925 for the Annan 
Plan case and 0.863 for the Presidential Election case.  
 
 
3.3.1 Unit of Analysis 
 
The unit of analysis is the official declarations, press meetings’ papers belonging 
to the military, of AKP and CHP, speeches of the political party leaders and of the 
members in the public meetings, in the parliament and in group discussions. The 
interactions and relationships between these actors may be determined or shaped by 
ideological differences, or formed in order to keep status-quo in parallel to the 
traditional approach to policy making. However, these determinants are not included 
in this study since, only the process is analyzed rather the causal relationship of the 
cases. As pointed out above, these influential determinants can be studied further after 
this thesis generates theoretical and policy implications regarding the interaction of 
the actors and the nature of these interactions. 
 
 
3.3.2 Likert Scale Model 
 
According to Neuman “scaling is based on the idea of measuring the intensity, 
hardness, or potency of a variable”.215 Manheim and Rich also define the scaling 
methodology as “a procedure in which we combine a number of relatively narrow 
indicators into single , summary measure that we take to represent the broader, 
underlying concept of which each is a part.216 Additionally, Neuman states that the 
scaling method has two main purposes. Firstly, scaling is helpful “in the 
conceptionalization and operationalization processes”.217 Secondly, scaling can be 
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used in quantitative measures to test hypothesizes. In this thesis, the likert scale model 
is used in order to analyze the interaction of the actors in both cases. Although 
Neuman argues that the likert scale model is mostly used in survey research, in this 
thesis, rather than survey, a dynamic analysis is exercised through coding the data 
through the likert scale coding model. Because it allows the researcher to show the 
general picture as well as, most importantly, providing a comparison between two 
cases, the likert scale coding model is used.   
 
The likert scale coding consists of 5 scales. Each speech, declaration and 
announcement which actually constitutes the data, is coded in accordance with these 
scales in terms of its content.  
 
 
3.3.3 The Explanation of Competitive – cooperative organization/scale 
 
This line includes five main sub-titles which are competitive, somewhat 
competitive, neutral, somewhat cooperative, and cooperative.  
 
Code Scale Explanation 
1 Competitive  
The discussion between the actors is held in a highly 
tense atmosphere and it is also held through media 
speeches rather than face to face discussions. This 
includes the speeches or explanations of actor(s) which 
blame(s) and criticize(s) the other actor(s) for creating 
crisis and making the process hard to talk.  
2 
Somewhat 
Competitive  
Rather than blaming each other, actors mostly express 
their position for the crisis. However; the tone is again 
negative and competitive.  
3 Neutral  
Actors simply declare their positions and opinions about 
the crisis and there is nothing about blaming the other 
actor or its actions. 
4 
Somewhat 
Cooperative  
Actors state their own position but the tone is more 
cooperative and actors are close to creating cooperation 
in the next steps. 
5 Cooperative  
Actors are ready to work together in cooperation. Actors 
encourage each other to work together and express their 
pleasure about the process. 
 
Table 2: Explanation of the Scales 
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3.4 Procedures 
 
Data are generated through tracing political interaction per actor, per event and 
per time. Example of data codification according to the scale is presented below: 
  
Code Scale Data 
1 Competitive  
“The new policy line shows that we have entered an era 
when we are given instructions and obey what others say. 
Today, it is Cyprus, tomorrow, there will be other issues 
taken up with such a mentality. There is no end for it.”218  
2 
Somewhat 
Competitive  
“Those who held political power for years but failed to 
show the necessary political will are now criticizing us, 
even though they know the truth. We will not stoop to 
their level and shrink from our responsibilities. Being the 
government, we have to be committed to show this 
will.”219 
3 Neutral  
“There is an expectation that the military should always 
expose its certain position by declaring yes or no for any 
important issue and it actually has to be and this certain 
position should be shared with the public and we are 
respectful to that. However, it shouldn’t be expected that 
the military has always taken a side, a party, and should 
share these opinions with the public.”220 
4 
Somewhat 
Cooperative  
“Turkey as a whole should be in search of its president. 
Political parties and society should contribute to this 
process. The president must be an honest, distinguished 
and neutral person who matches the description stated in 
the Constitution and absorbs the Charter very well; 
obviously he should be someone who has no desire to 
change the pillars of the Constitution bluntly or secretly 
and no desire to tail a political party. Compromise must be 
genuine. Unilateral imposition or quadruple-imposition 
makes no difference. Conciliation on a presidential 
candidate cannot be mandated by a multiple-choice test. If 
                                                
218 Hürriyet Daily News, “Baykal: Government submissive on Cyprus talks” (18 April 
2004) available on http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=baykal-government-
submissive-on-cyprus-talks-2004-02-18  
 
219 Hürriyet Daily News, “Erdogan: Annan plan reflects our priorities” (7 April 2004), 
avaliable on http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=erdogan-annan-plan-
reflects-our-priorities-2004-04-07  
 
220 The original quote is avaliable on 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/n
isan2004/ana.html 
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the Prime Minister pays visits to parties, I hope he will 
have a ‘none of the above' choice among the options.”221 
5 Cooperative  
“A summit chaired by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was 
held yesterday at the Presidential Palace. During the three-
hour-plus meeting, top officials including Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Chief of General Staff Gen. Hilmi 
Ozkok, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, Foreign Ministry 
Undersecretary Ugur Ziyal and National Intelligence 
Organization (MIT) Undersecretary Senkal Atasagun 
discussed a new Cyprus plan prepared by the Foreign 
Ministry and other related institutions. The officials fully 
approved the plan, which uses UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan’s Cyprus plan as a basis, and resolved to solve the 
Cyprus issue as soon as possible through negotiations.”222 
 
Table 3: Example of Data Codification 
 
The next chapter is followed with the case presentations which cases are 
presented in general and actors’ positions in each case are introduced in detail.  
                                                                                                                                          
221 Hürriyet Daily News, “Baykal’ President Profile” (12 July 2007), avaliable on 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=baykal-include-none-of-the-above-
choice-in-akps-presidential-candidate-list-2007-07-12  
 
222 This data is considered as cooperative since the military and the AKP gathered to 
discuss the Annan Plan and ultimately agree to start negotiations. This is cooperative 
scale for both the military and the AKP. Document is available on 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinicerikarsiv.aspx?Id=6&Tarih=20040109&Haftalik=0#%
200  
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4 CASE PRESENTATION 
 
 
Chapter 4 presents the cases: the Annan Plan in 2004 and the Presidential 
Election in 2007. Firstly, backgrounds of the cases are introduced; secondly, the 
positions and perceptions of the actors are explained based on data collected.  
 
 
4.1 The Annan Plan in 2004 for the Cyprus Problem  
 
The first AKP government’s223 new approach to the Cyprus problem revealed the 
fault lines in its domestic politics as a very dense process of political conflict appeared 
around the Cyprus issue. In 2002, the AKP, came to power holding the majority of 
seats in the parliamentary elections.224 One of the first actions of the newly formed 
government was to develop and implement new policies on the protracted conflict of 
Cyprus. Although the military and the CHP together have been defenders of status-
quo, the military distinguished itself from CHP and took a more moderate position in 
interactions with the AKP. Moreover, the military and the AKP stated their 
commitment to work together in order to reach a mutually beneficial agreement for 
each side in Cyprus.225 
                                                
223 First AKP Government was in power between 2002 and 2007.  
224 In the overall voting, AKP had 34.34 %; CHP had 19.41 % of the votes. In the 
parliament, AKP had 365 seats and CHP had 177 seats. Although AKP had the simple 
majority of the seats, it was not enough to make constitutional amendments. Therefore 
AKP did not hold the absolute majority power in the national parliament.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/specials/1419_turk_elections/page2.shtml  
225 For a detailed analysis regarding the relations between the AKP and the military in 
period given, see: Metin Heper, “The Justice and Development Party, Government and 
the Military in Turkey”, Turkish Studies, Vol: 6 No:2 (2005): 215-231. Esra Çuhadar-
Gürkaynak and Emel Oktay, “The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus Policy: 
Implications for Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”, Turkish Studies, Vol:7, 
No:2, (June, 2006), 261-273. 
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The discussions which continued would lead to the negotiations of the Annan 
Plan proposed by Kofi Annan the Secretary General of the United Nations, and the 
subsequent 24th April 2004 referenda on the island. The Greek Cypriots rejected the 
Annan Plan in the referendum,226 and after that the Cyprus issue seemed to come to 
another gridlock. Currently, the leaders of Greek and Turkish Cypriots are still 
holding negotiations in Cyprus. 
 
In the following sections, the general background of the Annan Plan case, and the 
actors’ position and perception about the case are presented. 
 
 
4.1.1 General Background 
 
The Cyprus problem has occupied the agenda of Turkish politics since 1950. 
Briefly,227  
• In January 1950, Turkey accepted that  the island belonged to England  
• Through the mid-1950s, the slogan as well as the policy changed to 
“either Cyprus, or death” and in the same year the idea of division of the 
island was discussed and policy was shaped around the idea “either 
division, or death” in December 1955.  
• In 1960, the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus was recognized by 
Turkey.  
• In 1974, the issue continued escalate and the conflict led to a war which is 
known as the “Cyprus Peace Intervention to protect the human security 
and human rights of Turkish Cypriots” by the Turkish Republic.  
                                                
226 76 % of Greek side voted “no” and 65 % of Turkish side voted “yes”. See Esra 
Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Emel Oktay, “The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus 
Policy: Implications for Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”. 400.000 people 
from Greek side and 200.000 people from Turkish side voted in the referendum. For a 
detailed results, see: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/22/eu.cyprus  
227 This section very briefly explains the general foreign policy of Turkey since 1950s. 
Rather than chronological history of Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus, the evolution of 
Annan Plan and its assessments by the political actors in Turkish politics are presented. 
For a detailed historical research, see: Ali Çarkoğlu and William Hale, “Cyprus and 
Greek-Turkish Relations” in Part 14, The Politics of Modern Turkey: Critical Issues in 
Modern Politics, Vol: III (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp.153-191. 
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• In February 1975, the status of Turkish Cypriots started to be called as 
“the Federation of Cyprus Turkish State” by Turkish authorities. 
• In 1983, the Turkish-Cypriot side established their own state the “Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)” and Turkey has been the only 
state to recognize it since then.  
• In June 1989, calling Cyprus a Federation with two parts was adopted by 
Turkey.  
• In 1997, the idea of uniting the Northern Cypriots with the Turkish 
Republic was started to be spoken.  
• In January 2003, the position, which emphasized preserving national 
security was very crucial, was adopted.228  
 
It has been almost sixty years that Turkey has been a party to the Cyprus 
problem. Nevertheless, there have been very different and sometimes contrary policies 
such as on the one hand intervention into Cyprus and on the other hand recognition of 
a federation with two parts. These policies have been usually determined by political 
parties and mainly the leaders of political parties as well as the military domain. The 
main determinants of this inconsistent Cyprus policy can be stated as the 
westernization attempts of Turkey, the security and strategic anxieties of the military 
and public opinion (Kınacıoğlu and Oktay, 2006). Especially public opinion regards 
the Cyprus issue as a national issue and this determinant has mainly stressed the 
political parties and military, and affected their domestic as well as international 
politics.  
 
Throughout these sixty years, various resolution attempts have been developed 
either by the Guarantor states229 or the international organizations such as the United 
                                                
228 This berif explanation is written by Baskın Oran and published on Agos Newspaper 
on 29 Jan 2004. For a detailed historical background of the Cyprus issue and Turkish 
foreign policy on Cyprus, see: Halil Çivi, “Dünden Bugüne Kıbrıs [Cyprus From Past to 
Present]”, in Dr. Đrfan KALAYCI, Kıbrıs ve Geleceği: Ekonomik-Politik Bir Tartışma 
[Cyprus and its Future: A Economic-Political Discussion],(Ankara: Nobel Yayın 
Dağıtım, 2004). 
229.Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United 
Kingdom and Turkey states under ARTICLE 2:  
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Nations. One of the plans that has been widely known and negotiated several times by 
the parties is the Annan Plan. Although the Annan Plan was developed by the 
secretary-general of the UN, Kofi Annan, during the 1990s, the roots of the plan go 
back to the 1970s. The backbone of the Annan Plan was based on common policies 
regarding the resolution which had been decided in negotiations between Makarios 
and Denktaş on 12 February 1977 and between Denktaş and Kipriyanou on 19 May 
1979.230 The discussion in 2004 actually started in 2002 and the Annan Plan has been 
changed and revised five times during the negotiations between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots, and between Turkey and Greece between 2002 and 2004.  
 
In domestic politics, the negotiation of the Annan Plan also caused many 
discussions between the political parties, between the political parties and the military, 
between the political parties and the interest groups as well as within the public 
domain. Two main opinions arose leading to the evolution of two main camps of 
disagreement about the Annan Plan. On the one hand, there is a group231 who is 
against the Annan Plan and they perceive agreement on the plan would lead to the end 
of freedom for and perhaps even lead to the end of the existence of Turkish-Cypriots 
on the island. Therefore, the fundamental argument of this group is that the Annan 
Plan would propose a united Cyprus state, which is not acceptable since the Greek 
Cypriots would be the powerful community and might assimilate the Turkish 
Cypriots, ignoring the existence of two communities. Thus, this group seeks to have 
                                                                                                                                          
“Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the 
Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognize and guarantee 
the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also 
the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution. Greece, Turkey, 
and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concern them, any 
activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other 
State or partition of the Island”. William Mallinson, Cyprus : a modern history(London 
; New York : I.B. Tauris) 2005 p. 143. 
230 Mehmet Hasgüler, “Annan Planı Öncesi ve Sonrası Kıbrıs [Cyprus Before and After 
the Annan Plan]”, in Dr. Đrfan KALAYCI, Kıbrıs ve Geleceği: Ekonomik-Politik Bir 
Tartışma [Cyprus and its Future: A Economic-Political Discussion],(Ankara: Nobel 
Yayın Dağıtım, 2004). 
231 The first group mainly involves CHP and defenders of status-quo. The second group 
involves AKP and partly the military. Although the military is counted as the defenders 
of statud quo, it is way of communication on public is mostly in line with neutral 
approach in the case of Annan Plan. 
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two equal and independent separate states with two separate communities. According 
to this group, the Annan Plan does not also consider the security and strategic 
concerns of Turkey. On the other hand, the second group232 believes that there should 
be a solution because all other resolution attempts have failed and because Turkey has 
become a candidate for EU membership. Therefore, this group defends the positive 
sides of the Annan plan and states that the parties should negotiate and come to an 
agreement based on this plan. Moreover, they believe that Turkey would be helpful in 
making the Turkish Cypriots reach a mutually beneficial agreement. Before the talks -
between the military and the government- began in 2004, in 2003 there were also 
domestic discussions between the government and the military as well as the TRNC 
and tense explanations by Tayyip Erdoğan which were considered as the breakup of 
Turkish foreign policy of the past 40 years. This initial process is affirmed as 
following: 
 
“The Turkish position on Cyprus was divided mainly into two camps: on one 
side, President Sezer, the TRNC President Denktaş, and the Turkish military; on 
the other side, the JDP and the opposition parties in the TRNC. All the other 
political parties in Turkey, including the opposition Republican People’s Party 
and prominent political figures such as Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel, 
were supporting the former. In fact, it would not be far-fetched to argue that the 
unity on Turkey’s Cyprus policy since 1950 cracked for the first time.”233 
 
These discussions took part in domestic politics and the political parties-the 
government and the opposition-, the military, the interest groups, and NGOs 
announced their opinions and stated their positions regarding the Annan Plan. The 
issue has occupied the political agenda as well as the public discussion for a long time. 
Nevertheless, when the AKP won the national legislative election on 3 November 
2002 and the issue was brought to the table, the discussion started over again yet in a 
different way.  The Cyprus issue has been a complicated and complex story in the 
process of Turkey’s EU membership adventure starting in the 1990s. It was not 
directly linked to Turkey’s EU membership; however, the candidacy of Cyprus in the 
                                                
232 The second group involves AKP and partly the military. Although the military is 
counted as the defenders of statud quo, it is way of communication on public is mostly 
in line with neutral approch in the case of Annan Plan. 
233 Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Oktay, “The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus 
Policy: Implications for Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”, p.265. 
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EU has had a trigger effect on Turkey’s position toward the resolution of Cyprus 
problem. Moreover, EU officials have repeated many times that there is no connection 
between Turkey’s EU membership and Cyprus and they emphasized that the 
resolution of Cyprus problem is not one of the Copenhagen criteria during the 
December summit, in 2002 and later on.234 Another explanation is according to 
Robins, the underlying reason for this retreat, which is introduced as domestic one, is 
the influence of Kemalist establishment “which labeled the government naive and 
inexperienced”.235 
 
As a result, the situation in 2003 is different than in 2004 in the sense that it 
would be very difficult to say that the military was still in the same camp. At the 
beginning of 2004, it was observed that although the aggressive opposition of the CHP 
and the opposition in Cyprus had continued, the military and the AKP government 
worked together and led to the process being finished which was the realization of the 
referendum in Cyprus. The process which is analyzed in this thesis starts in January 
2004236 when the domestic actors agreed to evaluate the issue again in a cooperative 
way.  
 
The Annan Plan negotiation in Turkish domestic politics starts on 8 January 2004 
which is very important because the president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, hosted a summit 
with the participation of the prime minister, the ministry of foreign affairs, the 
ministry of defense, the head of the Turkish Armed Forces, and high level bureaucrats 
and generals from the military to discuss the Turkey’s Cyprus policy. At the end of 
                                                
234 Rasmussen’s statement “We see no connection between Turkey’s EU membership 
and Cyprus ... We have no intention of giving up the Copenhagen criteria in return for 
Cyprus”, Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Oktay, “The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus 
Policy: Implications for Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”, p.264. 
235Philip Robins, “Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002: Between a “post-Islamist” 
Government and a Kemalist State”, International Affairs, Vol: 83, No:1, (2007), p.289. 
  
236 The date 8 January 2004 is very important due to the fact that the presidency, the 
president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, hosted a summit with the participation of the prime 
minister, the minitery of foreign affairs, minitery of defence, the head of the Turkish 
Armed Forces, and the high level bureaucrats and generals from the military to discuss 
the Turkey’s Cyprus policy. At the end of this meeting, the participants agreed to forster 
the attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem through taking the Annan Plan as a 
resolution plan and decided to collobratively work. 
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this meeting, the participants agreed to encourage the attempts to resolve the Cyprus 
problem through taking the Annan Plan as a resolution plan and decided to work 
collaboratively. Following that meeting, three National Security Meetings237 which 
shaped the Turkey’s Cyprus policy were held till the referendum. These meetings 
were attributed as very significant in the sense that the government, the AKP, and the 
military came together, discussed the position that Turkey would take and finally the 
actors stated their willingness to work together in cooperation in the process. Erdoğan 
and Özkök also met privately a couple of times without any participants from the 
government or the military.238 Moreover, other than the NSC meetings239 and private 
talks, the military officially sent its strategic plan and opinion paper to the prime 
ministry three times.240 All these interactions show that there had been active 
communication between the AKP and the military which is considered as important in 
making national consensus on the Cyprus Annan Plan. 
 
Subsequently, the AKP’s visit to the US to ask for ‘back-up’ support in the 
negotiations on the Annan Plan was also important. In January, both the US 
administration and the EU officials officially declared their support for the Annan 
Plan and stated their position seeking a resolution based on the plan. Not only did the 
AKP officials visit the EU countries and the US, but also the EU officials came to 
Turkey and announced their support for the Annan Plan and their gratitude of 
Turkey’s attempts in the process. These kinds of explanations and statements 
promoted the AKP’s domestic position in negotiations with the domestic actors such 
as the military as well as influencing the domestic actors in the sense that the military 
                                                
237 Three National Security Meetings on 23rd  January, 31st March and 1st April in 
2004 
238 Two private meetings between Erdoğan and Özkök were organized: on 7 February 
and 21 March in 2004. 
239 In the Constitution (1982), the members of the NSC is defined as following: “the 
National Security Council shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the 
General Staff, Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers of Justice, National Defence, Internal 
Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy and  Air Forces and 
the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the President of 
the Republic. Depending on the particulars of the agenda, Ministers and other persons 
concerned may be invited to meetings of the Council and their views heard”.  
240 On 15th February, 9th March and 28th March in 2004. 
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chose to work in coordination with the government. Table 3 is drawn to present all the 
activities and interaction in the process.  
The overall interaction is shown below: 
 
Date Event 
8 January 2004 
The meeting at the Presidential house with the participation 
of the president, the prime minister and the chief of the 
General Staff of the army as well as the ministry of foreign 
affairs and high level bureaucrats and generals. 
13 January 2004 
The government was established in TRNC after the general 
elections. 
14 January 2004 A briefing meeting by the military to the Prime Minister. 
16 January 2004 High-level general Đlker Başbuğ’s Statement. 
19 January 2004 
Verheguen’s message that both sides in Cyprus should decide 
to hold referendum of the Annan Plan. 
23 January 2004 1st NSC Meeting. 
24 January 2004 Erdoğan met Kofi Annan in Davos. 
25 January 2004 
The US administration241 stated that they appreciated the start 
of the Cyprus negotiation under the auspices of the UN and 
encouraged all parties to the conflict to finalize the Annan 
plan and hold the referendum. 
26 January 2004 
Erdoğan and Gül went to the US and asked them to support 
the Turkey’s position in the negotiations. 
                                                
241 Radikal, “ABD: Elinizi çabuk tutun” (25 January 2004) available on 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=103793 
“ABD Türkiye'nin, BM gözetiminde Kıbrıs müzakerelerinin yeniden başlamasına 
yönelik desteğinin memnuniyetle karşılandığını açıkladı. Dışişleri Sözcüsü Adam Ereli, 
MGK toplantısının ardından yapılan açıklamanın önemli olduğunu söylerken, "Biz, 
tarafların, BM Genel Sekreteri'nin taleplerine mümkün olduğu kadar çabuk uymaları ve 
Annan Planı'na dayalı müzakereleri, planı sonuçlandırıp, belli bir tarihte referanduma 
koymayı kabul ederek yeniden başlatmaları gerektiğine inanıyoruz" dedi. Ereli, "Bu 
adımları atmak üzere bütün tarafları cesaretlendiriyoruz. Dışişleri Kıbrıs Özel 
Temsilcisi Tom Weston, Ankara'nın talebi doğrultusunda Ankara'ya gitti ve Kıbrıs'ta 
çözüme yönelik görüşmelerini sürdürecek" ifadelerini kullandı”.  
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29 January 2004 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly242 assessed the 
position of Turkey in the Cyprus negotiation as pragmatic and 
open-minded. 
First week of 
January 
Heated discussions between Erdoğan and Denktaş. 
2 February 2004 
Baykal’s statement that Turkish foreign policy’s 30 years 
stance had been broken. 
4 February 2004 
Annan’s speech that stated everybody seemed ready to start 
the negotiations. 
7 February 2004 Government meeting to evaluate the Annan’s letter. 
7 February 2004 Bilateral meeting between Erdoğan and Özkök. 
8 February 2004 CHP accused the AKP of blackmailing the public.243 
11 February 2004 
CHP threats and warnings244 toward the Cyprus policy of the 
AKP. 
14 February 2004 
The EU’s position245 was clearly acknowledged by Jean 
Christophe Filori, the spokesperson of the European 
Commission. 
15 February 2004 
The AKP officials informed the opposition: Foreign Ministry 
Bureaucrat Uğur Ziyal informed the CHP vice-president Onur 
Öymen; Foreign Ministry group informed the True Path Party 
about the domestic negotiations on the Annan Plan; Prime 
                                                
242 Radikal, “Annan'ın takvimi: Martta uzlaşma, nisanda referandum” (21 January 
2004), avaliable on: http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=104221  
243 Radikal, “Baykal: Hükümet şantaj yapıyor” (8 January 2004), avaliable on  
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=105490  
244 Radikal, “‘Kanıma Dokunuyor’” (11 February 2004). avaliable on  
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=105801  
Basically, Deniz Baykal’s statements: “the Cyprus policy of the AKP frozen my blood”; 
“The AKP used double language” and “we could interpellate in the national parliament 
if it is necessary”, 
245 Radikal, “AB taraf olmuyor” (14 February 2004). available on 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=106193 
“Our role is to support the UN. We don’t have any intention to be a party or have an 
official role in this conflict. this could only happen if all parties invite us to do so” Jean 
Christophe Filori, the spokesperson of the European Commission, 
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Minister Erdoğan sent an information note to the MHP’s 
leader Devlet Bahçeli; and Abdullah Gül informed the 
president of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) 
Bülent Arınç. 
15 February 2004 
The military delivered an official paper stating their position 
and including their concerns to the government (1st one). 
16 February 2004 
Frits Bolkestein, a member of the European Commission said 
that the commission would contribute to the island’s peace 
process.246 
17 February 2004 TUSĐAD declared its appreciation with the Cyprus policy. 
18 February 2004 
General Discussion on Cyprus policy and Annan Plan in the 
TGNA between the CHP and the AKP. 
27 February 2004 The military’s monthly press information meeting.247 
9 March 2004 
The military delivered an official paper stating their position 
and including their concerns to the government (2nd one). 
22 March 2004 The negotiations started in Switzerland.  
28 March 2004 
The military delivered an official paper stating their position 
and including their concerns to the government (3rd one). 
31 March 2004 NSC Meeting but Erdoğan and Gül could not participate.  
1 April 2004 NSC Meeting with participation of Erdoğan and Gül. 
5 April 2004 
The Annan Plan was discussed within the government 
bureaucrats. 
6 April 2004 
TGNA was informed about the ongoing process of Annan 
Plan and Cyprus negotiations by Abdullah Gül. 
13 April 2004 The military’s statement248 on Cyprus. This statement 
                                                
246  European Commission’s Bolkestein: “We Will Contribute To The Peace Process On 
Cyprus” available on 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/chr/ing2004/02/04x02x17.htm#%207 
Similar speeches by the EC and UN bureaucrats made throughout the process. For 
detailed information, see 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/arsiv/?bulten=Newspot  
247 The overall statement is avaliable on 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/s
ubat2004/ana.html  
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presented the concerns and position of the military. 
15 April 2004 
Denktaş’s speech at the Turkish National Grand Assembly 
and he affirmed that Cyprus is being lost. 
Till the referendum 
The domestic accusations continued between the CHP and the 
AKP as well as between Denktaş and the AKP. And Denktaş 
announced that he would vote against the Annan Plan. 
24 April 2004 
The referendum for the Annan Plan was held in Cyprus 
(South and North Cyprus). The outcome of the referendum 
was 65 % of Turkish Cypriots voted “yes” and 76 % of Greek 
Cypriots voted “no” to the Annan Plan. Therefore, the Annan 
Plan was rejected. 
 
Table 4: Summary of the Political Development in Annan Plan Case 
 
 
4.1.2 The position and the perception of the actors about the Annan Plan 
 
This section provides the general observations and explanations about the 
positions and perceptions of the actors regarding the Annan Plan in 2004. Each actor 
has taken different positions and perceived the Annan plan and negotiations over the 
Plan according their interests. 
 
 
4.1.2.1  AKP 
 
                                                                                                                                          
248Avaliable on: 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/n
isan2004/ana.html  
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The AKP249 had been established just 15 months before the general elections in 
2002. The AKP came to power after the general legislative elections on 3 November 
2002 holding 363 seats out of 550 in the TGNA and constituted the single party 
government. As a political party, the AKP officials refer to themselves as a 
conservative-democratic political party.250 The AKP leaders were the previous 
politicians of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP) which was formed within the 
Turkish Islamist Movement251 milli görüş (national outlook252), and which had been in 
power in coalition governments during the 1970s and 1990s. Regarding this, although 
the AKP tried to express itself as more modern than the RP, it was still argued that the 
core ideology of the AKP had not changed and it was a continuum of the RP.253 
Therefore, the first perception that the AKP had roots of the Islamist movement 
created very serious suspicions in public opinion about whether the AKP would 
establish a kind of Islamist state and draw the country away from the secular and 
                                                
249  For detailed information about AKP and developments after AKP’s victory in 
November 2002 general election, see: Recep Yener, Interview Türk Sağı ve AKP[Right-
wing of Turkey and AKP], Hasan Bülent Kahraman; söyleşi Recep Yener. (Đstanbul : 
Agora Kitaplığı, c2007).; Bilâl N. Şimşir, AB, AKP ve Kıbrıs : Araştırma (Đstanbul : 
Bilgi Yayınevi, 2003); Metin Heper, “The Victory of Justice and Development Party in 
Turkey”, Mediterranean Politcs, Vol.8 No:1 (Spring 2003). pp. 127-134. Ahmet Đnsel, 
“The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey”, The South Atlantic Quarterly 
Vol:2, No:3, (Spring/Summer 2003). Metin Heper, “Conservative-Democratic 
Government by Pious People: The Justice and Development Party in Turkey”, in 
Ibrahim : Abu –Rabi (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought 
(New York: Blackwell). For information from official web page of AKP, see: 
http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/akparty.html  
250Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Parti Programı (The Programme of Justice and 
Development Party), Ankara 2002. 
251 Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Oktay, “The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus 
Policy: Implications for Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”. 
252 Çoşar briefly explained this tradition as following: “The National Outlook tradition 
has been represented by the National Order Party (Millıˆ Nizam Partisi, MNP)–National 
Salvation Party (Millıˆ Selamet Partisi, MSP)–RP– FP–Bliss Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) 
line throughout a period of almost three decades. The division between ‘reformists’ and 
‘traditionalists’ was not, in fact, alien to the National Outlook line. The first of such 
divisions within the National Outlook line was experienced in the last MSP congress in 
1978”. Simten Coşar and Aylin  Özman, “Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 
General Election: Neo-liberalism with a Muslim Face”, Contemporary Politics, Vol.10,  
No: 1 (2004), pp.57–74. 
253AKP is claimed as viewed as an offspring of the National Outlook tradition: Coşar 
and Özman, “Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 General Election: Neo-
liberalism with a Muslim Face”. 
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western establishment.254 However, the very initial attempt of the AKP was to 
emphasize its willingness to undertake all steps and implement whole policy changes 
to make Turkey an EU candidate. Starting from the EU summit in December in 2002, 
the AKP leaders, chiefly Erdoğan and Gül developed very close relationships with the 
EU member states, lobbied Turkey’s candidacy in these countries, and made the 
necessary amendments in the legislature to be an EU candidate. These type of 
statements and endeavors about foreign policy issues such as the resolution attempts 
for the Cyprus problem showed in a way that the AKP had not any concrete policy to 
prove these suspicious. Therefore, the AKP constituted the government and ruled the 
country till the general legislative election which was held on 22 July 2007.  
 
Within the context of the Annan Plan, the position of the AKP has always been 
made clear by statements that declare support for a mutual agreement and resolution. 
Especially Erdoğan and Gül lobbied the issue in the US and at the EU level and tried 
to convince them to support the Annan Plan and Turkey’s position. The AKP refused 
to stay with the status quo and insisted that it had to be changed. Thus, Gül, in his 
explanation, expressed that there were two alternatives for Turkey: either to support 
the resolution or to keep the status quo and if the status quo was kept, there would be 
problems in getting Cyprus accepted by the world.  
 
Additionally, the AKP also affirmed its readiness to compromise and work in 
cooperation with the army in domestic discussions regarding the Annan Plan. In this 
sense, the AKP differentiated the Annan Plan negotiations between the military and 
the government that is the plan was related to the military in the sense of security and 
it was related to the ministry of foreign affairs in the sense of politics. Therefore, it has 
been always the case that the AKP stated their position as one of working with the 
military within the context mentioned above in the process. Indeed, this policy has 
been implemented through the whole process in which the AKP has been in 
government. The general policy has been introduced by Heper as follows: 
 
“… just as the military strove to develop a modus Vivendi with the government, 
the AKP government, too, tried to achieve the same goal. Both Gül and Erdoğan 
                                                
254 Ahmet Insel, “The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey”, The South 
Atlantic Quarterly Vo: 102, No:2/3, (Spring/Summer 2003), pp. 293-308,  
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, as prime ministers, suggested that the government and the military should get 
together as often as necessary and go over the issues on which the military is 
sensitive.”255 
 
This approach can be an explanation as to how the AKP sustained the 
relationship with the military in general in the Annan Plan process in 2004.  
 
The relation of the Annan Plan with the EU had also been another discussion 
topic between the actors in the process. The AKP kept emphasizing that Cyprus would 
join the EU by the 1st May, so they associated the resolution of Cyprus issue and the 
membership of Turkey to the EU. Kınacıoğlu and Oktay’s following observation is 
very valuable to introduce the AKP’s, determination: 
 
“Erdoğan’s decisiveness this time and throwing his weight behind the new 
initiative by intensifying the pressure on Denktaş stemmed mainly from two 
factors. First, the fact that the Greek Cypriot side would become an EU member 
by May 1, 2004 increased the time pressure for the solution of the Cyprus issue, a 
factor repeatedly underlined by the EU officials as a would-be obstacle for 
Turkey’s getting a date for accession talks in December 2004. Second, Erdoğan’s 
assertiveness can also be explained by his consolidated political position and 
hold on the parliament after one year in the office as the Prime Minister.”256 
 
Although Erdoğan and other AKP officials clearly stated that the resolution in 
Cyprus is not a necessary condition to the Turkey’s EU candidacy nor is it one of the 
Copenhagen criteria, Erdoğan’s statement257 which underlined that they, as the 
government, should consider the process after May 1st indicated that Erdoğan actually 
thought that the Cyprus problem could be an obstacle for Turkey to be the EU 
candidate. 
 
 
                                                
255 Metin Heper, “The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in 
Turkey”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, (June 2005), p.224. 
256 Müge Kınacıoğlu And Emel Oktay, “The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus 
Policy: Implications for Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”, Turkish Studies 
Vol. 7, No. 2, (June 2006), p. 268. 
257 Erdoğan’s speech in Turkish “1 Mayıs'tan sonraki süreç ne getirecek, ne götürecek 
bunun hesabını yapıyorlar mı bunu konuşanlar. Bunun hesabını yapmak lazım.” 
Avaliable on: http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=3487&kategori=1  
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4.1.2.2  CHP  
 
The CHP258 is the political party which founded the Turkish Republic and it was 
established in 1923. The CHP was the only political party at that time ruled the 
Turkish Republic until the general national election in 1946. After that the CHP had 
mostly been in coalition governments at different times. The very last time that the 
CHP was in power, as a political party, was during the coalition government between 
1995 and 1996 (during the III. Çiller Government)259. Since that time the CHP has 
been as opposition party and during the AKP government between 2002 and 2007, the 
CHP had been the main opposition party in the national government. 
 
During the process of the Annan Plan in 2004, the CHP was completely against 
the Annan Plan negotiations as well as the policy making methods of the AKP. Thus, 
the main stance of the CHP was basically based on criticism of the AKP and the 
Annan Plan. Regarding the AKP, the policy and attempts of the AKP were seen as a 
very dramatic shift from the Turkish Foreign Policy of Cyprus which had been 
implemented for 30 years as well as a resignation in foreign strategic interests. The 
CHP also criticized that the unease created by the Annan Plan was ignored but without 
considering the CHP the plan was opened to discussion by the AKP officials.  
 
According to the CHP, the plan, itself, was totally wrong and it was a critical 
dissolution of Cyprus rather than a resolution260 to Cyprus since the plan proposed the 
one united state with two communities rather than two independent states. This 
proposition was believed to moving away from the situation which was held in 
                                                
258 For detailed information about CHP, see: Sinan Ciddi, Kemalism in Turkish politics : 
the Republican People's Party, secularism and nationalism  (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2009); Gülsüm Tütüncü Esmer, CHP: 1965-1980: Türk siyasal yaşamında 
ortanın solu (Đstanbul : Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayınları, 
2006); Hikmet Bilâ, CHP, 1919-1999 (Đstanbul : Doğan Kitapçılık, 1999). 2nd ed. 
  
259 The president of the CHP Deniz Baykal was the Ministry of Foreign Affiairs and 
vice-prime minister between 30. 10.1995 and 06.03.1996  in coalition government of 
True Path Party-DYP- and the CHP. www.tbmm.gov.tr  
260 Radikal, “Meclis Kıbrıs’ı tartıştı”(7 April 2004) available on 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=112440  
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1974.261 The CHP argued that if the Annan Plan was accepted, the TRNC would be 
shared with the Greek Cypriots as well. Additionally, the CHP also claimed that the 
prime minister both in Turkey and TRNC as well as people who would vote for it did 
not know about the Plan. The CHP officials argued that the acceptation of the Annan 
Plan in Cyprus would affect Turkey in the sense that Turkey would have to give more 
concessions in its foreign policies. 
 
 
4.1.2.3 The Military 
 
The Turkish Armed Forces, the military, was one of the founding elements of the 
Turkish Republic. The military has had a right to be involved into politics from time 
to time through either military coups such as the 1960, 1971 and 1980 coup d’états  or 
‘soft’ interventions such as through sending a note to the government as happened in 
1997 and in 2007. Yet, according to Heper, since 1999, the effect of Turkey’s position 
and attempts to be a candidate to the EU has changed this approach in general. It was 
the case that the head of the army, Özkök emphasized that political and military aspect 
of issues should be differentiated at the beginning of the AKP government.  
 
The military did not get involved in either political aspect of the Annan Plan nor 
the political discussion. The generals and the officials from the military especially 
avoided making any political statement about the Annan Plan. Kınacıoğlu and Oktay 
made the following statement about the stance of the military: 
 
“The stance of the Turkish military during the whole course of the negotiations 
was one of restraint. The occasional statements by top military officials have 
mostly underlined a viable and just solution on the island, and military officials 
were cautious not to make statements that could affect the course of the 
negotiations in any way. On April 13, 2004, before the referenda, outlining the 
pros and cons of the Annan plan and reiterating the significance of Cyprus for 
Turkey’s security and regional stability, the Chief of General Staff Özkök 
pointed out the plan’s failure to provide permanent derogations as the most 
serious deficiency. Nevertheless, he also stated that Turkey’s parliament and the 
Turkish Cypriot people had the final say on the proposed Cyprus deal based on 
                                                
261 Deniz Baykal’s speech is avaliable on 
http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?module=chpmain&page=show_speech&speech_id=15
8  
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the Annan plan. Thus, it would not be wrong to argue that the Turkish military’s 
approach, which is traditionally sensitive to the Cyprus issue and considers it a 
“national cause,” can be characterized as one of prudence.”.262 
 
In the process, the military shared its opinion and position about the plan with the 
government through the NSC meetings. Three NSC meetings were held as well as 
three military position papers being sent to the Prime Minister. Therefore, as 
Kınacıoğlu and Oktay pointed out, the military could be considered as neutral in the 
political discussions over the Annan Plan which had been contrarily experienced till 
then. 
 
 
4.2 The Presidential Election in 2007 in Turkey, 
 
The second case of this thesis is the Presidential Election held in 2007. The 
incidents which happened during the process were also called political crisis and 
presidential crisis. Yavuz and Özcan point out that the real problem in Turkey was the 
“radical polarization of society, which is an outcome of Turkey’s political ethos of 
creating a secular and national society through the means of the state”263 In the 
Presidential election process, these radical polarized societies, which are called the 
“secularist” vs the “Islamists”, clearly appeared. This polarization has also been 
evolving at the administrative level for years and when it reached its peak point with 
the exaggeration of political parties and the military in 2007, the presidential crisis 
dramatically happened. The section below provides a general background about the 
case of the Presidential election and an explanation of the position and perception of 
the actors about the Presidential Election in 2007.  
 
 
4.2.1 General Background 
                                                
262 Kınacıoğlu and Oktay, “The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus Policy: 
Implications for Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”, p.269. 
 
263 M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, Crisis In Turkey: The Conflict Of Political 
Languages, Middle East Policy, Vol:14, No: 3, (Fall, 2007), p.118. 
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During this process, the parliament housed hot debates, mutual accusations, and 
flaming speeches between the two political parties: the AKP and the CHP. In addition 
to the parliamentary discussions, labor organizations,264 interests groups,265 and the 
public in general participated in the process through demonstrations, press meetings, 
and declarations. In the final stage of the crisis, the escalation reached its peak when 
the military establishment published a declaration on its web page, emphasizing its 
position and strict standing against the AKP’s candidate. This positioning was 
considered by many scholars, journalists, public authorities and the public as an e-
memorandum, a kind of military intervention, which occurs when the military “openly 
displays its position and attitudes when it becomes necessary” concerning the issue of 
secularism. Therefore, it was a military intervention into civil political domain to stop 
the existing ruling power. The government responded to the military’s intervention in 
an unprecedented way which clearly reminded all concerned that the military is 
responsible to the prime minister and any declaration against this institution or any 
such attempts are unimaginable. Nevertheless, the crisis was taken into a new phase 
when the Turkish Constitutional Court reinterpreted the constitution, with its decision 
annulling the first round of the presidential election and requiring of all 367 deputies 
to be present in the parliament in the election. Therefore, this decision made it 
impossible for the current formation of the parliament to elect the president. Thus, the 
government had to run for an early general election on 22 July 2007.  
 
Regarding the political camps that led to this crisis, Balkır (2007) sums up the 
division of the society in her argument: 
 
“With the rise of AKP, the ‘security barrier’ erected by the former status quo 
powers to guard themselves against challenging elements has failed to function. 
Over the past four and half years, the ruling AKP has worked carefully to 
convince both the secularist and conservative elite of the country that, though it 
was coming from an Islamic background, it has ‘changed and progressed’ and 
become centrist. However, the current political map of Turkey shows a sharp 
divide between AKP and the secularist opposition. The people supportive of the 
AKP, other Islamist or Islamist-nationalist groups, and those who may not 
support the AKP under normal conditions but consider the attitudes taken against 
the ruling party as anti-democratic have supported the AKP in the polls of 22 
                                                
264 Such as KESK, Hak-Đş, Memur-Sen, Türk-Đş, TĐSK. 
265 Such as TUSĐAD, TOBB, MUSĐAD, Committee of University Rectors. 
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July. On the opposite side, the hard-core secularists, Kemalists, nationalists as 
well as those who feel that there is a fundamental threat to their way of secular 
living are supportive of the main opposition CHP, Democratic Party (DP), Young 
Party (GP) and the extreme rightist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)”266 
 
Three breaking points are observed in the analysis of the process. These are i) the 
announcement of the presidential candidate ii) the e-memorandum iii) the decision of 
the Constitutional Court. In order to present the background of the case, these points 
should be introduced and briefly explained. To begin with, the process until the 
announcement of the presidential candidate had been experienced mostly between the 
AKP and the CHP. The involvement of the military was seen as very limited (but a 
very significant and influential intervention, even so) with the exception of some 
official declarations defining the president’s characteristics. In this first process, 
although there were certain cooperation attempts, the nature of the discussion and the 
interaction was very tense, aggressive and competitive. However, the interaction 
became even worse when the AKP introduced Abdullah Gül as a presidential 
candidate. The initial reaction from the CHP was based on the argument that Gül had 
the same ideological identity as Erdoğan had which was believed to be a threat to the 
regime. Balkır points out that “the opposition accused the government of endangering 
the country’s secularist traditions by proposing a presidential candidate whose wife 
wears a headscarf”.267 Even though CHP’s leader Deniz Baykal congratulated 
Abdullah Gül on being a candidate, he affirmed that Gül should leave his political and 
ideological beliefs aside, but he also emphasized that the CHP would closely follow 
his presidency. Balkır states that “Erdoğan decided to drop his candidacy, the 
possibility of which had brought severe criticism from secular forces that had been on 
the streets demonstrating against him, due to his previous Islamist political views”.268 
The process continued with the publication of the e-memorandum and the 
Constitutional Court’s decision. Needless to say, the military e-memorandum which 
was considered as an intervention into politics was the second turning point. The brief 
statement of the e-memorandum read “The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their 
sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the 
                                                
266 Canan Balkır, “The July 2007 Elections in Turkey: A Test for Democracy”, 
Mediterranean Politics, Vol:12, No:3, (2007), p.417.  
267 Ibid., p.415 
268 Ibid. 
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unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey”.269 This intervention was 
unexpected as Abdullah Gül stated as well as unimaginable as Çemil Çiçek stated in 
the counter statement of the government. The military statement also proved how 
much importance was attributed to the issue of presidential election by the military 
and thus showed that the military still believed it had the right to warn the government 
which is not the case in democratic regimes. Lastly, the decision of the Constitutional 
Court had a very significant impact on the process through the regulation of the 
quorum for the TGNA meeting. Because of that decision, the government, the AKP, 
had to call a general election since the AKP could not reach the quorum 367 in the 
parliament. After the decision was made to run the general election, the interaction 
between the actors, mainly between the AKP and the CHP became more insistent and 
they blamed each other of sustaining the political crisis. The importance of and the 
critical power of the Constitutional Court are highlighted by Balkır when he states that 
the Constitutional Court and the Presidency have been institutions to fill the absence 
of a check and balance system such as a Senate institution and argued that these 
institutions implicitly check and balance the system based on the 1982 Constitution. 
 
The overall interaction with important dates is shown based on date in Table 4. 
  
Date Event 
12 January 2007 
Erdoğan’s speech stated that they would not seek for a 
compromise with the CHP. 
2 March 2007 
TUSĐAD’s statement to the political parties to compromise 
(1st one). 
6 March 2007 
Baykal’s speech stated that if there is no compromise, there 
would be crisis. 
March 2007 The discussion over ‘367’ case started. 
8 March 2007 Baykal’s meeting with the TUSĐAD. 
9 March 2007 Arınç’s meeting with the TUSĐAD. 
29 March 2007 
TUSĐAD’s statement to the political parties to compromise 
(2nd one). 
                                                
269 Ibid. 
 81 
5 April 2007 
Various statements from the labor organizations: Hak-Đş, 
Memur-Sen, Türk-Đş; from the interest groups: TUSĐAD, 
MUSĐAD, Rectors Committee, TOBB. 
13 April 2007 
Press Meeting of the military: Büyükanıt’s speech to state the 
loyalty of the president to the principles of the republic.270. 
14 April 2007 Tandoğan Demonstration in Ankara (1st Republic Meeting). 
25 April 2007 
The official presidential candidate of the AKP was announced 
as Abdullah Gül. 
25 April 2007 
Comments on the Gül’s candicacy from political party 
leaders: Erkan Mumcu (Motherland Party), Devlat Bahçeli 
(Nationalist Moverment Party), Zeki Sezer (Democratic 
Leftist Party), Recai Kutan (Saadet Partisi), Doğu Perinçek 
(Labor Party). 
27 April 2007 
Parliament Meeting, 1st round of the presidential election was 
held but 367 votes were not found to elect the president in the 
1st round. 
27 April 2007 
Midnight e-memorandum of the military was published on 
www.tsk.mil.tr at midnight. 
28 April 2007 
The government’s reply was read by Cemil Çiçek and the 
government stated its stance to support the democratic system 
and emphasized the military’s official hierarchical position in 
Turkey’s governing system.  
28-27 April 2007 The CHP took the issue of 367 to the Constitutional Court. 
30 April 2007 
TUSĐAD’s statement which considered the e-memorandum as 
anti-democratic movement. 
1 May 2007 
The Constitutional Court decision that accepted 367 as a 
quorum to gather in the parliament for the presidential 
election. 
1 May 2007 
Abdullah Gül’s statement: “I am still a presidential 
candidate”. 
6-7 May 2007 Parliament Meeting, 1st round of the presidential election was 
                                                
270 Radikal, “Büyükanıt cumhurbaşkanı adayını tarif etti” (13 April 2007) available on 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=218257  
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held but 367 votes again were not found to elect the president 
in the 1st round. Therefore, based on the new Constitutional 
amendment, the election of the presidential was cancelled. 
7 May 2007 Abdullah Gül resigned from the President candidacy. 
? May 2007 
The decision of the government to run the general elections 
on 22 July 2007. 
22 July 2007 The General Elections in Turkey. 
13 August 2007 Abdullah Gül was again a presidential candidate. 
15 August 2007 Gül’s visit to MHP, DSP, BBP and independent candidates. 
16 August 2007 Labor Unions’ statements: DĐSK, Türk-Đş, TĐSK, Hak-Đş. 
16 August 2007 Gül’s visit to TOBB. 
18 August 2007 Gül’s visit to TUSĐAD and MUSĐAD. 
20 August 2007 
Presidential Election 1st Round Meeting, 367 was reached 
with the participation of the MHP. 
27 August 2007 
TSK, the military, published its note for the 30 August 
Victory Bayram 3 days early and once more emphasized the 
uneasiness of the military about the presidential candidate. 
28 August 2007 
Presidential Election 2nd Round Meeting and Abdullah Gül 
was elected as the eleventh President of Turkey. 
 
Table 5: Summary of Political Developments in Presidential Election Case 
 
 
4.2.2 The position of the actors in the process 
 
In this section, the position of the actors during the process is going to be 
introduced. Firstly, the presidency as an institution has had a very important power 
such as appointing high level bureaucrats to significant institutions for the consistency 
of the regime and a symbolic power representing the Turkish Republic and its secular 
stance. This perception had been upheld for many years in Turkish politics and thus 
the presidency has been considered as a veto or control power upon the government.  
 
 
4.2.2.1 AKP 
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In the beginning of the process, the AKP chose to be silent and decided not to 
discuss or negotiate the presidential candidate. The AKP bureaucrats thought that the 
process was fair and they had a right to keep silent. Later on, the AKP changed its 
position and decided to talk to the some NGO’s representatives as well as discuss the 
issue within the party administration. Nevertheless, the decision on the candidacy of 
Gül had been reached without any discussion within the AKP or with any other 
political party. After the political crisis appeared and peaked with the e-memorandum 
and the Constitutional amendment, their position shifted to blaming the ‘other’ party 
which was mainly the CHP and partly the military for creating the crisis. To a certain 
extent, the AKP’s position can be argued as competitive. Another issue is about the 
perception of the presidency as an institution by the AKP. According to the statements 
made by the AKP bureaucrats, the presidency belongs to everybody in the country, to 
70 million citizens not an elite group or such.271 Moreover, related to the discussion of 
‘367’ case, the AKP’s officials continuously emphasized that they would elect the 
president as had happened in previous elections and thus stated that they would not 
look for 367 deputies to be present in the parliament to start the election of the 
president. 
 
 
4.2.2.2 CHP 
 
CHP’s position had been mostly stated by Deniz Baykal. Three issues should be 
explained regarding the CHP’s position. First, from the beginning of the process, the 
CHP pressured the AKP to declare its candidate and blamed it for creating a political 
crisis (presidential crisis). The issue of deciding who would be the presidential 
candidate had been very much publicized in the statements of the CHP. The CHP 
claimed that the AKP perceived the presidency not as an institution but a place to 
conquer and thus the election of the president was also a process of conquest.272 
                                                
271 The original quotation is avaliable on 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=18562&kategori=1  
272 The original quotation is “Bu anlayışın sonucu Çankaya, cumhurbaşkanı seçilecek 
bir mevki olmaktan çıkmış, fethedilecek bir zirve hâline dönüşmüştür” avaliable on 
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Second, the CHP perceived the presidency as an institution as a control center which 
has the authority to veto inaccuracies in the administration as well as to represent the 
regime. Additionally, Deniz Baykal stated that at the time when a political power, 
which had a tendency to make mistakes, was in government, the importance and value 
of the presidency had been increased.273 It was also the case that “if Gül was elected, 
the AKP would control the presidency, the government and the parliament” (Balkır, 
2007: 415) which was completely unacceptable by the CHP. As a third issue, the CHP 
had continuously affirmed the characteristics of the president such as loyalty to the 
principles of the regime, secularism and etc. Lastly, the CHP assessed its own position 
and strategies which it had implemented as successful in protecting the country from a 
crisis and chaos as well as the regime from a threat. 
 
 
4.2.2.3 The Military 
 
The military is also presented as a party to the April 2007 crisis by Yavuz and 
Özcan and they introduce the military’s position as an “opposition party” (2007: 125). 
In this thesis, the military’s position is presented in two ways: prior to the e-
memorandum and after the e-memorandum based on observations of the process. 
Prior to the military declaration and the declaration of Gül’s candidacy, the military 
statements defined the characteristics of the president as a person who was loyal to the 
core values of the republic from their heart.274 Moreover, the head of the army, 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?module=chpmain&page=show_speech&speech_id=33
8  
273 The original quotation is “Cumhurbaşkanlığı bizde, rejimimizin bir anlamda hem 
temsil bakımından hem de yönetiminde yanlışlıkların engellenmesi açısından çok 
önemli fren yetkileri olan, yanlışa engel olma şansına sahip, en yukarıdan yanlışa engel 
olma şansına sahip, en tehlikeli yanlışları önleyebilme şansına sahip fevkalade önemli 
bir yönetim noktası. Cumhurbaşkanlığı bu bakımdan çok büyük önem taşıyor, hele 
yanlışlığa eğilimli bir siyasi iktidarın iş başında bulunduğu dönemlerde, 
Cumhurbaşkanlığının değeri, önemi çok daha artıyor” avaliable on 
http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?module=chpmain&page=show_speech&speech_id=33
7 . 
274 Radikal, “Büyükanıt cumhurbaşkanı adayını tarif etti” (13 April 2007) available on 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=218257  
The orginal quotation is “seçilecek cumhurbaşkanı aynı zamanda TSK'nın 
başkomutanıdır. Bu yönüyle seçimler TSK'yı yakından ilgilendirmektedir”. “Hem 
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Büyükanıt reminded all concerned that the president would be the leader of the army, 
too and added that within this context the military is highly and truly interested in the 
presidential election. These statements were very crucial and very significantly shared 
with the public and thus exposed the uneasiness of the military.  
 
Hence, the e-memorandum was a position statement and clearly a warning to the 
government:  
 
“The problem that [has] emerged in the presidential election process is focused 
on arguments over secularism. [The] Turkish armed forces maintain their sound 
determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the 
unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. It has been observed that 
some circles have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb fundamental values 
of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, and have increased their efforts 
recently. Those activities include requests for redefinition of fundamental values 
of the Republic and attempts to organize alternative celebrations instead of our 
national festival symbolizing the unity and solidarity of our nation. Those who 
carry out the mentioned activities, which turned into an open challenge against 
the state, do not refrain from exploiting holy religious feelings of our people, and 
they try to hide their real goals under the guise of religion.…Those who are 
opposed to the Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s understanding ‘How 
happy is the one who says I am a Turk,’ are enemies of the Republic of Turkey 
and will remain so. The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound 
determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the 
unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this 
determination is absolute.”275 
 
As was expressed in the statement, the military reminded the government that 
they would not hesitate to use their rights which are stated in the Constitution. This 
statement was not simply a position statement, but very critically a warning to the 
government in order to make the government rethink its position and actually to give 
up its position. In this sense, this powerful threat had gone down into Turkey’s history 
as another political crisis and military intervention. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
vatandaş hem TSK'nın bir personeli olarak cumhuriyetin temel değerlerine sözde değil 
özde sahip olan bir kişinin cumhurbaşkanı seçilecek olmasını umut ediyoruz” The 
English translation of this speech is presented as “someone who truly respects the 
principles of the republic, not someone who pretends to do” Yavuz and Özcan, “Crisis 
In Turkey: The Conflict Of Political Languages”, p.130.  
275 Ibid., p.120. 
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Consequently, all the actors indicated their positions through public speeches, 
official declarations and statements. For the above mentioned explanations, all actors 
took competitive positions which are analyzed in this thesis and explained in detailed 
in the next chapter. Nevertheless, Yavuz and Özcan suggest that the main motivation 
of the crisis is “the Kemalist establishment’s animus toward the AKP and Erdoğan’s 
style of managing the presidential election. They accused Erdoğan of confusing the 
AKP parliamentary group and the synergetic nature of Turkish society”.276 
 
The next section presents the findings based on an analysis of the cases 
introduced in detail above. The observations are also pointed out after the general 
introduction of the analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
276 Ibid., p.121. 
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5 DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
This section consists of two main parts. First, result of the analysis per case are 
presented in each case section. The figures display the percentage of the actors’ way 
of interaction according to the codification of the data. The figures provide a general 
visual result of the data codification. After each actor’s data codification is presented, 
the finding and discussion section follows. This section presents observations 
regarding the actors’ interaction. The first section also contains the comparative 
analysis that is developed to compare the data for the actors’ interaction and to display 
the nature of the interaction for each case. 
 
Secondly, the general comparison of the cases and actors’ interaction are 
introduced again based on figures developed through data analysis. It starts with the 
Annan plan case and continues with the Presidential election case.  
 
 
5.1  Annan Plan – 2004 
 
This section presents the demonstration of analysis and findings of the actors’ 
interaction over the Annan Plan in 2004. Figures display the cooperative and 
competitive scores of the actors for the Annan Plan case.  
 
 
5.1.1 AKP 
 
The AKP, as the government, started the negotiation process to resolve the 
Cyprus Problem based on Annan Plan framework at the beginning of January 2004. 
Throughout the process, the AKP interacted with the other actors in ways such as 
cooperative, competitive and neutral. In this section, the AKP’s manner of interaction, 
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codification results, and the main issues during the process which made the AKP 
either cooperative or competitive are presented. 
 
According to the data codification, AKP interaction between CHP and the 
Military was coded in all scales. Figure 4 shows the competitive and cooperative 
scores of the AKP in the Annan plan case. As can be seen from figure 4, it is certain 
that the cooperative scale is the highest compared to the other scales 38 %. This result 
is also the highest percentage of the cooperative scale when compared with the other 
actors’ cooperative scales. This highest scale is predicted and expected due to the fact 
that the AKP’s policy on Cyprus problem has considerably shifted in the sense that 
they emphasized the resolution based on mutual agreement as well as they really 
lobbying this issue to reach a consensus in domestic politics as well as in international 
politics.  The some-what cooperative score is 13 %. It could be argued that the overall 
cooperative scores of the AKP in this case is over 50 %. Another important result is 
that the AKP had 25 % neutral score. Therefore, more than 75 % of the overall score 
can be claimed as cooperative through including the neutral scale. This result shows 
us that the AKP’s moves and interaction occurred mostly in a cooperative way.  
 
Figure 4: AKP in the Annan Plan (2004) 
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The total number of the data collected is 64 which the highest number collected 
for an actor in the case of Annan Plan. Because each and every speech of the prime-
minister and other ministers are published either on the AKP’s webpage 
(www.akp.org.tr) or in an online-newspaper (www.radikal.com.tr) the number of 
pieces of data is that many. Although there were hundreds of declarations, speeches 
and press meetings, and releases done by the AKP regarding the Annan Plan, they 
were not directly related to the interaction of the AKP with other actors in the process. 
Rather, they are mostly related to the position of the AKP in the negotiations with the 
UN and Northern Cyprus. Therefore, they were not collected as data. Table 5 is the 
list of division of the data among the scales. As shown in table 5, 7 pieces of data are 
coded as competitive, 8 pieces data as somewhat competitive, 16 pieces data as 
neutral, 8 pieced data as somewhat cooperative and 25 pieces data, which was the 
highest number, are coded as cooperative. 
 
1-Competitive 7 
2-Somewhat Competitive 8 
3-Neutral 16 
4-Somewhat Cooperative 8 
5-Cooperative 25 
Total 64 
 
  Table 6: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale – 
AKP, Annan Plan 2004 
 
Consequently, AKP’s interaction can be characterized mostly as cooperative 
according to results of the figure 5 and table 5.  
 
 
5.1.2 CHP 
 
Figure 5 shows the competitive and cooperative scores of the CHP in the Annan 
Plan case. As can be seen from figure 5, the competitive scale is 75 % which is the 
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highest percentage for all actors. The somewhat competitive scale is 15 %. Both of 
these scales prove that the CHP’s style of interaction in the process is 90 % 
competitive. The neutral score of the CHP is 10 %. It is also shown in figure 5 that the 
CHP’s moves and actions have not been coded in somewhat cooperative and 
cooperative scales. Therefore, these scales are zero.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: CHP in the Annan Plan (2004) 
 
Table 6 presents the distribution of the number of pieces of data collected for the 
CHP in the case of Annan Plan.  The total number of pieces the data is 20 of which 15 
coded as competitive; of which 3 coded as somewhat competitive; and of which 2 
coded as neutral. As it can clearly be seen, there is not any data coded in the sections 
for somewhat cooperative and cooperative which indicates that the CHP had not made 
any speeches or declarations in a cooperative way.  
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1-Competitive 15 
2-Somewhat Competitive 3 
3-Neutral 2 
4-Somewhat Cooperative 0 
5-Cooperative 0 
Total 20 
  Table 7: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale – 
CHP, Annan Plan 2004 
 
 
5.1.3 The military 
 
Figure 6 clearly demonstrates that the military had kept their neutral position 
during the discussions in the process. The neutrality score is the highest at 63 % 
compared to other scales. The second highest score is the cooperative scale with 31 %. 
Taking neutrality and cooperativeness into consideration as a positive and cooperative 
mode of interaction, the overall score is 94 %. The least percentage is the somewhat 
competitive score with 6 %. It can also be seen in figure 6 that, the data have not been 
coded for the competitive and somewhat cooperative scales which thus has 0 % 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The Military in the Annan Plan (2004)1 
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Table 7 lists the number of pieces of data collected for the military in the case of 
Annan plan. It can be seen that 16 pieces of data have been collected. 10 of the pieces 
are coded as neutral. 5 of them are coded as cooperative and only one piece is coded 
as competitive. 
 
1-Competitive 0 
2-Somehow Competitive 1 
3-Neutral 10 
4-Somehow Cooperative 0 
5-Cooperative 5 
Total 16 
 
Table 8: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale – the 
Military, Annan Plan 2004 
 
 
5.1.4 Findings and Discussion 
 
This section presents observations regarding the actors’ initial moves and actions 
in the interaction. These observations are generated from the content of the data which 
is composed of the speeches, declarations and statements of the actors. All of these 
components form the interaction between the actors. Basically, there are two types of 
observations appeared. The first one is the actor’s initial position declaration through 
official statements. The second one is the actor’s reaction to the other actors’ speeches 
and statements. Taking these observations into account, the following part presents 
main issues which arise from the observations in data analysis. 
 
 
5.1.4.1 AKP 
 
As a result of more detailed analysis, there are five main observations that should 
be pointed out to present the AKP’s co-operatively style of interaction. 
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The first finding is related with the nature of the interaction between AKP and 
the military. The AKP makes its position clear by emphasizing the good relations with 
the military and the collaboration between the institutions such as the presidency, the 
military and the government in making the national policy on Cyprus issue. Especially 
the Prime Minister (PM) Tayyip Erdoğan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
Abdullah Gül emphasized several times that the military and the AKP were closely 
working together in the policy making process. The interaction between these two 
actors was even analogized by Abdullah Gül as a very organic and intermingled one: 
“such as the relations between bone and body [et-kemik olayı] that intersected and 
existed together”.277 In addition, according to the AKP, the Cyprus issue is closely 
related to both the Turkish Armed Forces for security reasons and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs for political concerns; therefore, the AKP stated that instead of 
working separately and combining the positions on this issue later, both institutions 
should start   collaborating from the beginning.278 Moreover, Tayyip Erdoğan   gave 
an interesting answer to the question about how they dealt with the reactions of some 
groups in the military and in the state administrative body: that they tried to look at the 
full side of the glass and added that the important thing is the historical decisions 
made by the governing groups279. In addition, both Abdullah Gül and Tayyip Erdoğan 
also denied many rumors about the disagreement between the AKP and the military 
on Cyprus policy. As a last indicator of cooperativeness, the AKP bureaucrats also 
liked and supported the Chief of Turkish General Staff Hilmi Özkök who stated that it 
shouldn’t be expected that the military would always share its position and its political 
opinion in public. These statements and speeches by the AKP are coded as 
cooperative since all these indicate the AKP’s willingness to work together and, 
moreover, encourage the other actors to work together. Additionally, the AKP 
                                                
277 Radikal, “'Kıbrıs çözülmezse sıkıntılı şeyler olur'” (10 January 2004).. Avaliable on 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=101929  
“Dışişleri ile Genelkurmay arasında görüş ayrılığı iddialarına sert çıkarak "Dışişleri ile 
Genelkurmay et ve kemik gibidir" diyen Gül, Kıbrıs tutum belgesinin, MGK'da 
görüşülebileceğini, ancak MGK'nın bu konuda karar vermeyeceğini söyledi” 
278 Radikal, “Erdoğan, Annan'a çağrıda bulunacak”(15 January 2004) avaliable on 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=102592  
279 Radikal, “’Çözümden dönmek yok’”, (27 January 2004) avaliable on 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=103995  
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expressed its pleasure about the policy making process and interaction between them 
and the military. 
 
Secondly, crucial meetings occurred between the AKP and the military where 
they came together, discussed the Annan Plan, and generated a road map for the 
Turkish government for the negotiations with the General-Secretary of the UN, Kofi 
Annan. The first one was organized by the presidency on January 8, 2004 with the 
participation of the government, the military officials, the president, and high level 
civil and military bureaucrats.  This meeting could be considered as the start date of 
this cooperative interaction on the Cyprus issue between the military and the AKP. 
This meeting also resulted in a consensus to start the negotiations with the UN in 
order to achieve a mutual resolution for Turkey and Northern Cyrpus. This was the 
initial meeting between the actors in 2004. The second one was the NSC meeting held 
on January 23, 2004 with the participation of all NSC members.280 The outcome of 
this meeting mattered in the sense that the consensus being reached was necessary to 
take the initial steps to restart the negotiation process in Cyprus. The participants also 
underlined their political commitment to resolve the problem through negotiations by 
taking the Annan Plan into consideration. The third meeting, which is the second NSC 
meeting, with the agenda of Cyprus issue, was held on March 31, 2004 again with the 
members of the NSC just without the presence of Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül 
since they were in Switzerland for the negotiations over Annan Plan with Kofi Annan. 
Thus, another NSC meeting was organized on April 1, 2004 with their participation as 
well. The importance of NSC meetings lies in the significance of the NCS as an 
important institution. In other words, even though this institution – the NSC- is an 
advisory council, the decisions are not binding and the final decisions made by the 
government, it is still a crucial institution where the members discuss critical and 
highly sensitive political issues regarding the position of Turkey’s policy, generate 
important statements and develop influential policies which have actually had a de 
facto influence on the overall politics of Turkey, so far. Therefore, these meetings 
                                                
280 The Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Prime Ministers, 
Ministers of Justice, Minister National Defence, Minister Internal Affairs, and Minister 
Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Land, Navy and  Air Forces and the General 
Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the President of the 
Republic. 
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should also be pointed out in order to present the influence of AKP’s interaction 
during the process. AKP’s statements regarding these meetings are coded either 
cooperative or neutral since some of them just repeated the position rather than 
declared any cooperative endeavors.  
 
The third important observation is related to the discussions of approval of the 
Annan Plan either by the parliament or by the government. Firstly, the Cyprus policy 
was argued as a national state policy by the Minister of State Beşir Atalay. Regarding 
the approval of the plan by Turkey, Tayyip Erdoğan affirmed that the approval of the 
Annan Plan would be made by the TGNA. However, this idea was then reversed by 
the statement of Ömer Çelik from AKP who stated that it was not necessary for the 
plan to be approved by the TGNA but anyone from the government could sign the 
approval. This issue and few discussions are coded in neutral section since these were 
just about the AKP’s own political position. 
 
Fourthly, the Minister of Justice Cemil Çiçek suggested that cooperation should 
be developed in domestic politics over the Annan Plan discussions. In contrast to this, 
it was emphasized several times that this issue shouldn’t be a subject of the domestic 
political discussions. The reason behind these explanations is that local elections281 
were about to be held in Turkey. Therefore, some speeches and declarations accused 
the AKP’s Cyprus policy of moving away from the general Turkish foreign policy 
during the election process by the opposition parties. In this case, two types of coding 
have been used: on the one hand, cooperative while Cemil Çiçek talked about 
cooperation for the domestic discussions, on the other hand, competitive while the 
AKP officials criticized the CHP for exploiting the policy in its election speeches 
related to the Cyprus policy of the AKP.  
 
Lastly, the government – the AKP – twice gave information officially to the 
TGNA and all political parties in the parliament. In this regard, first, the foreign 
ministry bureaucrat Uğur Ziyal informed the CHP vice-president Onur Öymen, 
another committee from the ministry of foreign affairs informed the True Path Party, 
and also an information note was sent to Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist 
                                                
281 Local municipality elections were held on March 29 in 2004 in Turkey. 
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Movement Party. Abdullah Gül also informed Bülent Arınç, the President of the 
TGNA. Secondly, an information session was organized by Abdullah Gül to whole 
TGNA on April 6, 2004, about the negotiations held in Switzerland. Both these 
attempts were considered as cooperative actions and coded accordingly. 
 
In international relations, the AKP pursued an active policy with Tayyip Erdoğan 
and Abdullah Gül going to the US to ask for support of the US administration and 
they considered these negotiations with the US administration as a diplomatic victory. 
Moreover, they also took that discussion to the EU level and the EU acknowledged its 
support for the resolution of the Cyprus problem through the Annan Plan. 
Nevertheless, because the unit of analysis is the domestic interaction rather than 
international interactions, the relations of the AKP to the international actors are not 
seen as data and coded.   
 
As a result of the codification, the AKP’s cooperative percentile was the highest 
since the AKP stated speeches and made declarations mostly such as mentioned 
above. Nevertheless, competitive   interaction was also ranked at 11 %, indicating   
AKP’s lack of total cooperation during the process. This competitive interaction had 
been mostly actualized towards the CHP not the military. One of the most common 
statements in which competitive interaction was apparent were those in which the 
AKP officials, particularly Tayyip Erdoğan, told the AKP not to undertake particular 
effort to convince the opposition party about the Annan Plan and the Cyprus policy of 
Turkey but just to meet them in the parliament to inform all parliamentarians about the 
process. The AKP officials also criticized and blamed the CHP for making the issue a 
subject of the domestic politics, thus blurring   the process in order to satisfy the 
CHP’s political interests. Additionally, during the discussions in the TGNA, Onur 
Öymen – the CHP Vice President criticized the government for not taking the 
necessary measures. Abdullah Gül responded by saying that the only response that the 
government had not taken was to declare war and he asked the CHP whether they 
would do that. Abdullah Gül’s comment also revealed that CHP had ideological 
obsessions. Moreover, Tayyip Erdoğan stated that he did not find the criticisms of the 
CHP sincere and constructive, that he respected them but he did not care about them 
which is interesting political doubletalk. Lastly, the vice-president of the AKP, Dengin 
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Mir Mehmet Fırat,282 as well, criticized the position of some political parties which 
was to provoke discussion and make propaganda in order harm the referendum 
process of the resolution of Cyprus problem. These main issues constitute the totality 
of AKP’s competitive interaction. 
 
Another significant result which should be taken into account is the neutral 
interaction, which forms one-fourth of the score. Here, the AKP reiterated its position 
and opinions about the issue without touching on any relational emphasis or 
comparing its position with any other actor or blaming any actor.  
 
The general argument about the AKP’s interaction could be that the AKP as the 
ruling party and the government had been very active both in domestic political 
interactions, the core of this analysis, and in the international negotiations as well. In 
domestic interaction, it is clear that the AKP always underlined the collaborative work 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Armed Forces, the military, 
and showed that collaborative work as legitimate proof to foster its position both in 
the public opinion and in international negotiations.  
 
5.1.4.2 CHP 
 
From the beginning of the process, CHP had always positioned its declarations 
and speeches against the Annan Plan and the AKP’s foreign policy making on the 
Cyprus problem. During the process, Deniz Baykal, the CHP president made almost 
all the declarations and speeches regarding the issue from the CHP. In other words, 17 
statements out ot 20 were made by Deniz Baykal. Therefore, examples and 
observations from Baykal’s speeches   introduce the CHP position   in the process. 
The general observations regarding the CHP’s interaction are presented below. 
 
                                                
282 Dengin Mir Mehmet Fırat’s original quote: “Fakat maalesef Türkiye'deki bazı 
siyasiler ve siyasi partiler doğrudan doğruya, bağımsız kabul ettiğimiz, ona saygı 
göstermek zorunda olduğumuz KKTC içerisinde bu yapılacak referandumda bir taraf 
olarak propaganda yaptıklarını üzülerek müşahede ediyoruz. Yetki alanına girmediği 
halde doğrudan müspet veya menfi bir propagandanın içerisine giren siyasiler, çıkacak 
sonucun gereklerini yerine getirmek durumundadırlar.”available on 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=4564&kategori=3  
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Firstly, Deniz Baykal, criticized the Cyprus Policy of the government in general. 
According to Baykal, the current AKP’s Cyprus policy ignores Turkish strategic and 
security concerns. He stated that a very dangerous breaking point had appeared in 
relation to the 80 year-old Turkish foreign policy, the like of which had not been 
experienced for 80 years. This abandonment of previous policy was perceived as fait 
accompli by the CHP. As a solution, Deniz Baykal asked for the national government 
to stop following this policy and take control. Baykal also accused the AKP of   
blackmailing the public into accepting the Annan Plan283 by presenting the Annan 
Plan as the only resolution. In addition, Baykal’s most striking declaration is his 
criticism of AKP and its Cyprus policy as not having concrete plans only abstract 
policies; that the AKP used dual language and spoke differently within domestic 
politics than in international ones; and lastly, that the Cyprus policy was presented as 
a national one, a position which the CHP opposed. Moreover, Baykal dramatically 
added that this presentation as   national policy froze his blood284. According to 
Baykal, the national policy of Turkey should be decided in the TGNA and in the NSC 
not solely by the government. That speech revealed a huge gap in the understanding 
and perception of the AKP and the CHP over Cyprus Annan Plan.  
 
All these speeches and declarations blaming the AKP are considered as 
competitive actions and coded accordingly. Moreover, from the CHP, Cemil Topuz’s 
comment claiming that Turkey did not have a concrete Cyprus policy encouraged 
many institutions and people to participate in the policy making process. Topuz also 
criticized the policy of AKP, saying “a situation without resolution is not a resolution” 
and blamed the AKP of accusing previous politicians of not presenting a concrete 
resolution plan. This Cyprus policy of the AKP was even believed to be an 
abandonment of the foreign policy of Turkey followed since the Lausanne Agreement, 
a period which is again considered as shaping the core values and lines in Turkey’s 
foreign policy. 
 
                                                
283 Radikal, “Baykal: Hükümet Şantaj Yapıyor”(8 January 2004) avaliable on  
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=105490  
284 Radikal, “’Kanıma Dokunuyor’” (11February 2004) avaliable on 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=105801  
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As a second issue, the CHP, particularly Deniz Baykal, disapproved of the Annan 
Plan and believed that the Annan Plan would make Turkey give more concessions 
about the Cyprus problem. Baykal’s speeches directly relate to the Annan Plan itself. 
For instance; he officially called the Annan Plan not a resolution but as a dissolution 
plan which tried to dissolve the Cyprus Turkish side.285 Furthermore, the plan was not 
seen as a peace agreement but as a plan to dispose of all foreign policies on Cyprus 
that had been implemented for 30 years. Furthermore, it was believed by the CHP side 
that the plan would create one nation (Greek Cypriots) in the South, yet two nations 
(Greek and Turkish Cypriots) in the North rather than the only one nation which is 
only the Turkish Cypriots. 
 
Nevertheless, in one of the statements, the CHP started to negotiate over the 
Annan Plan to reach a mutual resolution, yet again added that accepting the Annan 
Plan as presented was not a resolution. Another critique regarding the Annan plan is 
about the lack of knowledge of the Prime Minister of Turkey, of the President of 
Northern Cyprus and of the people who would specifically vote for the plan.  
 
The third observation is that the CHP criticized the AKP’s policy making on the 
Cyprus issue. The main accusation is related with the fact that the AKP shaped its own 
secret agenda on Cyprus during the visits to the US. According to CHP CHP, a secret 
compromise occurred between the AKP and the US administration in Washington 
which was in total contrast to the policy that was discussed and decided on in the NSC 
meetings.286 Therefore, the CHP asked for information sessions for the opposition and 
the parliament as well as the public to explain that secret compromise and agenda. 
 
Fourthly, it is important to point out the understanding of the NSC institution by 
the CHP. CHP vice-president Onur Öymen stated that the NSC might not be a 
decision-making institution but a significant and crucial institution which should be 
seriously taken into account  
 
                                                
285 Radikal, “Meclis Kıbrıs'ı tartıştı” (7 April 2004) avaliable on 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=112440  
286 Radikal, “Baykal: Hükümet Kıbrıs'ta emrivaki yapıyor” (6 February 2004) avaliable 
on. http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=105262 
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In conclusion, the interaction between the CHP and the AKP has been 
experienced competitively with a high degree of accusation and blame on the part of 
the CHP. These observations explain how the CHP can be classified as the most 
competitive actor in the case of Annan Plan. 
 
 
5.1.4.3 The Military 
 
Neutrality is at 63 %, the highest among all the actors’ in both cases; thus the 
military could be called as the most moderate actor in this process.  This result also 
shows the military’s trying to keep its position and not wanting to take part in political 
discussions regarding domestic policy-making, a position which is actually reversed in 
the 2007 presidential election. Observations regarding the neutral position and neutral 
way of interaction of the military are presented below. 
 
Firstly, there are some general remarks about the process. It should be mentioned 
that the military took its position to find a fair and permanent resolution through 
negotiations for the Cyprus problem. In the beginning of the process, this emphasis 
was acknowledged in the introduction of all official declarations released by the 
military. The second general and important issue is that the military’s long standing 
avoidance of argument and disagreement with the AKP-the government- in public, 
and denial of the speculations about any disagreement between them.  
 
There are two main results   which are the neutrality and the cooperativeness of 
the military.  Firstly, the content of data which is coded as cooperative is composed of 
the military’s statements which emphasize   collaborative work with the government 
through participation in the National Security Meetings (NSC).  For instance, it was 
stated that regarding the Cyprus issue the general opinion of the military was actually 
formed by the discussion among the military officials as well as the gendarme 
officials in the meetings on December 19, 2003 and January 2, 2004. According to the 
explanation in the military releases, this general opinion was shared with the 
participants (the President, the PM, the ministers, and the civil and military 
bureaucrats) at the meeting held in the presidency on January 8, 2004.   
 
 101 
Secondly, the neutrality of the military was the highest among all actors. This 
result is important in the sense that the military did not involve itself in daily political 
discussions which is as should be in democratic societies and regimes. For instance,   
one quote by the Hilmi Özkök perfectly explains the neutrality of the military as 
follows:  
 
“There is an expectation that the military should always expose its certain 
position by declaring yes or no for any important issue and it actually has to be 
and this certain position should be shared with the public and we are respectful to 
that. However, it shouldn’t be expected that the military has always taken a side, 
a party, and should share these opinions with the public.”287  
 
The neutrality scale is formed based on speeches and declarations of the military, 
which emphasize that their concerns are by and large related to strategic position of 
the military in the Northern Cyprus, which have been mostly made at the end of the 
NSC meetings  
 
A different observation also appeared during the analysis of the data which stated 
the importance of Cyprus in the Turkish Arm Forces’ eyes. According to Hilmi 
Özkök’s speech two significant concerns appeared regarding the Cyprus Problem. The 
first one is the responsibility to provide security for the Turkish Cypriots which has 
been agreed by the Guarantee agreement,288 and the second one is the strategic role of 
Cyprus in the context of Turkey’s security which is also stated in the Treaty of 
Alliance.289 Moreover, Özkök added that these two concerns, which actually underline 
                                                
287 The original quote is avaliable on 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/n
isan2004/ana.html  
288 The Treaty of Guarantee was signed in 1960. It was agreed that “Greece the United 
Kingdom and Turkey, taking note of the undertakings by the Republic of Cyprus 
embodied in Article 1, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity 
and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the provisions of the basic articles of 
its Constitution. They likewise undertake to prohibit, as far as lies within their power, 
all activity having the object of promoting directly or indirectly either the union of the 
Republic of Cyprus with any other State, or the partition of the Island” (article 1). 
289 Treaty of Alliance was signed in 1960 and regarding the status of Greek and Turkish 
military it was agreed that: “Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite 
Headquarters so established with the military contingents laid down in Additional 
Protocol No. 1 annexed to the present Treaty.The said contingents shall provide for the 
training of the army of the Republic of Cyprus” (article 4). 
 102 
the critical and sensitive position of Turkey in the process, have been and will be 
permanent. He also affirmed this statement in another speech and said that it was not 
only important to protect Turkish Cypriots but to maintain Turkey’s security as well.  
 
It is also very clear that the military did not experience   competitive interaction. 
Nevertheless, 6 % of the somewhat competitive interaction came from the Hilmi 
Özkök’s speech which stated that the existence of cooperation was not totally verified 
since they did not agree on all issues. He also underlined that the general framework 
which was shaped in the NSC on January 23 was not totally followed290 by the AKP 
during the negotiations with the UN officials. Hilmi Özkök again explained the 
somehow uncomfortable situation within the military through basically stating that it 
wouldn’t be right to share the issue with public and the media due to the fact that the 
process they were going through might harm the domestic interaction and added that 
if they had an explanation, it would also be unfair to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
who then might react similarly which could lead to a deadlock in the interaction as 
well as in the policy making process. 
 
As a last remark, the overall data collected for the military is 16; as the lowest 
number, this shows that the military did not declare its positions or opinions on the 
issue as much as the other actors.  
 
 
5.1.5 All Actors 
 
This part provides the comparison of these actors in each scale in figure 7 and the 
nature of the interaction in figure 8 in the process of the case of Annan Plan in 2004. 
To begin with figure 7, clearly shows that the CHP has been the most competitive 
actor in the interaction at 75 %. This is the highest score of all scores. The AKP is the 
second most competitive actor at 11 %. On the other hand, the military has had no 
competitive interaction at 0 %. As also can be seen from figure 7, all actors have very 
close percentages (AKP 13 %, CHP 15 %, Military 6 %) for the somewhat 
                                                
290 The original quote is available on 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/n
isan2004/ana.html  
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competitive score. Thirdly, in the neutral scale, the military is the highest one at 63 % 
of all. The AKP and the CHP also have neutral scores of 25% and 10% respectively. 
Fourthly, the AKP is the only actor with a somewhat cooperative score: it is 13%. As 
for the last score, the cooperative one, two actors, the AKP at 38 % and the military at 
31 % come into prominence. However, the CHP has not been coded in cooperative 
scale. Based on figure 7, the first result shows that the AKP and the Military are the 
most cooperative actors and the interaction between them has taken place 
cooperatively. The second result obtained from the figure 7 is that the CHP is the most 
competitive actor and this eventually results in the CHP’s interaction being the most 
competitive. Thirdly, the most neutral actor of all actors is the military at 63%. 
 
 
Figure 7: Comparison of All Actors in the Annan Plan (2004) 
 
Another explanation is that on the one hand, the CHP has interacted with other 
parties mostly in competitiveness; on the other hand, the AKP and the military have 
interacted with each other and the CHP relatively cooperatively.  
 
As shown in figure 8 the nature of the interaction is that actors interacted mostly 
in cooperation at 38 % and neutrality at 28 %, which is 66 % of the overall interaction. 
The AKP’s high percentage on the cooperative scale as shown in figure 7 contributed 
to cooperative score of figure 8 and it is the same for the neutral section of figure 8 
which is generally composed of the military’s neutrality (63 %). It can also be seen 
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from figure 8 that almost one-third of the overall interaction is competitive and 
somewhat competitive which is 34% of the total. Competitiveness is raised to 34% by 
the CHP’s competitive interaction: 75 %. Based on this analysis, it can be argued that 
the actors, AKP and the military, interacted in cooperation at, 66 %, during the 
domestic political interaction over the Annan Plan case. Therefore, it is obvious that 
the nature of the process is cooperative in the case of Annan Plan. 
 
 
Figure 8: All Actors in the Annan Plan (2004) 
 
In the table, the overall data codification with the actor based differentiation is 
shown. Based on table 8, the number of pieces of data collected is 100 in total. 22 
pieces out of 100 are coded as competitive; 12 pieces are coded as somewhat 
competitive; 28 pieces are coded as neutral; 8 pieces are coded as somewhat 
cooperative; and finally, the highest number, 30 pieces are coded as cooperative. It 
can be seen from table 8 that the CHP has 20 pieces of which distribution as follows: 
15 pieces are coded as competitive, 3 pieces are coded as somewhat competitive, and 
2 pieces are coded as neutral. CHP has no data coded for the somewhat cooperative 
and cooperative scales. Secondly, AKP has 64 pieces of data which are the highest 
number of data collected for an actor. The division of data is: 7 pieces are coded as 
competitive, 8 pieces are coded as somewhat competitive, 16 pieces are coded as 
neutral, 8 pieces are coded as somewhat cooperative, and 25 pieces are coded as 
cooperative. Lastly, the military has the least number of pieces of data, 16 pieces are 
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in total. 10 pieces are coded as neutral and 5 pieces are coded as cooperative. Only 
one piece of data is coded as somewhat competitive.  
 
Based on table 8, it can be argued that the AKP with its 25 pieces of data coded 
as cooperatively is the most cooperative actor. However, the most surprising fact is 
that the CHP hasn’t had any single data coded for cooperative or somewhat 
cooperative. Instead, the CHP has the highest number of data coded for competitive 
which naturally made it the most competitive actor. 
 
 CHP AKP Military Total 
1-Competitive 15 7 0 22 
2-Somewhat 
Competitive 
3 8 1 
12 
3-Neutral 2 16 10 28 
4-Somewhat 
Cooperative 
0 8 0 
8 
5-Cooperative 0 25 5 30 
Total 20 64 16 100 
 
Table 9: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale – All 
Actors, Annan Plan 2004 
 
 
5.2 Presidential Election 
 
This section presents the analysis and findings of the actors’ interaction over the 
Presidential Election case in 2007. Figures display the cooperative and competitive 
scores of the actors for the Presidential election case.  
 
 
 
5.2.1 AKP 
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Figure 9 shows competitive and cooperatives scores of the AKP’s interaction in 
the Presidential Election case. The results of the analysis show that the process of the 
presidential election in 2007 was very dynamic for the AKP since AKP’s data has 
been coded in all scales. AKP’s interaction has been realized in all scales ranging 
from 35 % to 10 %. Yet, the highest one is the 35 % competitive scale, anticipated at 
the beginning of the research. Secondly, the somewhat competitiveness score is at 17 
% which is again almost one-fifth of the total. 
 
Taking into account these two scores, the AKP’s total competitiveness increases 
to 52 %, this is more than half of all. Third, the neutral scale is at 27 % for AKP and 
this is the second highest percentage. The somewhat cooperative at 11 % and the 
cooperative at 10 % comprise less than one-fourth of the overall data. Based on table 
10, it can be argued that, the AKP interacted with other actors mostly in competition.  
 
Figure 9: AKP in the Presidential Election (2007) 
 
The AKP’s interaction in the presidential election is coded based on 99 pieces of 
data for this analysis. This is the highest number of data that was collected for an actor 
for one case. The division of data among scales is: 34 pieces are coded as competitive; 
17 pieces are coded as somewhat competitive; 27 pieces are coded as neutral; 11 
pieces are coded as somewhat cooperative; and finally 10 pieces are coded as 
competitive. It can be seen from table 9 that, the AKP’s statements, speeches and so 
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on are coded as mostly (51 data out of 99) competitive or somewhat competitive. 
However, only 21 data are coded either cooperative or somewhat cooperative. 
 
1-Competitive 34 
2-Somewhat Competitive 17 
3-Neutral 27 
4-Somewhat Cooperative 11 
5-Cooperative 10 
Total 99 
 
Table 10: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale – 
AKP, Presidential Election 2007 
 
 
5.2.2 CHP 
 
Figure 10 shows the cooperative and competitive scores of the CHP in the 
Presidential case in 2007. The highest score seen in figure 10 is the competitive scale 
at 41 %. This is followed by somewhat cooperative at 19 %. Both these add up to 60 
% f the overall CHP interaction. In the third scale, the CHP had a neutral score of 
12%. Fourthly, the somewhat cooperative score is at 9 % and finally cooperative score 
is at 19 %. Again, the somewhat cooperative and the cooperative scores add up to 
28% which is almost one-third of the overall interaction. 
Figure 10: CHP in the Presidential Election (2007) 
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In the codification of the CHP, 81 pieces of data are collected which is very close 
to the AKP’s number. The distribution of the data is shown below in table 10. Over 81 
data, 34 are coded as competitive, 15 are coded as somewhat competitive, 10 are 
coded as neutral, 7 are coded as somewhat cooperative, and finally 15 pieces of data 
are coded as cooperative.  
 
1-Competitive 34 
2-Somewhat Competitive 15 
3-Neutral 10 
4-Somewhat Cooperative 7 
5-Cooperative 15 
Total 81 
 
Table 11: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale– CHP, 
Presidential Election 2007 
 
 
5.2.3 The Military 
 
Figure 11 indicates the military’s cooperative and competition scores in the case 
of Presidential election. It can be seen from figure 11 that the competitive score is 20 
% and the somewhat competition score is 40 %. This result shows that 60 % of the 
military’s overall score is on the competition side. Besides this, 40 % of the score is 
neutral. What is interesting is that the military has not got any scores in the somewhat 
cooperative or cooperative scales. Therefore, both scales have been shown as 0 %. 
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Figure 11: The Military in the Presidential Election (2007) 
 
Table 11 shows the overall number of pieces of data for the military in the case 
of Presidential Election. This is the least number of the data collected for an actor. 
Table 11 shows that only one piece of the data is coded as competitive; 2 pieces of the 
data are coded as somewhat competitive; and the last 2 pieces of data are coded as 
neutral. There is no data coded for the somewhat cooperative and cooperative scales.  
 
1-Competitive 1 
2-Somewhat Competitive 2 
3-Neutral 2 
4-Somewhat Cooperative 0 
5-Cooperative 0 
Total 5 
Table 12: Distribution of the overall number of pieces of data for each scale – The 
Military Presidential Election 2007 
 
 
5.2.4 Findings and Discussions 
 
In this part, the findings and observations from the analysis of data are presented 
through giving examples from the data itself. This section basically explains what 
constitutes scores of the actors.  
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5.2.4.1 AKP 
 
In the presidential election case, the highest score for the AKP is competitive 
one. This is expected since the actors in presidential elections have been argued to 
interact competitively due to the lack of the international audience’s interests and the 
subsequent lack of any influence from them. The competitive scale is coded according 
to AKP’s position which is mostly blaming the main opposition party, the CHP, but, 
rarely the military.  The declaration to not take any steps to compromise with the 
adversary actors is also coded in competitive scale. This process has sub-processes. 
During the analysis, I realized that the decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court, 
which required the presence of 367 deputies in the TGNA to hold the first round of the 
election process for the presidency, made an important shift. After this decision, the 
parliament decided to go for a legislative (national) election and the interaction 
became much harsher especially between the AKP and the CHP. The second 
significant development is the issue of the e-memorandum by the military to remind 
the government that the government was watched by the military.  
 
Considering these very critical developments, this analysis is divided into two 
sections. The first section introduces the main issues as following: i) nominating a 
candidate ii) blame and accusation of the CHP by the AKP iii) the AKP’s position 
about the public demonstrations and the discussions over the ‘367’ case iv) the AKP’s 
standing toward the e-memorandum of the military. All these issues present the 
cooperative, competitive or neutral interaction(s) of the AKP. Besides this, the 
decision of the Constitutional Court led the parliament to go for a general election. In 
the process of the election campaign, the tone of the AKP became much more 
aggressive and they blamed the CHP for everything that had happened during the 
process before the Constitutional Court’s decision.  
 
Firstly, the process began with the discussions about the nomination of a 
presidential candidate. Regarding this question, the AKP chose to be silent and 
declared that they would not talk about this issue until April, 2007 which was the time 
to name a candidate according to the constitution. Since the AKP had the majority of 
the seats (but not an absolute majority to elect the president on its own in the first 
round), it was the case that whoever would be the candidate would be the eleventh 
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president. This choice was explained later by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah 
Gül that they, as the AKP, did not want to start the discussions about the presidential 
elections earlier since the discussions could provoke polemics that could harm Turkey 
especially the Turkish economics. Therefore, they declared that the AKP would 
nominate a candidate when the time was up. This attitude of the AKP rendered the 
situation very controversial and escalated the political disagreement between the AKP 
and the actors to a political crisis. The only explanation done by Tayyip Erdoğan was 
that the AKP would negotiate the nomination of a candidate for the presidency within 
the party administration by taking public opinion into consideration through meeting 
with leaders from institutions and NGOs, as well. Nevertheless, although the 
candidate was nominated just two days before the parliamentary elections, the 
discussions had continued more than for 4 months in a very tense atmosphere which 
was arguably very competitive.  
 
The second important issue was another very competitive interaction which took 
place between the AKP and the CHP in the process of presidential election in 2007.  
Initially, the AKP acknowledged that they would not cooperate or compromise with 
the CHP over a candidate since the CHP has been considered to insult the AKP and 
the Prime Minister. This was Tayyip Erdoğan’s very first justification at the beginning 
of the process. In addition, the AKP also criticized the CHP creating a tense and 
escalatory crisis in the process. In this regard, Tayyip Erdoğan stated that they were 
open to be criticized by the opposition parties, yet the opposition should not polarize, 
provoke and create conflicts in society. He claimed that they, as the AKP, would not 
be part of any polarization that was created by the CHP; yet he still invited them to 
contribute to more constructive political environment at the end of his speech. Not 
surprisingly, this never happened. In another speech, Erdoğan blamed the CHP also 
for not bringing any proposal or concrete discussion topic to discuss, but just creating 
fear in society. Erdoğan also asked particularly Deniz Baykal to declare the CHP’s 
candidate for the presidency and criticized him for commenting on the method used 
by the AKP for nominating a candidate.  These were the general issues that two actors 
interacted about repeatedly and coded the AKP in competitive section. 
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Thirdly, public demonstrations, called “Republican Rally”, with participation of 
thousands of people, were organized in many of the big cities of Turkey291 by the 
Association of Atatürkist Thought (ADD) (mostly organized by retired generals and 
military officials) in order to support the secular regime and in fact to oppose the 
general policy of the AKP in the process of the presidential election as well as to 
oppose the candidacy of Erdoğan to the presidency. AKP officials considered and 
respected these demonstrations as a part of the democratic participation process. 
However, people were also called “bindirilmiş kıtalar” [motorized masses] by Prime 
Minister Erdoğan in his speech in which he also said “they [the participants] held a 
rally. It's their democratic right. But what about those figures? Some are talking about 
millions meeting there. It is like our million lira notes”.292 In this speech, Erdoğan 
actually criticized the media’s interpretation and exaggeration of the meetings and the 
number of people who participated in these meetings. Indeed, in his criticisms about 
the demonstrations Erdoğan actually reminded the people that it was the parliament 
would elect the 11th president. 
 
Another crisis within the crisis also occurred during the process. This particular 
crisis was called the ‘367’ crisis in general. This number was claimed to be the 
quorum of deputies who should be in the parliament to elect the president. In other 
words, a parliamentary quorum of 367 deputies was required for voting to be held, 
which was not the case when the election process started on 27 April, 2007 according 
to the Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision. The actors were inevitably separated 
again and expressed completely opposite viewpoints of this case. On the one hand the 
AKP argued that 367 parliamentarians did not to be present but just 184 and explained 
that only 367 votes over 550 are required in the first round to elect the president-
which is accepted the two-thirds of the parliament. On the other hand the CHP, 
contrarily, argued that 367 were necessary to start the election process in the 
parliament, in the first round. Although this issue had also been discussed among legal 
                                                
291 The first one was organized in Ankara on 14 April, the second one in Đstanbul on 29 
April, the rest were orgnaized in Đzmir on 14 May, in Samsun on 21 May and in Denizli 
on 28 May. See: Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of 
Political Language, Middle East Policy. Vol. XIV, no:3 Fall 2007. 
292Hürriyet Turkish Daily News, “Erdoğan pledges commitment to secular regime” (18 
April 2007) available on http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-604014 .  
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practitioners, lawyers and judges for a while before the parliament gathering on April 
27, 2007, the CHP took the issue to the Constitutional Court just after the first round 
of the election process finished. It was the case that actually the president of the 
TGNA also did not call the roll to check whether there were 367 deputies or not. 
Moreover, the AKP accused the CHP of blocking the democratic process and 
sabotaging the election process even though the AKP officials declared that they 
trusted the law and the decision by the Court. The first objection of the AKP was that 
they believed that nothing similar had done in any of the previous president election 
processes and therefore they argued that it would be unfair to ask for this 
parliamentary quorum at this time. These discussions are also coded as competitive 
and somewhat competitive.  
 
The fourth issue is the e-memorandum from the military to the AKP government. 
That e-memorandum is believed to be the actual reason of this political crisis also 
known as the presidential crisis. Although the interaction had been competitive and 
tense from the beginning, the impact of this e-memorandum was considered as a 
significant intervention to the democratic system of Turkey and shifted the actors’, 
particularly the AKP’s tone into the aggressive. Regarding the influence of military in 
politics, both by Tayyip Erdoğan or Abdullah Gül, they previously stated that the 
process at that time would be different and for the first time, there would not be any 
presidential crisis. They also emphasized that Turkey was negotiating with the 
European Union which meant that nothing like a military intervention was possible. 
Nevertheless, at serious speech about the characteristics of the possible candidate was 
made by the head of the Turkish Armed Forces, Yaşar Büyükanıt, who clearly stated 
that the president should have heartfelt loyalty, not just a token loyalty to the 
principles of the Turkish republic and its secular organization. That speech was 
positively considered by Erdoğan but it was obvious that he did not want to go into 
details about this speech. The military made some other explanations which were not 
discussed in front of the public by the AKP officials. This situation continued till the 
e-memorandum of the military which was published at midnight293 on 27 April, 2007 
on the webpage of the military. This intervention was totally unexpected by the AKP 
                                                
293 It is called “the military’s midnight statement” by Barçın Yınanç in Turkish Daily 
News, “Even Gül is not moderate enough for the military” (30 April 2007) available on 
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-604866  
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and many other groups and institutions such as TÜSĐAD, TOBB, as well. Since the 
governments in Turkey had always been overthrown by obvious military coup d’états 
(in 1960 and 1980) or by these kinds of official declarations such as those that 
happened on March 12, 1971 and January 28, 1998, the reaction of the AKP was 
expected to be the same with the previous cases. However, the AKP’s response was 
not in line with the previous cases as harsh as the military statement was. Right after 
this incident, at a government meeting, the statement was assessed by the Cabinet. It 
was the spokesman of the AKP, Cemil Çiçek who read the government’s statement 
which called the military statement “unimaginable”. It is as follows: 
 
“In a democratic country governed by rule of law, it is unimaginable that the 
General Staff, which is attached to the prime minister, make a statement against 
the government… It is regrettable that there were utterly wrong expressions 
about the relations between the government and the General Staff. All 
institutions of our state should be more sensitive and careful… Every problem in 
Turkey will be resolved within the legal framework and democracy. Any 
contrary thought or stance is definitely unacceptable. The duty on all individuals 
and institutions is to help this process proceed smoothly. Painful experiences 
have shown how different approaches have harmed our country and the nation… 
Everyone should know that our government is a side more than everyone and 
more sensitive than everyone when it comes to protection of the basic values of 
the state, integrity and unity of our country, about Turkey's being secular, 
democratic and social state governed by rule of law.”294  
 
This statement basically explains the role and the place of the military under the 
law in which the Turkish Armed Forces remains under the orders of the prime 
minister. Actually, this relationship made the military’s statement unimaginable since 
they spoke out against the government- the prime ministry- as well as ignoring 
democratic rules. It was also underlined that the government was the only institution 
authorized to protect the core values of the state which are protected under the 
democratic norms of law. After these harsh statements between the actors, the case 
was labeled a military-government deadlock.295 Therefore, it was seen that the AKP 
side did not want to continue the discussion and chose to be silent in its relationship 
                                                
294Today’s Zaman, “Government hits back at military interference in election process” 
(28 April 2007) avaliable on http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=109749  
295 Hürriyet Turkish Daily News, “Politics in deadlock; judiciary holds the key” (30 
April 2007). Göksel Bozkurt from the Turkish Daily News called the case as such, 
available on http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-604858  
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with the army. For instance, Tayyip Erdoğan in his speech, after this incident, stated 
that they did not intend to keep these discussions alive and prolong them which could 
cause conflicts between institutions296. Instead they intended to erase them on their 
agenda. According to Abdullah Gül, this e-memorandum was even more surprising 
than the Constitutional Court’s decision and considered the intervention as 
undermining the image of Turkey. He underlined that he would be the one as the 
Minister of foreign affairs who would work to fix this image. Additionally, he also 
mentioned that the society did not deserve chaos since the consequences of this crisis 
would affect everybody. All the reactions, responses and statements during this 
process are mostly considered competitive interaction except the data expressing the 
neutral position of the AKP when they chose not to protract the disagreement. 
 
The other very important influential incident during the process was the Turkish 
Constitutional Court’s decision over the discussions about the ‘367’ case. There were 
not so many pieces of data coded related to this case. Moreover, they were mostly 
considered as neutral statements as the AKP officials just stressed their position and 
opinion about the case. Nevertheless, while the court was discussing the issue, the 
CHP’s statement that affirmed that any decision that was made against the CHP’s 
opinion would lead the country into an environment of conflict was considered as very 
unfortunate by the AKP. It was also argued that the ideology behind this explanation 
was not national interests but political ones. The decision of the CHP to take the ‘367’ 
case to the Turkish Constitutional Court caused a hard-line position within the AKP 
and then the interaction became harsher between the actors. Even in his speeches, 
Erdoğan blamed the CHP for not being a representative of the public but of the elite as 
well as being a representative of the old-fashioned politics297. The Constitutional 
Court annulled the first round of the parliament election for the presidency.  Although 
the official statements of the AKP emphasized their respectfulness towards the 
decision, chiefly Erdoğan debated and criticized the decision in public meetings in the 
general election process.  
 
                                                
296 AKP webpage, (1 May 2007) available on 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=17265&kategori=1  
297 AKP webpage, (16 June 2007) available on 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=17824&kategori=1  
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Lastly, the AKP also made very competitive statements during the general 
election process since the existing crisis was exacerbated by the competition. The only 
exception was when Erdoğan affirmed that he would look for compromise for the 
presidential elections after the general legislative elections and stated that they did not 
have any pre-conditions to start negotiations with any political parties. Nevertheless, 
after the general election, Abdullah Gül was nominated as a presidential candidate 
once more. Moreover, that time with the participation of the MHP in the 
parliamentary election, 367 quorum was met to hold the first round and Abdullah Gül 
was elected as the eleventh president of Turkey in following rounds. The statements of 
the AKP and public speeches of Erdoğan related to the presidential elections in the 
process of the legislative elections are coded mainly as competitive. 
 
The only cooperative interaction of the AKP was coded on cases where Gül 
announced that he would meet with the political parties in the Parliament in order to 
ask for support. This activity of meeting was repeated in both processes—before the 
decision to go to the general election and after the general election was held. In 
addition, before the e-memorandum and the decision of the Constitution Court, Gül 
and Erdoğan claimed that the process of the presidential election was the most modest 
and reasonable process that had been experienced so far and there would not be any 
crisis. These kinds of positive statements have been coded as a cooperative 
interaction. 
 
 
5.2.4.2 CHP 
 
The presidential election in 2007 had been a dynamic process for the CHP, as 
well. As can be seen from figure 9, the interaction of the CHP have been coded in all 
scales and it is also obvious that the competitive scale is the highest one (41 %) not 
only for the CHP’s chart but also in general. Therefore, according to my data analysis, 
the CHP, as an actor in the process, was the most competitive actor when compared 
with the others. From the analysis, an exploration of CHP’s interaction and position 
seems to be possible in three main parts. The three parts which are the CHP as 
competitive, as neutral and as cooperative are presented through giving examples from 
specific speeches and statements made by the CHP officials. 
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For the first part, the CHP had been coded as competitive with 41 %. There are 
six major issues that explain the competitiveness of the CHP. The CHP’s very first 
criticism is that the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan should not be the presidential 
candidate, and eventually the president, since he had been in a fight to change the core 
of the Constitution. Therefore, according to CHP, the representation by Tayyip would 
be wrong and dangerous for Turkish Republic. Deniz Baykal even accused Tayyip 
Erdoğan of not believing in the Constitution. Baykal also affirmed that one who 
believes the core values of the constitution should be the president. Moreover, he 
underlined that this is all about the peace of the country not about Tayyip Erdoğan in 
particular. These kinds of accusations as well as opposite statements by the CHP were 
witnessed in the first three months in 2007. This was one of the issues that led to CHP 
being coded as competitive in the data analysis. 
 
Secondly, compromise’ and ‘the necessity of compromise’ were also the most 
repeated words that the CHP’s leader Baykal stated many times in his speeches and 
these are coded in both competitive and cooperative scales. As competitive 
interaction, Baykal in general blamed Erdoğan and the AKP for not compromising on 
a candidate name and for being silent in discussions. According to the CHP, 
compromise was a must to continue the process in peace and it was also a must 
specifically for Tayyip Erdoğan who was thought to be a threat to societal peace and 
compromise. Through to the end of the process, Baykal also affirmed that if Erdoğan 
sought to compromise, there would not be any problems or crisis so the AKP and 
Erdoğan were accused of causing the crisis to happen.  
 
The third issue is about the CHP’s criticisms of the selection process of the 
presidential candidate by the AKP. From the beginning of the interaction, the AKP 
chose to be silent and decided not to talk about the candidate’s name till the week that 
they had to start. However, this position was continuously criticized by the CHP in 
claims that the AKP had a secret agenda and would put its candidate in at the last 
minute which would cause a very dangerous obligation. This position was also 
considered as a threat for the state of law. These were the initial criticisms of the CHP 
and after the AKP announced that Abdullah Gül was the presidential candidate for the 
AKP. The criticism continued with the characteristics and previous political life of 
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Abdullah Gül. Deniz Baykal argued that Adullah Gul, just like Tayyip Erdoğan, was 
raised in the ideology of milli görüş [National View]298 which is not welcomed or 
accepted by the republicans. Abdullah Gül was also chastised for very unsuccessful 
policies as the Minister of foreign affairs. Deniz Baykal also argued that Abdullah Gül 
had not a sincere and honest character to be the president. Apart from these, the very 
initial uneasiness of the CHP was that the situation of Tayyip Erdoğan as the Prime 
Minister, Bülent Arınç as the president of the TGNA and Abdullah Gül as the 
president was not appropriate to the nature of the country in the sense that this 
combination would not serve the core values of the constitution but would have power 
overall control and balance mechanisms within the regime.299 After the decision of the 
Constitutional Court which stated the requirement of 367 deputies presence in the 
parliament in order to hold the presidential election and after the AKP could not reach 
that number in their second trial, the CHP leader Deniz Baykal affirmed that the AKP 
couldn’t succeed in electing one of its “militants”300 as the president and it would not 
be successful in the future. Later on, the explanations of the CHP have changed in the 
sense that CHP claimed that they saw the threat coming so that they took precautions. 
Moreover they cared about the society’s sensitivity towards the issue. This position 
was considered as well as called as success and the CHP officials stated that they were 
proud of this success. Lastly, after the general election when Abdullah Gül was again 
nominated as the presidential candidate, the CHP’s position did not change its position 
a lot. Instead the officials declared that they would certainly be respectful to the 
parliament’s decision, yet the CHP would always keep its distance with the 
presidency.  
                                                
298 Atacan explains the milli görüş movement as “the core ofMilli Görüş ]was formed 
by the members of a particular Nakşibendi group. But in practice, all these parties 
represented a loose coalition of different Islamic and conservative groups”. See: Fulya 
Atacan, “Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP”, Turkish Studies, 
Vol: 6, No:2  (June, 2005), pp. 187-199. Also, Turunc argues that “the AKP’s leading 
cadre is mostly from the Milli Görüş [National Outlook] tradition”. For a deatiled 
analysis of evolution of this tratidion, see: Hasan Turunc, “Islamist or Democratic? The 
AKP’s Search for Identity in Turkish Politics”, Journal of Contemporary European 
Studies, Vol 15. No:1, (April, 2007), pp.79-91. 
299 The original quotation is available on 
http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?module=chpmain&page=show_speech&speech_id=33
7  
300 This interpretation of the CHP is very extreme calling and is considered as very 
extreme attitude to call a member of the parliament as such. 
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The fourth important issue was the opinion and perception of the CHP about the 
demonstrations. The data showed that the CHP considered these demonstrations as a 
very important civil society movement and also as a proof of the support for Ataturk’s 
republic. The CHP claimed that the reaction of people had been ignored by the Prime 
Minister and the AKP government. Regarding the crisis, these protests were argued as 
a key to solve the crisis in Turkey since they brought out a new dimension into politics 
and they were also evidence that everybody was aware of the threat. The CHP also 
stated that the government and the prime minister provoked the creation of a 
conflictual relation between the state and the society, yet the CHP claimed there was 
not such a thing. According to the CHP officials’ statement, this argument was 
actually stated earlier than this crisis in July 2005. Therefore they claimed that the 
CHP had been aware of these attempts long before. As a result, the CHP affirmed that 
these discussions were not about the presidency but about the survival and future of 
the Turkish Republic as a secular, democratic, and social state of law.  
 
As a fifth issue, the position of the CHP in the discussions of the “367” case is 
also coded as competitive. Although in his initial speeches, Deniz Baykal, explained 
the situation and the CHP’s opinion in a more moderate way, by the end of the 
interaction he began insisting that the Prime Minister should compromise on a 
candidate considering the “367” case as well. After they took the case to the 
Constitutional Court, they stated that if the Constitutional Court made a decision that 
367 deputies were not required to hold the session, it would lead Turkey into a 
dangerous conflict.  
 
The sixth and last issue is about the CHP’s considerations about the process and 
the perception of the AKP in the election of the president. One of the CHP worries   
was based on the explanation of Bülent Arınç, the president of the TGNA, who 
claimed that the president should be a secular, a civil and a religious person. Upon this 
statement, Deniz Baykal harshly criticized the AKP. Moreover, according to the CHP, 
the AKP considered the presidency as a strategic position to be conquered and added 
new requirements to be the president-such as being religious. However, this type of 
requirement was totally against the Constitution according to CHP officials. Besides 
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this, the CHP thought that the prime minister led the process very badly and they were 
surprised with the consequences.  
 
These six main issues could be proof of the competitive style of interaction and 
are coded accordingly.  
 
As cooperative interaction, the CHP was coded at 19 %, almost one-fifth of the 
total. The main cooperative statements of the CHP were made mostly by Deniz 
Baykal who affirmed the necessity of compromising and emphasized the need for a 
neutral candidate outside the parliament who could be accepted by all. Since the CHP 
attached importance to the presidency and considered the presidential election election 
as concerning the whole, the process was believed to be carried out through 
compromising, negotiating and collaborating. The CHP even stated that there could be 
someone from the AKP as a presidential candidate. This statement happened in the 
very initial stage of the interaction. In addition, during the national election process, 
just before the election was to be held, the CHP again emphasized that there should be 
a compromise on the election of the president and repeated their readiness to discuss 
and negotiate the issue, actions which exemplify cooperative interaction. 
 
CHP was also coded as a neutral in some cases which are mostly related to the 
official declarations or position acknowledgements regarding the issues on the agenda 
without declaring any name or any actor. For instance, the fact that Mustafa Özyürek, 
a deputy from the CHP, considers the statement of the military as a memorandum and 
Deniz Baykal’s declaration that he was surprised and sorry about this e-memorandum 
by the military was coded as neutral. The fact that the CHP officials perceived their 
propaganda and hard work during the presidential election process as a success was 
also coded as neutral because they claimed that they prevented the country from 
experiencing a presidential crisis.  
 
 
5.2.4.3 The military 
 
The interaction of the military was coded mostly as competitive, completely 
opposite to the finding for the military in the Annan Plan process. In this case, 
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according to the data, the military has been its moderate position to an aggressive and 
competitive one in almost two-third of the interactions. During the interactions, the 
speeches by the head of the military Yaşar Büyükanıt and the declarations created the 
impression that the military was very confident and intended to take control whenever 
required. Therefore, the detailed analysis has been shaped around some important 
issues which are obtained from the data analysis. Similar to previous explanations, the 
military’s scores are also explored. 
 
The first significant explanation of the military is about its understanding and 
perception of the presidency as an institution. Related to that, Yaşar Büyükanıt stated 
that the president would also be the head of the army and emphasized that, in this 
regard, the election of the president was very important to the military. It is also the 
case that he mentioned this argument as a citizen as well as a member of the military 
and he hoped that the president would be respectful to the essences and core principals 
of the republic not as a token but with his/her whole heart. In my opinion, it is crucial 
that the military noticeably stated its opinion on the domestic political discussion. In 
addition to that, one week after that speech, he said that if there were people who did 
not understand it, he would wonder about their ability to understand301. Clearly, he 
declared the military’s position and tried to give an underhand message to the relevant 
actors. These explanations are coded as neutral. 
 
The second observation is that these speeches are made to remind the public that 
the military was aware of its responsibility and when it was time to use that 
responsibility the military would be ready and not hesitate to take action. This 
message was clearly given by the military officials and therefore at the societal level, 
there appeared some groups who wanted the military to overthrow the government by 
coup d’état, a totally unacceptable act in democratic regimes. These kinds of 
statements are considered as competitive. 
 
                                                
301 Radikal, “Orgeneral Büyükanıt: 'Özde' mesajım herkese ulaştı” (20 April 2007) 
avaliable on http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=218954  
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The final observation, which is the most critical one, is about the so-called post-
modern coup d’état of the military through publishing an official statement302 on its 
webpage at midnight on April 27, 2007. The timing of the publication and the content 
of the statement were very shocking to the many groups which actually supported the 
democratic election process for the presidency election. Initially, the content of the 
statement briefly can be summed up as it “… stressed that the TSK [Turkish Armed 
Forces] was watching the parliamentary presidential vote with concern and warned 
against questioning the country's secular system and issued a veiled threat of 
intervention saying it would” openly display its position and attitudes when it 
becomes necessary.”303  
 
This statement briefly presents how the military became a party to the political 
crisis in the presidential election process in 2007. This statement was considered as a 
coup d’état because of the fact that the military clearly and very concretely affirmed 
that they would act when it was necessary, actually when they thought it was 
necessary. The statement also reminded people of the constitutional rights304 of the 
military and that they would not hesitate to use these rights. This statement is 
considered as the only piece of competitive data and it is coded accordingly since it 
                                                
302 “Son günlerde, Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimi sürecinde öne çıkan sorun, laikliğin 
tartışılması konusuna odaklanmış durumdadır. Bu durum, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri 
tarafından endişe ile izlenmektedir. Unutulmamalıdır ki, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri bu 
tartışmalarda taraftır ve laikliğin kesin savunucusudur. Ayrıca, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri 
yapılmakta olan tartışmaların ve olumsuz yöndeki yorumların kesin olarak 
karşısındadır, gerektiğinde tavrını ve davranışlarını açık ve net bir şekilde ortaya 
koyacaktır. Bundan kimsenin şüphesinin olmaması gerekir. Özetle, Cumhuriyetimizin 
kurucusu Ulu Önder Atatürk’ün, “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene!” anlayışına karşı çıkan 
herkes Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin düşmanıdır ve öyle kalacaktır. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, 
bu niteliklerin korunması için kendisine kanunlarla verilmiş olan açık görevleri eksiksiz 
yerine getirme konusundaki sarsılmaz kararlılığını muhafaza etmektedir ve bu 
kararlılığa olan bağlılığı ile inancı kesindir.” cited from 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklam
alari/2007/BA_08.html  
303 Hürriyet Turkish Daily News, “Turkey faces a democracy test” by Yusuf Kanlı (30 
April 2007). avaliable on http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-604829  
304 “Article 35 of the Internal Service Law of the military stipulates that the Turkish 
Armed Forces are responsible for 'guarding and defending the Turkish republic as 
defined by the constitution'” see: Soner Çağatay, “How will the Turkish Military 
React?”, Washington Institute (2007). Available online access: 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1076  
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contains a threat to the existing administration. In this sense, it is also not surprising 
not to see any cooperative style of interaction in the process.  
 
 
5.2.5 Comparison of All Actors 
 
This part briefly provides the comparison of these actors in each scale in figure 
12 and the nature of the interaction in figure 14 in the process of the case of Annan 
Plan in 2004.  
 
Figure 12 shows the comparison of the actors’ scores in the presidential election 
case. It can be seen from figure 12 that the most competitive actor is the CHP with its 
41 % competitive score. It is followed by the AKP at 45 % and the military at 20 %. 
The second score shows the somewhat competitive scale in which the military has the 
highest score at 40 %. The AKP (17 %) and the CHP (19 %) have very close scores. 
As has been done in earlier figure explanations, when these two sections are added up 
for an each actor, they reach very close scores: AKP 52 %, CHP 60 % and the military 
60 %. This result indicates that all actors are as competitive as each other in the 
Presidential election case. On the neutral scale, the military is the highest at 40 %, the 
AKP is the second highest neutral actor at 27 %, and finally the CHP is the third at 12 
%. The fourth scale shows the somewhat cooperative scale in which only AKP (11 %) 
and CHP (9 %) have scores. The last scale is similar to the previous one in which the 
AKP (10 %) and the CHP (19 %) are only actors which have scores. The military does 
not have any scores in the fourth and fifth scales. 
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Figure 12: Comparison of All Actors in the Presidential Election (2007) 
 
Secondly, figure 13 shows the nature of the interaction in the presidential 
election case. The nature of the political interaction between the actors is divided into 
five scales which are shown in figure 13. It can be seen that the competitive scale is 
the highest one at 37 %. This result indicates that the interaction which took place 
between the actors was mostly competitive. Besides this, if the second scale, the 
somewhat competitive at 18 %, is also added to overall competitive scores, then the 
nature of the interaction is indicated as 55 % competitive. Nevertheless, neutrality is 
also one-fifth of the overall interaction at 21 %. The fourth score at 10% and fifth 
score at 14 % can be considered as total cooperation scores and show that 24 % of 
overall interaction is cooperative. 
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Figure 13: All Actors in the Presidential Election (2007) 
 
In table 12, the number of pieces of data collected is shown. In total, 185 pieces 
of data are collected and coded for the presidential election case. 99 pieces of data 
belong to the AKP; 81 pieces of data to CHP; and only 5 to the military. It can clearly 
be seen from table 12 that 69 pieces of data are coded as competitive and this number 
is the highest. 34 data are coded as somewhat competitive; 39 pieces of data are coded 
neutral which is the second highest number. For the somewhat cooperative scale, there 
are 18 pieces of data and 25 pieces of cooperative data are coded accordingly. The 
detailed explanation for each actor has previously been indicated in the above section. 
 AKP CHP Military Total 
1-Competitive 34 34 1 69 
2-Somewhat Competitive 17 15 2 34 
3-Neutral 27 10 2 39 
4-Somewhat Cooperative 11 7 0 18 
5-Cooperative 10 15 0 25 
Total 99 81 5 185 
 
Table 13: Distribution of the number of overall pieces of data for each scale – All 
Actors, Presidential Election 2007 
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The actors’ interaction, as seen in this case, is much more competitive and 
harsher toward each other than in the previous case. Starting from the competitive 
part, the CHP is the most competitive actor, a position   very closely followed by the 
AKP. In this case, it can be argued that both political parties competed with each 
other. The CHP and the AKP have been coded in all scales.   The AKP is clearly more 
neutral than the CHP; however the CHP is more cooperative than the AKP in the 
process of the presidential election in 2007. Nevertheless, the overall competitive 
interaction of both parties is very close to 60 % and this clearly shows that the process 
in the presidential election was experienced competitively and so that the nature of the 
process has been very competitive. It is also shown in figure 14 that the overall 
process is 55 % competitive in total and only 24 % cooperative which again proves 
that the nature of the interaction is competitive not cooperative. 
 
The role and position of the military as a very competitive actor turned the nature 
of the interaction to very competitive as well. Besides the cooperation and competition 
scales, the neutral scale forms one-fifth of the overall interaction because of the 
neutral position held by the military and AKP during the discussions.  
 
 
5.3 Comparative Analysis of the Actors and the Cases 
 
Figure 14 shows the cooperative competitive scores and percentages of the actors 
for each case separately in one chart. The actors are named AKP 1, CHP 1, and 
Military 1 which indicates actors for the Annan Plan case and AKP 2, CHP 2, and 
Military 2 which indicates actors for the Presidential Election case. Taking into 
account these practical labels figure 14 can be explored. Firstly, it can be seen from 
figure 14 that, the CHP (CHP 1 at 75 % and CHP 2 at 41%) is the most competitive 
actor compared with the other actors in both cases. Therefore, although there is a 
decrease in the score, the CHP kept its competitive position in the presidential election 
case as well.  Secondly, the actual shifts are seen in AKP’s and the military’s scores. 
On the one hand, AKP 1 is at 11 % and on the other hand AKP 2 increases to 53 %. It 
is the same for the military which has no competitive scale in the Annan Plan case as, 
Military 1; however Military 2 is at 20 %. In the second scale, somewhat competitive, 
Military 2 is the highest at 40 %, but Military 1 is only is at 6 %. AKP 1 (13 %) and 
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AKP 2 (17 %) have very close scores similar to CHP 1 (15 %) and CHP 2 (19 %).  In 
the neutral scale, the military (Military 1 at 63 % and Military 2 at 40 %) is again the 
most neutral party for each case. The scores of AKP 1 (25 %) and AKP 2 (27 %) are 
very close. In the fourth scale, somewhat cooperative, only AKP 1 has 13 % for the 
Annan Plan case. AKP 2 (11 %) and CHP 2 (9 %) score in this scale for the 
presidential election case. Military 1 and Military 2 have not been scored for any of 
the cases. Finally, the cooperative scale is also very interesting to analyze. AKP 1 is at 
38 % and Military 1 is also at 31%; however CHP 1 is at 0 % for the Annan Plan case. 
Nevertheless, in the case of presidential election, AKP 2 is at 10 %, CHP 2 is at 19 %, 
yet military 2 is at 0% this time.  
 
Figure 14: Comparison of actors per Case 
 
Figure 15 shows the comparison of the interactions among the actors based on 
cases. C 1 means the Annan Plan case and C 2 means the Presidential Election case. 
At first, the nature of the interaction is 22 % competitive for the Case 1, the Annan 
Plan case; however, it is more competitive in Case 2, presidential election case, at 37 
%. Therefore, it can be seen that the nature of the interaction in Case 2 has been more 
competitive than Case 1. Secondly, the score for somewhat competitive is also the 
same as the first score. During Case 1, the interaction is 12 % somewhat competitive, 
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and again in the process of Case 2 the interaction increase to 18 % somewhat 
competitive. The third scale shows that the nature of the interaction is more neutral in 
Case 1 (28 %) than in Case 2 (21 %). The somewhat cooperative scale is similar to the 
first and second scales; Case 1 (8 %) is less than Case 2 (10 %.) by only 2 %. 
Nevertheless, the big difference happens to be indicated in the last scale, the 
cooperative scale. It can be seen that the nature of the interaction is 30 % cooperative 
in the case of the Annan Plan; however, it is only 14 % cooperative in the case of the 
presidential election. In brief, based on figure 15, it can be argued that the nature of 
the interaction in the case of Annan Plan is more cooperative than in the Presidential 
Election case. It can also be argued that the nature of the interaction in the presidential 
election is much more compete tive than in the case of Annan Plan. 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Comparison of the Nature of Interactions 
 
Figure 14 and 15 present the overall compared analysis of the actors based on 
each case and of the interactions based on each case. During this analysis, there 
appeared general observations which give some explanations about the nature of the 
interactions. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The conclusion section presents the findings of the overall analysis and the 
theoretical and policy implications of this analysis.  
 
 
6.1 Findings 
 
In this thesis, it is argued that the high percentage of the cooperative style of 
interaction in the process of the Annan Plan discussions in 2004 could be explained by 
the presence and interests of the international actors which are argued as influencing 
actors in the interaction.  The results for the AKP and the military verify this 
argument. The presence of the international actors into the domestic politics makes 
conflictual political interaction more moderate and cooperative, while the absence of 
such actors leads relations to become more aggressive and competitive as well as 
make the actors take a sharper polarization which was an experienced in the process of 
the presidential election in 2007. More specifically, the presence of an international 
audience such as the United States and the European Union is the most important 
influencing factor over the interaction of the actors, Firstly, data analysis shows that 
the military was as neutral and cooperative as the AKP in the process of the Annan 
Plan in 2004; however, the military was as competitive as neutral but not cooperative 
at all in the process of the presidential election in 2007. Therefore, it could be argued 
that the absence of any influence of international actors would foster and encourage 
the competitive way of interaction such as the military intervention in the process of 
the presidential election in 2007. Such an impact is also related with the actor’s own 
position in the international arena and relations. The military has many international 
relations in this sense such as its membership of NATO, the UN and the EU 
peacekeeping forces. Due to these relations, it can be claimed that the military did not 
take a position which could put it in conflict with the interests of the international 
 130 
audiences. Secondly, the AKP is the most cooperative actor in the process of the 
Annan Plan case together with the military. However, its nature of interaction 
completely changed in the case of Presidential Election case and AKP’s interaction 
turned to be as competitive as the other actors. This conclusion is also explained by 
the presence and absence of the international audience as well as by the relationship of 
AKP with those audiences. In the case of the Annan Plan, the US and the EU were 
also supporting the resolution based on that plan and thus made statements to 
encourage parties of the Cyprus problem to reach a mutual agreement based on the 
Annan Plan. Hence, AKP was also supported by these international actors. Besides 
this, the AKP’s relations with the EU for the EU candidacy and with the US in terms 
of strategic concerns and diplomatic responsibilities did not allow the AKP to pursue a 
conflictual policy with the domestic actors. Moreover, it was the AKP that wanted to 
start the negotiations over the Annan Plan in Cyprus, so that these curial relations 
provided the AKP with support forces and made its position very powerful in 
domestic discussions. Nevertheless, in the case of presidential election the absence of 
involvement of international actors provided the AKP to take a competitive stand and 
pursue its political goals in a competitive way of interaction. The AKP’s relationship 
with the military was found to be held also in a competitive way and it was seen that 
the actors had taken polarized positions. On the other hand, the CHP is the only actor 
that has been the most competitive in each case. Its position and interaction has 
always received the highest score in both cases. This result shows us that the CHP, as 
a political party or as a main opposition party has not been influenced by the 
international audience. Furthermore, actually, the CHP has not had international 
relations with neither the US nor the EU in either case. Instead, its statements and 
speeches always reflected domestic concerns and the party’s considerations.  
 
Secondly, the main interaction had been actualized between the same actors but 
at the different level. In other words, the main interaction and the negotiation had been 
mostly taken place between the military and the AKP in the process of the Annan Plan 
in 2004. The actors came together in the NSC meetings, negotiated over the Annan 
Plan and Turkey’s position to the Plan, and finally came to an agreement and 
developed a road map for Turkey’s standing and role in the process. However, the 
main interaction had been mainly realized between the AKP and the CHP in the 
process of the presidential election in 2007. Although they did not come together and 
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negotiate the issue through meetings etc, they communicated through speeches in 
public or on TV. In fact, the way of interaction between these two actors was very 
competitive and the actors criticized and even blamed each other of the occurrence of 
crisis in the process. 
 
Thirdly, the actors who took part in both cases are the same which are the AKP, 
the government party; the CHP, the main opposition party; and the Turkish Armed 
Forces, the military. Moreover, in both cases, it is seen that most of the time the ones 
who stated the party’s position and opinion on the issue were the leaders of the 
political parties. On the military side, it was mainly the chief of the Turkish General 
Staff made the statements and explanations. The Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan is 
the one for the AKP and the president of the CHP Deniz Baykal is the one for CHP 
who made almost all the announcements, statements and public speeches. 
 
Figure 16 and 17 present the summary of the analysis conducted for each case: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: International Stakeholder Present  
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Figure 17: International StakeholderAbsent 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Theory Implications 
 
The first part of literature review consists of the presentation of the policy and 
decision making models, and veto player theory as well as the definitions of coalition 
building and interaction from the political science literature. The aim of the 
presentation is to visit relevant literature in order to find an applicable theory or 
methodology that might help to conduct this analysis. Therefore, models of policy and 
decision making and the veto player theory are presented: i) Richarson’s ‘Four-stage 
model’, ii) Kingdon’s ‘Stream Metaphor’, iii) Sabater’s The Advocacy Coalition 
Framework’, iv) ‘Punctuated Equilibrium’ as policy making models, v) Alison’s 
Model II and Model II, vi) Putnam’s model, vii) Hermann’s ‘Decision-Unit 
Framework and viii) Conn’s Model on Political Decision Making. It is seen that some 
of these models are relevant with this research, yet they are not sufficient enough to 
assess the nature of the process which is analyzed in this thesis. The reason for this 
lies in the fact that these models have mostly been applied to either policy making 
process in parliament or foreign decision making process; however, the policy making 
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processes analyzed in this thesis are realized between both elected political parties in 
domestic politics (CHP and AKP) and the military. Additionally, because these 
models lack a way to assess the impact of the international actor on the domestic 
policy making process, it could be argued that the models and mechanisms presented 
above cannot be comprehensively and truly applicable to the analysis which is 
undertaken in this thesis.  
 
In summary, none of these theories, models and explanations presented are 
directly relevant to what this research focuses on which is a dynamic political analysis 
and this lack necessitated to review the conflict resolution field. For this reason, the 
second section of literature review presents various definitions and models from the 
Conflict Resolution literature which focuses on interaction analysis. Specifically 
negotiation literature and the methodology of process tracing have been beneficial in 
order to create a theoretical framework in this research. 
 
Consequently, because the existing process and decision making models have not 
been completely helpful to undertake this process analysis, I develop my own analysis 
schema and coded the data accordingly. Although this coding method is very new and 
only applied to these cases, it differently indicates and identifies the conflictual 
process and the interaction of parties to the conflict. Therefore, this unique property of 
this study constitutes the different foci of this thesis. To sum up, further studies can 
develop this model and may apply it to various process analyses of domestic as well 
as international politics.  
 
 
6.3 Policy Implications  
 
The Annan Plan case and the Presidential Election cases are both very essential 
and significant issues in Turkish domestic politics. It could be argued that there are 
four main issues in Turkish domestic politics, which are considered as taboos which 
can block any attempt to discuss them or any attempt to resolve them. They have been 
the Cyprus issue, the Armenian issue, the Kurdish issue, and secularism. Although the 
first three might relate to international actors and foreign politics, the domestic 
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discussions which aim to change the status quo in relation to these issues are still 
considered as a threat to the unity of the state and the people. Secularism, which is one 
of the taboos, is very significant issue that has occupied the country’s political agenda 
since it was established. It has always been believed that the secular characteristic of 
the state should be protected and any threat to this would be eliminated, immediately.  
 
In this thesis, the answers for following researched questions are: What is the 
nature of political interaction in Turkey? In what ways do the actors interact with 
each other in sensitive domestic political discussions? Do the structure of political 
environment and the existence of an international audience affect the actors’ 
interaction and the nature of the interaction? To begin with the first question, the 
nature of the political interaction in Turkey is traced through data analysis. Based on 
that analysis, on the one hand, the nature of domestic political interaction over the 
Annan Plan in 2004 is concluded to have taken place cooperatively. On the other 
hand, the political interaction of the presidential elections was shown to be 
competitive. The main motive for that difference is presented as the influence of the 
international actors such as the US and the EU and their relationships with the 
domestic actors. In this regard, my argument at the beginning of the thesis is 
supported. As an answer to the second question, it is indicated that the actors have 
interacted with each other cooperatively in the former case, but competitively in the 
latter one. Eventually the actors’ interaction caused the nature of the interaction 
process to become either cooperative or competitive. Lastly, the structure of the 
political environment, which was formed with the existence and influence of the 
international actors, influenced the nature of the interaction as well as the interaction 
of the actors. It can be seen that the absence of such actors resulted in the process and 
the interaction being competitive and aggressive. Hence, what was argued in the 
beginning was clearly verified. The actor’s interdependency with international actors 
is also another influential determinant in the conclusion. Taking this argument into 
consideration, it can be claimed that if a domestic actor has a strong and mutual 
relations with an international actor, then a domestic actor cannot position itself only 
according to its own interests without considering the interests of the international 
actor. Nevertheless, a domestic actor with limited involvement with the international 
community is able to take the liberty to show a competitive stand in achieving its 
political goals. Based on these arguments, future research may focus on other 
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domestic political debates such as, the Kurdish issue, the Armenian issue, the Cyprus 
issue, and secularism, in order to assess the impact of the international involvement on 
the nature of domestic political interactions. Methods and approaches taken in this 
research are believed to provide a starting point, a framework to investigate future 
case studies. 
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